tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012
ISSN 1726-670X
http://www.triple-c.at
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Media and the Economic Crisis of the EU: The ‘Culturaliza-
tion’ of a Systemic Crisis and Bild-Zeitung’s Framing of
Greece
Yiannis Mylonas
Department of Media and Communication Lund University, Lund, Sweden, Yian-
nis.Mylonas@kom.lu.se
Abstract: This article critically studies the hegemonic discursive construction of the EU’s current (2012) economic crisis, as
it is articulated by political and economic elites and by mass media. The study focuses on the political economy of the par-
ticular crisis and through the critical concept of reification, the study emphasizes the hegemonic naturalization of the eco-
nomic crisis by the “free market” economistic ideology. The article problematizes the positioning of Greece as the “crisis
epicentre” in Europe, understanding Greece as a scapegoat and as a laboratory where political strategies of capitalist re-
structuring of the EU are performed. Through the frame analysis of Bild-Zeitung’s headlines on the coverage of crisis-struck
Greece, the article discusses a) the “culturalization” of the crisis and the diversion from a structural public debate on the
global economic crisis b) the disciplinary function of crisis’ publicity, related to social control and the production of new,
neoliberal social subjectivities c) the alienating effect of the culturalist crisis discourses to transnational publics, resulting to
the misrecognition of the ideological and structural reasons of the given crisis, the misrecognition of the effects of the crisis
and crisis-politics in people’s lives, the misrecognition of popular socio-political struggles in countries worse struck by crisis
politics, and the eclipse of transnational solidarity and identification to the common issues that European people in particular
are facing.
Keywords: Economic Crisis, Exception, Greece, Debt, Stereotypes, Spectacle, Reification, EU, Bild-Zeitung, Tabloidization
Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank Wassilis Tomanas.
1. Introduction: The Contemporary Economic Crisis and Its “Cultural” Impli-
cations
The economic crisis that broke out in 2008 in the US due to the collapse of subprime markets,
developed into a global economic recession crisis of the financial and non-financial sectors of the
economy (Kotz 2009, 305). Scholars from the Marxist tradition of economics (Harvey 2005, 2010;
Harman 2011/2009; Fumagalli and Mezzadra 2009; Milios and Sotiropoulos 2011), but also
Keynesian economists (Krugman 2008; Stiglitz 2009; Varoufakis 2011), emphasized the structural
and ideological aspects of the current, ongoing global economic crisis. The ongoing economic cri-
sis that struck Europe in 2010 is another major capitalist crisis (Fuchs, Schafranek, Hakken, and
Breen, 2010, 193). Furthermore, the current crisis is a systemic crisis of a particular form of capital-
ism, neoliberal capitalism (Kotz 2009, 306).
The crisis is related to the decrease in capital profits (Harman 2011/2009), a situation that capi-
talism has not been able to recover since the previous major economic crisis that occurred in the
early 1970s. History (Kotz 2009, 306) shows that each systemic capitalist crisis is followed by a
thorough restructuring of capitalism, which always results in a new form of capitalism. The formal
management of the crisis of neoliberal capitalism, as organized through official policies and dis-
courses, suggests vast socio-political changes that aim towards the production of a new form of
capitalism.
Political and economic elites as well as mass media were reluctant to analyse the crisis from a
structural perspective that would emphasize issues related to politics and power. As Žižek (2010,
85) noted, “the establishment proposes a de-politicized naturalization of the crisis”. Such a de-
politicized explanation presented the crisis to be largely produced by the problems of certain states
and certain people, particularly those of the European South. Cultural explanations organized the
hegemonic narratives of the crisis in defence of capitalism. The hegemonic crisis narrative tends to
take for granted the capitalist character of economic processes and economic relations as “natural”
entities that cannot be questioned. Culture in this context concerns the general “essentialist” char-
acteristics of people, categorically produced in national and geographical terms.
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 647
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
In an era characterized by capitalist globalization, culture is increasingly becoming a central de-
nominator of politics. Titley and Lentin (2011, 191) argue that the culturalization of politics is a par-
adigm to organize people’s choices under specific norms, compatible to the neoliberal ideological
paradigm. Culturalist politics strive towards the production of transnational conformity to the neolib-
eral configuration of “Western” identity. Since the free market economy cannot function without
political constitution and ideological consensus (Harvey 2005, 23), a new form of political configura-
tion and new forms of social subjectivities are necessary for a capitalist overcoming of the particu-
lar economic crisis, restoration of capital profits and also restoration of the political power of eco-
nomic elites in Europe (Harvey 2010, 48).
