Information, Self-Reference and Observation Theory in the Context of Social Sciences Epistemology

Juan Miguel Aguado

doi:10.31269/triplec.v7i2.94

Juan Miguel Aguado Associate Professor

DOI: https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v7i2.94

Keywords: Information, observation, constructivism, cognition, self-reference

Abstract

By attempting to fix an observable magnitude, the concept of information involves a cognitive model that enables a double ontological rupture: between subject and world, on one side, and between cognition and action, on the other side. A genealogical approach to information as a simultaneously epistemological and cognitive crossroad highlights the centrality of observation theory in the resolution of its contradictions. The recursive nature of observation inherent to informational logics makes constructivist assumptions especially relevant as a key contribution for an epistemological revision of the ideas of information and communication.

Author Biography

Juan Miguel Aguado, Associate Professor

PhD in Communication Studies at the Complutense University of Madrid (Spain) and Postgraduate in Phylosophy
and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw). Member of the Research Committee on Sociology of Communication, Culture and
Knowledge (RC14) and the Research Committee on Sociocybernetics at the International Sociological Association (ISA). Associate Professor of Communication Theory in the School of Communication and
Information Studies at the University of Murcia (Spain). His research and publications focus on epistemology of communication, complexity and
constructivism as well as on the social impact of technology, mobility
and the role of experiential mediation in cultural consumption
processes.