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CC: Creative Commons License, 2007.
integrating them in a logically coherent final formula, the physicist’s dream of the ultimate theory of every-
thing. Thus, all talk of higher level phenomena has to be dismissed as a kind of curiosity (illusion) or short-
coming (cognitive limitation). But I do not agree, because physic-chemical language simply cannot ex-
press function and meaning as emergent properties. Hence, in its consequences strong reductionism is
highly unsatisfying. Meaning is not only the basic inter-subjective experience that we (as a very social
biological species) conjointly build up and which is therefore real in the most fundamental sense, but also
underlies all our combined efforts concerning our cultural constructions; thus, including science on a
prominent position. Being human is being meaningful, nobody will deny that; at least not when one is re-
ferring to her/his day to day subjective experience of being alive. But of course, to dismiss this as a mere
physic-chemical epiphenomenon is easily possible by just representing such a notion as an intellectual
stance – actually, this is what can be seen concerning the strong reductionist position in science.
But then, how should we proceed when we reasonably cannot deny what lies at the basic of what can
be said to be essentially real (communication, meaning, experience, consciousness)? How is this to ex-
plain? Where do these features come from? Devine foreordination (as most of our early philosophic and
scientific ancestors have argued), notions like élan vital/omega-point/entelechy (as e.g. Bergson, Driesch,
Teilhard de Chardin have introduced) or, after all, rather the evolutionary way based on principles of self-
organization? Well, the scientific choice is clear, I think; the consequences then as well – communication
and meaning is something that once must have come into existence as an emergent property of a special
physic-chemical organization and then evolved to ever more complex forms. As such, it is a basic feature
of the phenomenon of life in general, found on all levels of its organization, thus representing a semiotic
quality deeply inherent to the phenomenon of life per se. This is the crucial assumption on which biosemi-
otics builds upon.
Evidence for that can be seen in the scientific concepts we have established for the understanding and
explanation of living systems accordant to empirical proof. Most prominent, this becomes clear when we
refer to the concept of the genetic code. As the editor in chief of the “Journal of Biosemiotics”, Marcello
Barbieri, has pointed out in the description of the journal: “The origin of life required a genetic code, and
the existence of a code implies the existence of meaning.” (Barbieri 2007) Thus, we can immediately see
that already on the very basis of the phenomenon of life, we cannot escape to refer to something like
meaning; and this is not just the case because there is a human natural inclination to an anthropocentric
point of view when we try to explain the world (what is surely often the case), but because there is good
evidence that this is simply necessary for a proper understanding of living systems.
But as Barbieri mentions, a very strange situation has arisen here, “…because modern science does
not deal with concepts like meaning and codes.” (Barbieri 2007) Hence, in spite of the experimental evi-
dence for the existence of the code, this idea cannot be considered as real. It is just a metaphor, a linguis-
tic construction in terms of convenience (or also a cutback strategy for dealing with otherwise too high
complexity). However, the biosemiotic community does not follow here; for them, meaning and semiotics
are real intrinsic characteristics of life in general.
Actually, it is hard to see, how we can avoid the idea of communication and meaning in any reasonable
way, when we consider about living systems. Starting with the notion of the genetic code at the very fun-
dament of biochemical biology, climbing up further the hierarchical ladder of the organization of life to the
cell and finally up to human social systems – meaning and accordant semiotic processes seem to be
deeply built in to living structure. So again, how should this be comprehended? Is it, for example, really
just a shortcoming of our limited cognitive capacities, to dismiss the idea of a merely physics-based soci-
ology as ridiculous? Is our fundamental qualitative experience of meaning (as our primary access of con-
ceiving the world) comprehendible in principle by relying on basic physical laws alone? If we doubt that,
we agree with the biosemioticians, who consider “meaning”, and methods of semiotics building upon it, not
only as a legitimate and – for a proper understanding of life – necessary idea, but also as one that has