Critical theoretical concepts like “state of exception”, “hegemony”, “reification” and “spectacle”
are reflexively deployed to explain the dominant crisis’ discourse and its objectives. Critical political
economy theory is also deployed in order to analyse the economic crisis and its politics. The public-
ity of the crisis needs to be thoroughly analysed and critiqued because it is public thought, debate
and praxis that will potentially alter the catastrophic crisis, for people, for the sustainability of the
social and the physical environment, for the survival and deepening of democratic institutions.
2. A Politico-Economic Analysis of the Crisis, and the Position of Greece
The following section aims at explaining the current global economic crisis through critical politi-
cal economic literature. The section critically discusses the position of Greece as the EU’s crisis
epicentre. Greece is understood as a “laboratory” (Badiou 2012; Žižek 2012) to develop post-
democratic, neoliberal institutions, for the whole of Europe, as well as to construct national-
orientated, “cultural” divisions in the transnational contemporary proletariat, the growing majority of
people across the world exposed to the violence, destruction and inequalities of the “free market
economy” (Žižek 2010, 89).
2.1. Crisis and Neoliberal Restructuring
Crises erupt due to contradictions rising in the capitalist processes of reproduction and expan-
sion. Money, labour and consumption are key denominators of a crisis. Money reifies the process-
es of economic production and distribution in the capitalist framework. Money is central to the capi-
talist process as a stable point to measure value (Harman 2011/2009). Quoting Marx, “a deprecia-
tion of credit money would unsettle all existing relations. Therefore the value of commodities is
sacrificed for the purpose of safeguarding the fantastic and independent existence of this value in
money” (Harman 2009, 297). The tight fiscal policies that followed from the 1970s crisis and on
aimed at expanding money supply through loans, so that profits and prices can increase, and at the
same time to foster policies that raise interest rates in order to intensify labour and productivity and
to push working people – through the risk of unemployment- to accept lower wages.
Harvey (2010) argues that the particular economic crisis is a crisis of (hyper) accumulation. A
crisis of hyper accumulation practically means that not enough profits are being produced and fi-
nancial capital is withheld from being invested as (social or other) conditions do not provide pros-
perous investment opportunities. Harvey (2010, 130) argues that the growth required for capital
reproduction is 3%. Political tools are therefore necessary to produce the adequate socio-political
climate that would guarantee the conditions favoured for capitalist growth.
The impossibility of maintaining high profits can be historically explained in the rise of global
economic competition challenging the post war economic predominance of the US in the globe.
The decrease in profits gave rise to more speculative and “safe” economic strategies. Harman
(2011/2009) explains that surplus value produced by productive sectors of the economy was thus
not re-invested to productive sectors because their profit revenues might be low. Surplus value was
instead invested to financial activities, particularly to speculative actions that would guarantee high
revenues on investments of financial capital. The growth of financial activities was only partially
related to productive capital. Financial capital is thus over-accumulated, waiting for the safe mo-
ment to be invested and bring economic revenues.
Fuchs, Schafranek, Hakken and Breen (2010, 194) argue that capitalism historically reached its
peak point of growth in the early 1970s, where the particular system met the second most serious
crisis in its history. All political and structural efforts to sustain a high level of capitalist growth since
then have proven unsuccessful. The 2007 mortgage crisis in the US is therefore the beginning of a
new serious crisis of capitalism that could be proven to be as important as the one of 1929. O’Hara
(2009, 326) argues that major capitalist crises occurred in regimes of economic “deregulation”. It is
therefore important to critically unfold the structural aspects of the current crisis, related to the polit-
ical doctrine of neoliberalism, which organized the model of capitalism in the post 1970s years.
648 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Neoliberalism is the political and ideological doctrine developed by political and economic elites
to overcome the crisis of the 1970s. Harvey (2005) argues that the capital temporarily succeeded in
overcoming the particular crisis of the 1970s, and that the contemporary economic crisis is con-
nected to the crisis of 1970s. Kotz (2009, 307) notes the characteristics of neoliberal capitalism in
the US: these include deregulation of economic activity, locally and globally, privatizations, optional
fiscal policy, reductions in social spending and reductions in taxation of the wealthier, aggressive
competition, flexible labour conditions. These characteristics resulted in three interconnected de-
velopments that created economic growth but also helped the development of contradictions that
resulted in the crisis. These developments are a) the growth of inequality b) the development of a
financial sector focusing on venture, risk and speculative investments c) the production of asset
bubbles due to speculator activity of financial “investors”.
