tripleC 5(3): 101-103, 2007
ISSN 1726-670X
http://tripleC.uti.at
CC: Creative Commons License, 2007.
Review:
Günther Witzany (2007) The logos of the bios 2. Helsinki: Umweb
Seán Ó Nualláin
Molecular and Cell Biology (MCB), UC Berkeley,
Berkeley, Ca 94705, USA;
Phone +15106426202; sonual@stanford.edu
1 Preliminary note
Previously (TripleC 5(1): 1-3, 2007), the writer
reviewed volume 1 of this series. Several of the
comments therein remain valid; Witzany’s at-
tempt to create a new environmentally sound
paradigm for biology is a worthwhile project,
though there is always a problem deriving
“ought” from “is” (or morality from life, as Kant
put it); Guenther needs to secure his grasp on
linguistics; finally, there are none of the egre-
gious mistakes about the number of human
genes as in volume 1. Since much of the previ-
ous critique remains valid, I will review this book
under a different set of categories. While he de-
scribes it (9; unless otherwise stated, page num-
bers are from his book) as a practical application
of “a pragmatic philosophy of biology”, its major
interest may be wholly other. In that same vein,
given that it is essentially a collection of recently
published articles, thematic unity might be more
difficult than in a monograph. That said, there
are four introductory chapters where his tripartite
biosemiotic schema is appropriately applied to
plant, fungal, coral, and bacterial communication.
The context of his books is the dearth of theory,
and the negative consequences, in some of the
major subfields within biology. It manifests itself
in evolution, where the absence of theory and
metatheory has led to entrenchment in the op-
posing camps of neo-Darwinism and intelligent
design (which, in turn, was recently outed as
creationism). In genetics, the much-hyped hu-
man genome project has led to frustration, as the
absurd claims made by its proponents have
fallen massively short of the reality, and as re-
searchers desperately seek for new paradigms
in network theory, language, and so on. The “sil-
ver bullet” ethos of the human genome project
exacerbated the destructive over-emphasis on
curative, versus preventative medicine. In neuro-
science, the very salience of synaptic transmis-
sion has been questioned by neural resonance
on the one hand, and extra-synaptic bursting on
the other extreme. In the meanwhile, the failure
to explain even the elements of human symbolic
behavior with respect to neural event has led to
crises within cognitive science, and a vacuum in
consciousness theory. Finally, there are the twin
paradoxes that reductionist analysis of life loses
life itself as it plunges to the nano level and be-
yond; finally, the issue of where the program lies
for life.
While this is quite an agenda, it is fair to say that
Guenther does not shy at the challenge. Inevita-
bly, of course, he falls short, as all of us will.
What follows is a set of specific criticisms of spe-
cific points; both books are essential reading for
anyone concerned with humanity's proper place
in the biosphere.
2 The levels of language
While obviously aware of Peirce (212), Guenther
is refreshingly free of the Peircean dogma that
holds biosemiotics somewhat in thrall, and at-
tempts analysis in terms of conventional linguis-
tics. So we can agree that syntax deals with the
rule-governed combination of symbols and,
roughly, that pragmatics deals with issues that
are context-sensitive; he diverges somewhat
from conventional usage in his contention that
Ó Nualláin, Seán 102
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semantics refers to content-sensitive issues.
One of the things we learned from a half-century
of work in computational linguistics was that it
was useful to distinguish context-specific from
context-general semantic primitives (see Ó Nu-
alláin (2003), chapter 3). Similarly, Guenther has
yet fully to digest JL Austin (ibid.) and continues
to use the word “illocutionary” for situations
where “perlocutionary” is appropriate.
This is actually quite a big deal as much hinges
on the notion that “life is structured linguistically
and organised communicatively” (9); it is in fact
the essence of the pragmatic philosophy of biol-
ogy. This tenet is expanded upon later (14) with
the statement that living nature is related essen-
tially to signals, syntax, and pragmatics. Echoing
Wittgenstein on the distinction between the older
and more streamlined parts of cities, Guenther
goes so far as to say (154) that coding DNA re-
sembles scientific language, and non-coding,
perhaps, everyday discourse. So there is a pro-
gram for life in this book; immersion in complex-
ity theory and its treatment of the relationship be-
tween organism and environment is, in my opin-
ion mistakenly, eschewed.
Guenther's analysis here is courageous and
imaginative; yet it is fatally flawed. This becomes
particularly the case when he baldly states in a
paragraph heading (12) that “context determines
meaning”. Context is of course a factor; so is the
lexicon, syntax, and semantics. Indeed, if context
is restricted, syntax can take over several of the
roles of semantics (Ó Nualláin and Richard
Strohman, 2007, 258). So we need to split this
word “context” into two related concepts; the par-
ticular domain being processed, and the episte-
mological or biochemical degrees of freedom are
the restriction of the context. Then, and only
then, can we begin to discuss how context inter-
acts with the lexicon (be it genetic or linguistic),
syntax, and semantics (ibid.)
3 Mitwelt versus Umwelt
Guenther is rightly concerned that we replace
the Umwelt with a Mitwelt, echoing Heidegger's
concept translated into English simply as “care”.
Mitwelt he defines (207) as a term for “the inves-
tigation of all rule-governed sign-mediated inter-
actions of organisms”. Perhaps mistakenly, he
insists that we regard biology as sign-based
rather than simply natural law-based. In the fa-
mous Villa Serbelloni sessions headed by
Conrad Waddington, the conclusion from the
Waddington group tended more in the direction
of emphasizing hierarchy to language,
and indeed later researchers like Strohman pro-
pose that the concept of law itself is attenuated
in biology, and that this needs to be rectified.
