
Ó Nualláin, Seán 102
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CC: Creative Commons License, 2007
semantics refers to content-sensitive issues.
One of the things we learned from a half-century
of work in computational linguistics was that it
was useful to distinguish context-specific from
context-general semantic primitives (see Ó Nu-
alláin (2003), chapter 3). Similarly, Guenther has
yet fully to digest JL Austin (ibid.) and continues
to use the word “illocutionary” for situations
where “perlocutionary” is appropriate.
This is actually quite a big deal as much hinges
on the notion that “life is structured linguistically
and organised communicatively” (9); it is in fact
the essence of the pragmatic philosophy of biol-
ogy. This tenet is expanded upon later (14) with
the statement that living nature is related essen-
tially to signals, syntax, and pragmatics. Echoing
Wittgenstein on the distinction between the older
and more streamlined parts of cities, Guenther
goes so far as to say (154) that coding DNA re-
sembles scientific language, and non-coding,
perhaps, everyday discourse. So there is a pro-
gram for life in this book; immersion in complex-
ity theory and its treatment of the relationship be-
tween organism and environment is, in my opin-
ion mistakenly, eschewed.
Guenther's analysis here is courageous and
imaginative; yet it is fatally flawed. This becomes
particularly the case when he baldly states in a
paragraph heading (12) that “context determines
meaning”. Context is of course a factor; so is the
lexicon, syntax, and semantics. Indeed, if context
is restricted, syntax can take over several of the
roles of semantics (Ó Nualláin and Richard
Strohman, 2007, 258). So we need to split this
word “context” into two related concepts; the par-
ticular domain being processed, and the episte-
mological or biochemical degrees of freedom are
the restriction of the context. Then, and only
then, can we begin to discuss how context inter-
acts with the lexicon (be it genetic or linguistic),
syntax, and semantics (ibid.)
3 Mitwelt versus Umwelt
Guenther is rightly concerned that we replace
the Umwelt with a Mitwelt, echoing Heidegger's
concept translated into English simply as “care”.
Mitwelt he defines (207) as a term for “the inves-
tigation of all rule-governed sign-mediated inter-
actions of organisms”. Perhaps mistakenly, he
insists that we regard biology as sign-based
rather than simply natural law-based. In the fa-
mous Villa Serbelloni sessions headed by
Conrad Waddington, the conclusion from the
Waddington group tended more in the direction
of emphasizing hierarchy to language,
and indeed later researchers like Strohman pro-
pose that the concept of law itself is attenuated
in biology, and that this needs to be rectified.
Chapter 7, explicitly dealing with Umwelt and
Mitwelt, features immersion in the deepest intel-
lectual waters to date (212-213). In a prelude
(209), the concept of Umwelt is critiqued for its
inability to transcend mere natural law to con-
sider rule-governed sign-mediated interactions.
However, Guenther is going for very big game
indeed; he wishes to establish that “semiotics as
well as biosemiotics are really social sciences”
(213). The argument is straightforward; biologi-
cal activity, including semiosis, is communicative
and intersubjective; therefore the social is pri-
mary.
This will never do. For a start, it is a category er-
ror; social science analyses processes like poli-
tics and business, which have sui generis emer-
gent laws. Secondly, much of our cognition and
symbolic behavior as humans in fact makes
clear subject/object dichotomies in practice.
Elsewhere (in press), this writer argues that the
Cartesian split is indeed an egregious one, but
that, pace Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty et al., there
is such a thing as an autonomous hman subject.
The “Da-sein” of the former and “esprit incarnee”
of the latter need to be supplemented with the
capacity for insulation from the world, perhaps a
cognitive correlate of the emergence of cells.
It behooves Guenther to consider this as a com-
plement to the pointed attack (213) on the “solus
ipse subject of knowledge of Descartes and
Kant”. Here, as elsewhere, one looks forward to
Volume 3. In the meantime (230-231), he posits
consequences from his position for a radically al-
tered science of genetic engineering, the avoid-
ance of “scientific, medical and even political fal-
lacies” in epidemiology, a hermeneutic approach
to biology, and inveighing against determinism.
4 The rehabilitation of viruses
Perhaps the strongest chapter of the book is
chapter 5, the “natural genome editing compe-
tences of viruses”. Pp. 157-164 read like an im-
passioned rehabilitation of viruses; indeed, P.
181 catalogues the achievements of viral gene
editing, including RNA/DNA, gene repair, methy-
lation, and both the adaptive and innate immune
systems. Gene-editing features also in volume 1;
this adaptation of the work of Villareal and others
is thought-provoking.
Elsewhere (220), Guenther refers to his previous
work on the Gemetacode, the exploitation of so-
called “junk” DNA in gene regulation. Herein
perhaps lie his true strengths; however, the no-
tion of meta codes in computational linguistics
led to something of a dead end, propinquant to
that of the Tractatus Wittgenstein (Ó Nu-
alláin and Richard Strohman, 2007, 256). Even if