Transnational economic institutions like the World Trade Organization were created in order to
pursue the global expansion of “free market” and to guard the local imposition of social institutions
favourable to ‘free markets’. Pre-existing economic institutions like the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund assumed a new role under the neoliberal ideological configuration, mainly by
providing loans to governments unable to economically and politically compete against global eco-
nomic monopolies or the political power of states keen on supporting free market expansion. Such
interventions result in the loss of competitive economic advantages and state sovereignty. State
loans and the reforms accompanying them concluded the further weakening of particular countries
and chained their people’s future to debt redemption.
The aforementioned characteristics of neoliberal capitalism produce contradictions in real world
processes (O’Hara 2009, 324). Contradictions concern institutional ambiguities, unequal levels of
development between different “spheres of social activity” (Harvey 2010, 122). Contradictions are
the sources producing a systemic crisis in the capitalist processes dominating social life.
Post Second World War capitalism developed large surpluses, which further led to increases in
wages. The particular model though came into a crisis by the 1970s as surpluses were demanded
to be distributed to different stakeholders, while global competition intensified (Resnick and Wolf
2010, 178). Deregulation of labour conditions and the “liberation” of capital from national bonds,
minimized the power of organized labour and resulted in the worsening of labour conditions and the
suppression of wages. The suppression of wages in order to sustain desired levels in surplus value
resulted in an inability to sustain cumulative demand. Neoliberalism surpassed this particular prob-
lem by providing loans so that different social groups could spend more than their income allowed
(Kotz 2009, 312). Lending became a central vehicle of capitalist accumulation in the post 1970s
years, aiming to keep levels of consumption high and wages low (Harvey 2010, 17).
The development of the financial sector in particular, relates to important contradictions con-
cerning the relations of the industrial to the financial sector. The traditional relation between finance
and industry for capital expansion and reproduction has been disturbed. As O’Hara (2009, 325)
notes, there is a progressive dominance of finance over the industry with a great amount of surplus
value allocated to financial sectors, for financial activities related to advice and investment security
issues. The post 1970s crisis years - particularly after the abandonment of the gold standard in
international economic transactions - saw “the financialization of everything” (Harvey 2005, 33), as
a way for the emerging financial markets to produce and to secure more complex global economic
interconnections. Industrial-based economic growth depends upon investments in research, tech-
nological upgrading of production and distribution units. The financial sector placed emphasis on
short-term profit making related to market rates of profit return, which resulted in the decline in prof-
it of highly profitable industrial sectors.
Harvey (2010, 35) argues that crises are moments of radical reconfigurations in capitalist devel-
opment. Crises serve capitalism to “self-correct” itself, primarily through political means. The over-
coming of the crisis in ways favourable to the capital requires political restructuring of labour, com-
modity production and market policies, as well as ideological hegemony of particular social values
that will (possibly) ensure the reproduction of the capitalist process. Naomi Klein (2007) demon-
strated the importance of crisis events for late capitalist expansion. Neoliberal political doctrines
and institutions use a given crisis as an opportunity to restructure non-capitalist structures accord-
ing to “free market” principles. A major economic crisis is similar to events described by Naomi
Klein, provoked or used to put in effect shock policies of a social restructuring that is favourable to
the capitalist classes. An economic crisis can create a situation that no one is prepared for, inter-
rupt the normal time and the normal course of events and affect the foundations of a society as a
whole (Kouvelakis 2010, 303).
Capitalist restructuring further aims at the production of forms of social consciousness that natu-
ralize the structure of capitalist process. Governmentality is the Foucaultian term describing the
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 649
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
appropriation and mode of conduct of a particular value system. The development of a neoliberal
governmentality relates to the individual internalization of neoliberal social values (such as competi-
tion, entrepreneurialism, instrumentalism) and their materialization in modes of self-conduct and
self-control (Foucault 2008, 226). The production of post-democratic, or neoliberal governmentality
in globalized social conditions requires great levels of abstraction (Dean 2003, 108) of the process-
es of commodity production, distribution and consumption, as well as of capital flows and value
production.
2.2. Debt
Mass media and elite discourse often address the capitalist crisis as a debt crisis. As Badiou
(2012) notes, the sovereign debt of Greece has been the official reason for its quarantining by cri-
sis politics. Nevertheless, the Greek sovereign debt increased sufficiently after two years of austeri-
ty measures that were supposed to make the country’s debt “sustainable” (sic). As mentioned,
reasons related to Greece’s inherent problems were propagated as explanations behind the coun-
try’s debt. National debt characterizes all countries, “developed” and “underdeveloped”. Some
countries, like Greece, are more vulnerable to the interests of their debtors, while countries like the
US, are able to sustain large external deficits and to borrow externally due to their military and ge-
opolitical advantages (Graeber 2011, 364).