Chapter 7, explicitly dealing with Umwelt and
Mitwelt, features immersion in the deepest intel-
lectual waters to date (212-213). In a prelude
(209), the concept of Umwelt is critiqued for its
inability to transcend mere natural law to con-
sider rule-governed sign-mediated interactions.
However, Guenther is going for very big game
indeed; he wishes to establish that “semiotics as
well as biosemiotics are really social sciences”
(213). The argument is straightforward; biologi-
cal activity, including semiosis, is communicative
and intersubjective; therefore the social is pri-
mary.
This will never do. For a start, it is a category er-
ror; social science analyses processes like poli-
tics and business, which have sui generis emer-
gent laws. Secondly, much of our cognition and
symbolic behavior as humans in fact makes
clear subject/object dichotomies in practice.
Elsewhere (in press), this writer argues that the
Cartesian split is indeed an egregious one, but
that, pace Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty et al., there
is such a thing as an autonomous hman subject.
The “Da-sein” of the former and “esprit incarnee”
of the latter need to be supplemented with the
capacity for insulation from the world, perhaps a
cognitive correlate of the emergence of cells.
It behooves Guenther to consider this as a com-
plement to the pointed attack (213) on the “solus
ipse subject of knowledge of Descartes and
Kant”. Here, as elsewhere, one looks forward to
Volume 3. In the meantime (230-231), he posits
consequences from his position for a radically al-
tered science of genetic engineering, the avoid-
ance of “scientific, medical and even political fal-
lacies” in epidemiology, a hermeneutic approach
to biology, and inveighing against determinism.
4 The rehabilitation of viruses
Perhaps the strongest chapter of the book is
chapter 5, the “natural genome editing compe-
tences of viruses”. Pp. 157-164 read like an im-
passioned rehabilitation of viruses; indeed, P.
181 catalogues the achievements of viral gene
editing, including RNA/DNA, gene repair, methy-
lation, and both the adaptive and innate immune
systems. Gene-editing features also in volume 1;
this adaptation of the work of Villareal and others
is thought-provoking.
Elsewhere (220), Guenther refers to his previous
work on the Gemetacode, the exploitation of so-
called “junk” DNA in gene regulation. Herein
perhaps lie his true strengths; however, the no-
tion of meta codes in computational linguistics
led to something of a dead end, propinquant to
that of the Tractatus Wittgenstein (Ó Nu-
alláin and Richard Strohman, 2007, 256). Even if
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successful, it would just have led to a search for
meta meta codes.
5 Conclusion
It may be clear by now that this reviewer greatly
admires the range and energy of the book, but
believes it misguided in thrust. To repeat a point
from the critique of volume 1, it is possible to be
just as rigid toward and destructive of a bio-
sphere considered as linguistic as one consid-
ered as subject to lower-order natural law. Sec-
ondly, it fails to take account of biochemistry
considered as a complement to descriptions
couched in the terms of gene expression. The
consequences of this can be massive; for exam-
ple, spina bifida in the progeny can be prevented
simply by the mother's taking folic acid dur-
ing pregnancy. No amount of gene expression
work using our current laboratory armory would
reveal this. In fact, a catalogue of these bio-
chemical pathways needs to be juxtaposed with
gene expression inventories for any progress in
this area to be established. There is an intriguing
analogy here; Vygotsky's radical notion that
“thought” and “language” come from distinct evo-
lutionary sources and are synthesised only in
humans. Thus arises the difficulty with natural
language processing by computers; the correlate
for epigenetics may be a myriad context-specific
interactions of gene and metabolic context (Ó
Nualláin and Richard Strohman, 2007). Tenta-
tively, one might propose that the HGP discov-
ered the 2% to 4% or so of gene-
expression mechanisms that are context-
independent. All others mechanisms change for
with the metabolic context.
Finally, we undoubtedly urgently need a new vo-
cabulary and set of emotional cathexes for our
relationship to the biosphere, one free of nature
as instrument (Ó Nualláin 2004) . The book ar-
gues that we need a concept of a Mitwelt, the
notion that we are intimately connected with na-
ture. Yet even that notion is an objective third
person judgement; we cannot avoid being neo-
Cartesians, if only momentarily. What we can do
is trust ourselves to build educational institutions
that introduce students into a reverence for life,
while also imparting both theoretical and applied
knowledge. Imposition of a Weltanschauung,
whether based on Roman Catholicism or semio-
sis, is a fortiori a controversial political act. We
can teach appreciation of nature and of the cos-
mos as surely as we can produce a good
arts education; yet words alone, independent of
contact with a teacher, will rarely suffice. Deriv-
ing morality from life, ought from is, remains un-
solvable as a general problem.
References
Ó Nualláin, Seán (2003) The Search for Mind. Third edition.
Exeter. England.
Ó Nualláin, Seán (2004) Being Human: The Search for Or-
der. Second edition. Exeter. England.
Ó Nualláin, Seán (forthcoming) Neural correlates of con-
sciousness of what? Target article, New ideas in psychol-
ogy.
Ó Nualláin, Seán and Richard Strohman (2007) Genome and
natural language: How far can the analogy be extended?.
In: Witzany (ed.) Proceedings of Biosemiotics 2006. Tartu
University Press. Finland. Umweb. pp 249-260