
Pinto, J. 56
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to mirror images in terms of their need of the present (both temporal and spatial). Some people will remark
that, in the case of mirrors, the presentness of the image needs the presentness of the object (which is at
the same time its cause and its reference), whereas in the case of technical images the object’s
presentness is not a necessary constituent. Even bearing this objection in mind, we still have a connection
in temporal terms: if the digital image is an object, as Virilio and others argue, it is a sign of itself, and,
therefore, an object of itself as a sign. All of this is in the present, in that such an image is a cliché and this
type of sign belongs to a, let us say, lasting synchrony because it is atemporal. Hence its perception as
purely present the discussion of the image in the digital environment would ensue the explicitation of a
presentness that seems to destroy that narrativity that lies under (or within) the image in an extradigital
context.
In terms of narrative time, it could be said that there are three basic elements on which to base a
perception of the unfolding of events. It would be possible to stipulate a time of reference (R), a time of
speech (S) and a narrated event (E). Without intending to describe in detail the whole theoretical
framework which would lend some solidity to the considerations below
5
, let us propose the following
configuration rule:
For the association of R, S, and E, the comma indicates co-temporaneousness and the dash
indicates temporal distance in the past, if R is on the left of S, and in the future, if R is on the right of S.
A verb tense like the Simple Past is described as E, R—S, whereas the Pluperfect is E – R – S, the
Future is S, R—E, and so forth. Thus, a typical narrative situation would be the one with the configuration
E, R—S, from the point of view of the writer, and E—R—S, from the reader’s standpoint. The writer thinks
of the narrated event as immediately prior to the act of writing, and readers are faced in their now with an
event that took place before some past reference. Readers operate, however, a temporal ellipsis, insofar
as they take the place of the narrator, i.e., they think narrative as previous to their present, not the
narrator’s present, unless the narrator (homo- or intradiegetic) makes it explicit that the narrated fact took
place before some other event also in the narrative’s past.
At any rate, the narrative (or the unfolding of the story, in the case of moving images) has its R’s moving
along together with any event narrated or shown, which becomes Reference for the next one. In Caesar’s
veni, vidi, vici, the R of ‘I saw’ is ‘I came’, and the R of ‘I won’ is ‘I saw’.
Rephrasing the initial question about the digital context, therefore, we might ask what this R would be
and where would E be. Would it be the case of a permanent S, R, E, a perennial co-temporaneousness,
especially in the already mentioned case of online journalism? This seems to be a trivial question, insofar
as we know that, even if the temporal interval between a fact and its recording as an event is minimal
(even if the recording is synchronous with its reception), there is a distance, and, therefore, the narrative is
there. Would the same situation occur in the case of the image?
Surely, the case of conventional images corroborates the postulation that they have an embedded
narrative in them. Peirce tells us about images that
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First.
That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen ... A sign by
Firstness is an image of its object and, more strictly speaking, can only be an idea. For it
must produce an Interpretant idea; and an external object excites an idea by a reaction upon
the brain. But most strictly speaking, even an idea, except in the sense of a possibility, or
Firstness, cannot be an Icon. A possibility alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and
its object can only be a Firstness. But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object
mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an
iconic representamen may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is
5
The theory is explained in detail in Pinto (1989).