Debt is intrinsic to the capitalist process of production and accumulation. The capitalist process
of production and accumulation relies on the monetarization of production as well as on financial
investments to be redeemed by the profits that a given capital investment will produce. As far as
the state is concerned, it relies on credit to fund its activities and the particular credit is provided by
financial institutions. National debt is a form of public credit for the borrowing of financial capital.
Banks loan money to states so that states can cover various expenses, and states use public in-
comes to cover their debts. The close relation of the state to the banking system resulted in the
authorization of the banking system to produce national currency and the borrowing of national
currency to the given state with an interest rate. Additional loans are also necessary to pay off the
system of national debt.
In Capital’s Vol. I, chapter 24, Marx emphasizes that an international financial system was cre-
ated along with the development of the national debt. Marx argues that international financial insti-
tutions are speculative organizations of private agents that enjoy benefits from governments due to
their ability to provide credit to states. States borrow money and expect to repay it through their
revenues mainly from taxation yet different variables related to economic and political competition
or to changes in the value of currency exchange rates, often make the redeeming of their debts
impossible. To repay their debts, states are forced to take exceptional measures related to the
changing of labour policies or to the vending of public property. As Marx (2008/1947) argued, “the
only part of the so-called national wealth, which in modern nations truly belongs to the people as a
whole, is the nations’ public debt”.
Debt becomes the reason for political pressure as well as for political changes under the ra-
tionale of debt redemption. Graeber (2011) though argues that no debt can ever be fully repaid. In
that sense, debt becomes a strategic tool for the advancing of economic but also political and so-
cial interests of specific social agents. Debt itself is an important tool in the production of the pro-
cess that Marx described as primitive accumulation. In simple terms, private accumulation is the
process according to which the construction of capitalist social relations occurs. Marx argues that
primitive accumulation is the process dividing the producer from the means of production, and
masses of people are deprived from their means of survival and pushed into the labour market as
proletarians. In times of crisis, economic social relations need to be drastically reconfigured and
debt provides the rationale for political strategies to reconfigure the economic social relations in
ways that would guarantee capital revenues.
The centrality of debt in capitalist accumulation today concerns the securitization of financial ac-
tivities (Vasudevan 2009, 291). According to Harvey (2010, 31), capitalism’s partial recovery from
the 1970s crisis occurred due to a boost in public spending through consumer loans, which substi-
tuted loss of wage increases. The capitalist restructuring that occurred after the 1973 crisis resulted
in the loosening of restrictions to economic transactions across the globe, giving rise to the finan-
cial sector of the economy. Important aspects of restructuring were the withdrawal of the gold
standard of financial value in global economic transactions and the withdrawal of state regulations
concerning the control of capital processes, towards regulatory policies in favour of private interests
rather than public ones. Vasudevan (2009, 300) argues that economically developed, “core” coun-
tries were able to partially overcome the 1970s crisis by attracting financial capital from so-called
“emerging economies” (sic) of the periphery, that were able to produce economic surpluses. The
650 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
particular capital flows were invested in financial assets that in the deregulated economic field,
entailed high risk. Failures and collapses of financial investments caused different debt crises since
the 1970s across the globe.
The 2008 capitalist crisis signified the end of financial capitalism, as occurred from the 1970s
onwards. The 2008 credit crunch made borrowing a difficult process through the increase of inter-
est rates and altered the rules of the game in EU’s “common market”. The possibility of “easy” bor-
rowing with low interest rates, protected by the global status of the Euro currency, covered the
Greek state’s loss of productivity due to the advance of monopolies from core Eurozone countries
1
.
Borrowing thus helped to boost consumption in the country and helped the further establishment of
markets from the core Eurozone states in Greece, taking advantage of the common currency and
the minimization of trade restrictions in the EU’s so-called “common market”. The Greek sovereign
debt was devaluated as “unsustainable” in late 2009 by international financial institutions, degrad-
ing the country’s ability to borrow money on low interest rates. Workers of the Greek Statistic Au-
thority have recently stated publicly that the figures representing the financial debt of Greece in
2009 were augmented so that the debt would be assessed by financial institutions as “unsustaina-
ble” and that the country would need to plea for IMF’s “assistance” (Ward, 2012).
The unsustainability of the Greek sovereign debt resulted to the country’s pursuing of funds to
cover its expenses. New funds though were to be accompanied by demands for “structural adjust-
ments” that would lead to a neoliberal configuration of the Greek polity and would result in a radical
change in labour conditions, in programs of mass privatizations of public property in favour of pow-
erful private economic agents. The memorandums signed by the Greek governments and the so-
called “Troika” (the EU, ECB and IMF) include the particular demands for “necessary” structural
adjustment plans. Funds are provided to Greece for the purpose of repaying its private debt to Eu-
ropean banks and not to cover its public needs and expenses, like public education and health.
Instead, the Troika imposes radical cuts in public expenditure, portraying public expenditure as
inefficient and wasteful. The burdening of Greece with further loans - this time with public money
from different Eurozone member states – to repay accumulated debts that are connected to unre-
strained financial activities as well as to the loss of the country’s own economic advantage by glob-
al economic monopolies, further ties the country to a debt spiral, reducing its chances of ever re-
paying the accumulated debt, while triggering the spite of EU citizens for the latter. The use of EU
countries’ public money to repay debts owned by private institutions is strategically connected to
the reconfiguration of European socio-political system, according to the ways that the Greek socie-
ty and the Greek polity are being drastically restructured under the emergency policies pushed by
debt. The further indebtment of Greece then seems to be serving the creation of “investment op-
portunities” in the country, and what Harvey (2010) described as “accumulation through disposses-
sion”: the process of a new capitalist configuration of social relations and the production of profit
through the appropriation of public (and private) assets. As Marx himself argued, national debt is
one of the most drastic vehicles of primitive accumulation and an important tool for political restruc-
turing of socio-political and economic institutions for capitalist reproduction. What needs to be clear
though is that loans do not have public legitimacy as a series of mass mobilizations throughout the
country against policies of indebting, demonstrates.
2.3. The Symbolic Power of Debt
Graber (2011) argues that no debt can ever be fully repaid, as humans are bonded by relations
of reciprocity and interdependence. Violent power interventions and ideological constructs objectify
rules organising property, exchange and debt in monetary and utilitarian terms. A world where eve-
ryone would have repaid all their debts would amount to a world of autistic individuals, idiots
(ιδιώτες), in the classical Greek sense of the term. In capitalism though, debt remains infinite. The
debt is a fetish object (Diken 2009, 59) and a political tool.
The following excerpt demonstrates the symbolic power of debt: "Those in insolvency have to
sell everything they have to pay their creditors," Schlarmann told Bild newspaper. "Greece owns
buildings, companies and uninhabited islands, which could all be used for debt redemption."…
Schaeffler told Bild in a story under the headline: "Sell your islands, you bankrupt Greeks! And sell
1
Despite EU officials’ discourse of the EU’s deceit by ‘Greek statistics’, no sanctions were called for the political and le-
gal responsibility of those creating the political possibilities for the advent of the Euro currency in Greece, in contrary to
Greece’s social conditions and interests. No critique or sanctions were taken towards global financial institutions –such as
the ones consulting the Greek government on how to present its economic figures. On the contrary, the EU was eager to
intervene to the economic policies of Greece and supported the banker Lucas Papademos, one of the main local advocates
for Greece’s entry to the Eurozone, as head of an unelected technocratic government for Greece in order to pursue austeri-
ty policies.
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 651
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
the Acropolis too!" “The Greek government has to take radical steps to sell its property – for exam-
ple its uninhabited islands".” (Inman and Smith, 2010).
The German technocrat’s imperative tone –elevated by the celebratory rhetoric of the most
popular “newspaper” in Germany, “Bild-Zeitung”- is legitimized by the symbolic and material power
of debt. The religious connotations of articulations such as “debt redemption”, foregrounds the
metaphysical roots of debt, which is further connected to punishment and to guilt (Graeber 2011,
5). Bankruptcy symbolizes ultimate failure and forms the pretext where rights can be exempted
(Graeber 2011, 359). In the crisis’ publicity, “debt” is used as a basis of legitimation of public “bully-
ing” to symbolically subordinate people. What is more important though is that such legitimacy
opens the way to the public acceptance of the physical subordination and oppression of people –
something that the majority of Greece’s residents (citizens and non-citizens) are currently facing
due to austerity and privatization policies. As Graeber (2011) argued, the concept of the debt bears
important and powerful symbolic meanings that are materialized in concrete practices of power
exercise. The language of debt moralizes relations founded on violence, making the victim to seem
guilty (pp. 5). Graeber brings the example of the Mafia’s relation to people’s infinite indebtness,
along with many historical examples of the usage of debt to exploit and to enslave people, due to
the impossibility of a full debt redemption.
2.4. Reification: The “Economy” and the Capitalist Restructuring of Europe through
EU’s “Weakest Link”
The reorganization of capitalism requires new political institutions, as well as new social and
cultural configurations. Regarding the latter, new constructions of subjectivity are required to legiti-
mize and to reproduce the emerging capitalist process. The case of Greece is exemplary in the
latter process. Nicolas Sevastakis (2012), a political theorist from the Aristotle University of Thessa-
loniki, compared the shift in hegemonic discourses constructing Greece abroad based on two
events that brought Greece to the world’s attention. The global celebration of the Olympic games of
Athens accompanied by international praises of the “Greek spirit” (sic) along with various “success
stories” (Sevastakis 2012, 202), was replaced by spiteful discourses urging for punishment of the
corrupt and “idle character” (sic) of the Greeks, only a few years later, when Greece was trans-
formed into the global economic crisis’ epicentre.
The cultural-orientated explanations of the crisis, focused on the “ontological” shortcomings of
the “Greek character” (Žižek 2010, 86). The vicious attack on Greek people as an objective whole
was accompanied by imperatives for a new configuration of the “Greek character” (sic). In the post-
crisis context, consumerism appears as an excessive behaviour of (corrupt) people, “living above
their abilities” (sic). Excess though is a central characteristic of capitalism (Harman 2011/2009).
Bauman (2005b, 84) argues that capitalism is characterized by “excess and profligacy, redundancy
and prodigal waste”. A configuration of the Greek people as economic villains of the Eurozone pro-
vides a scapegoat, where public frustration of EU citizens, related to anti-labour and anti-welfare
politics, can be channelled. Cultural racism performs the same task as biological racism with cul-
ture functioning the same way as nature, creating closed and bounded cultural groups (Wren 2001,
144).
The complexity of the economic crisis provides opportunity for a capitalist restructuring of liberal
democracies, starting with the “weakest” (Kouvelakis 2011, 19) part of the Eurozone, Greece. As
Merkel argues: “It is also about not being able to retire earlier in countries such as Greece, Spain,
Portugal than in Germany, instead everyone should try a little bit to make the same efforts – that is
important… We can't have a common currency where some get lots of vacation time and others
very little. That won't work in the long term… We cannot simply show solidarity and say these
countries should simply continue as before.” (EU Observer 2011).
The particular discourse obscures global structural and ideological reasons of the on-going
economic crisis. Merkel’s discourse also presents exceptional politics as “solidarity” (sic). Further-
more, capitalist restructuring is presented as imperative since the countries of the European South
cannot “simply continue as before” (sic). Žižek (2010, 85) argues that the naturalization of the crisis
also naturalizes the regulatory measurements proposed as “objective” doctrines organized by “neu-
tral” financial logics. As the article will demonstrate, a reified (Lukacs 2001/1923), simplistic view of
particular countries and their state of affairs to date is presented as the reason of the European
economic crisis. The objectification of the particular countries as problematic legitimizes the poli-
cies of capitalist restructuring.
What is also important is the reification of capitalism. Capitalism has become synonymous to
the term “economy” and the economy is presented as a natural entity that does not require thought
and critique (Žižek 2010, 90). Žižek argues that the logic of market and competition is a hegemonic
652 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
ideology that has penetrated all fields of the social. As such democratic institutions, political thought
and political praxis have been serious eroded, while the oppression and the injustices of the free
market practices are concealed as “natural”.
Reification is an important critical concept to understand one central aspect of the process of
capitalist restructuring, which concerns the reconfiguration of social subjectivities compatible to the
needs of the capital to overcome its crisis. Merkel’s claim that Southern Europeans cannot “contin-
ue as before” implies the imperative of discipline to specific rules that respond to economic needs.
In critical terms, one needs to see what the abstract generalizations such as “South Europeans”,
“Greeks”, “continue as before” or “economy” mean, while appearing in official discourses as cer-
tainties and physical realties, common sense “facts” that are granted.
Developed by Georg Lukacs in 1923, reification is a concept describing the imaginary objectifi-
cation of capitalist social relations. Reification derives from different forms of objectifications and
rationalizations required for the establishment of the social relations required by the capitalist pro-
cess. Capitalist social roles are naturalized as normal and rational. The process of reification is
connected to the fetish character of the objectified form of the commodity that does not carry in-
scriptions of the process of its production and circulation.
Reification occurs due to the rationalization and standardization of labour and the objectification
of the worker. The division of the commodity from its production process is connected to the con-
figuration of the subject producing and consuming the commodity. The continuous intensification of
labour configures the human characteristics and particularities of the worker as sources of possible
fault and diversion of the rules and norms organising the production process. The subjective hu-
man is mediated by the mechanistic process of production, and is assessed according to the axio-
matic laws that the capitalist process imposes, irrespective of the worker’s subjective will. The
worker is called to conform and to discipline him/herself according to the continuous changing
needs of the capitalist process and the technological developments that reproduce capitalism.
People are thus rationalized as objects that can be quantified and calculated, thoroughly divided
from the socio-historical context they belong to. In the current times of intense globalization, differ-
ent societies from across the globe are defined by the laws guiding “free market economy” as ho-
mogenous parts of a complete whole. Rational calculation is based upon the idea that social devel-
opment occurs according to objective laws where subjective will is irrelevant or “external”. The sub-
ject is therefore required to acknowledge the rational laws defining social development and to em-
brace the particular rationality that can produce the desired calculations which in turn affirm the
very logics of this rationality, while avoiding contingencies and features which potentially escape
and contradict the objectivity of the given laws. As Lukacs noted while observing the advent of Tay-
lorism, the rationalization of the inner aspects of people’s “souls”, resulted in the further reification
and commodification of psychological elements as quantifiable entities that can be organized in
productive terms. The “physical legitimacy” of objectified entities is presented as granted, as a fact
that cannot be overcome. The physical legitimacy of capitalism is affirmed “organically” by the re-
production of the processes characterizing capitalist society, related to production and consumption
as well as the values supporting it, like private property, hard work or antagonism. The reified con-
sciousness of people accepting things “as they are” legitimizes also confirms the immediate form
that the capitalist naturalization of the world obtains, lacking the knowledge to deconstruct the dis-
courses and socio-political interventions producing the particular reality. Reification conceals the
political interventions and the power inequalities that capitalist societies are structured upon.
3. Greece and the European Economic Crisis
Since late 2009, Greece has received worldwide attention from political and economic elites as
the EU’s crisis’ epicentre. Mass media from across the globe have also paid great attention to de-
velopments in Greece. Greece’s contribution to the EU’s GDP between 2001 and 2010 was
2,5%(Eurostat 2012), while Greece’s share to the global GDP was 0,42% in 2010 (Global Finance
2012). The importance of Greece to the productive European and global economy is therefore min-
imal. The attention that Greece received on the particular crisis is thus dubious. The following sec-
tion critically discusses the hegemonic frames that produced Greece as the crisis’ epicentre.
3.1. A Greek Particularity? Crisis Politics as Politics of Exception
A peripheral Western country and Euro’s weakest link, Greece has been the European econom-
ic crisis’ epicentre since late 2009. German Chancellor Merkel and former French President Sar-
kozy, among others, have repeatedly argued that Greece is a “special case” (sic) (BBC 2012), self-
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 653
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
responsible for its crisis, while the Eurozone risks to be “contaminated” (sic) by Greece’s economic
crisis. Exceptional measures are therefore required for “therapy”.
The exceptional discourse of Greece as a sui generis case in the Eurozone and in the Europe-
an Union, has been accompanied by metaphysical imperatives of “salvation” of the country from
“the crisis”. This discourse has been instrumentalized on a permanent basis by Greek politicians
from the neoliberal left, the neoliberal right and the parliamentary far right, as well as from the local
capitalist class, in order to legitimize emergency economic and political doctrines to the citizens of
Greece. The exceptional state of “Greece in crisis” legitimizes exceptional policies circumventing
human, political and social rights, through a series of austerity measures that are meant “to in-
crease competitiveness” (sic). Harsh austerity is proclaimed as “necessary” and inevitable, while its
duration is unclear. Exception legitimized the technical subversion of the country’s popular sover-
eignty in November 2011, with the appointment of a non-elected government of technocrats, ap-
pointed by the Troika and the former Greek government of Papandreou. As Agamben (2000) ar-
gues, the exceptional state is the “nomos of modernity”. The exceptional state is the rule of con-
temporary societies (Diken 2009b, 584). The prolonged state of exception is compatible to neolib-
eral governmentality according to Foucault’s (2008) later work, as mobility and competitiveness are
more crucial than established regimes based on defined socio-political rights.
The reconfiguration of subjectivity thus emerges as a crucial issue in politics of exception, for
the production of a civic governmentality compatible to the continuous changes, crises and needs
of capitalism. The exceptional status of Greece is further connected to identity issues concerning
its “European-ness” and “Western-ness”. As Douzinas (2010b, 11) argued, the Euro currency
seems to provide the symbolic centre of European identity today. In the exceptionalist discourse of
the EU, Greece stands at the threshold between the new (economistic) configuration of European
identity, and a (new form of) European otherness. Politicians and mass media in crisis-struck coun-
tries of the European South, like Spain, Italy and Portugal regularly reassure their citizenries and
the world that their countries “are not Greece”, despite the advent of the same austerity politics
there as well, concealing the fact that most of the countries across the world are indebted.
The exceptional discourse of Greece produced a paradigm that no one wishes to identify with, a
taboo ostracized from public debate. Greece is thus the scapegoat (Haroche & Enriquez
2004/2002) of the EU, the agent of profanations on a particular order (based on hard work, entre-
preneurialism, and economic rationality) incarnating configurations of the identity of what (neoliber-
al) Europeans/Westerners are not. In the capitalist restructuring process, Greece is the experi-
mental laboratory for the new capitalist paradigm to emerge.
3.2. A Critical Perspective on the “Greek Crisis”
Lapavitsas (2010, 294) foregrounds four main reasons to understand why Greece has been the
epicentre of the recession crisis in Europe, despite the fact that most European countries have
economic deficits in their budgets. The first reason is that the productive structure of Greece suf-
fered severely –due to the loss of competitiveness - from its inclusion to the Eurozone, because of
important differences between the centre and the periphery of the Eurozone. The advent of Euro in
Greece meant the acceleration of the country’s transformation process towards a service economy
that relied on foreign loans to maintain high levels of domestic consumption of imported goods,
produced by the core Eurozone countries and export-based economies like Germany (Lapavitsas,
2010). The second reason concerns internal weaknesses of the Greek state relating to corruption
and clientelism, the state’s inability to tax the high incomes and other inefficiencies and the lack of
a welfare state. The third reason relates to the loss of the country’s international credibility due to a
fiddling of economic figures, while the fourth reason is the country’s vulnerability to financial specu-
lation due to the country’s small size and its own structural problems. As Lapavitsas (2010, 295)
notes, “you can’t speculate so easily against Italy’ because Italy is much larger (than Greece)”.
As Bratsis (2010, 301) argued - in response to Featherstone’s (2010, 298) claim that Greece’s
vulnerability concerns its own domestic conditions relating to “a society in which there was no con-
stituency to limit the growth of the state” and an overall culture of corruption leading to state profli-
gacy – the arguments that corruption and clientelism are the sources of the crisis, are completely
ideological, concerning a metaphorical understanding of the problem. Such an understanding is
connected to the colonialist idea that the cause of poverty is that people are not working hard
enough; they are not civilized enough and corrupt in general. Corruption though concerns the ways
private interests infiltrate the policymaking process and result to policy decisions based on private
good instead of the public good. In that sense, Bratsis (2010, 302) concludes, the Greek corruption
is no different to the US, the British, the German or other. Crouch (2004, 83) analysed the penetra-
tion through lobbying or through the political work of transnational economic organizations like the
654 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
WTO, of specific economic interests to the public arena, as the main feature of the decline of liberal
democracies today. Corruption in that sense needs to be considered in political and economic
terms, other than cultural ones.
State corruption should be seen in relation to the lack of political will to represent the interests of
the Greek people, in expense of broader industrial and geopolitical interests on peripheral states
like Greece. The disciplinary function of institutions like the IMF aims in securing that the banks
would get their money back and that people would be forced to pay (Harvey 2010, 19). The impos-
sibility of repaying an odious debt though provides the possibility for restructuring societies and
spaces in ways that can strengthen capital interests.
The phase of the global capitalist crisis as a European debt crisis (and a Greek debt crisis in
particular) follows the bank bailout tactic of 2008, in a more disclosed way. Public money is used to
provide loans to Greece in order to repay banks that carelessly provided odious loans to corrupted
governments on one hand, and more generally to people worldwide in order to boost consumerism.
The loans provided by Eurozone members to the Greek state are used to pay off banks that do not
wish to accept any responsibility and loss, via Greece (Douzinas 2010b). The blaming of people as
irresponsible is in any case a typical neoliberal strategy to mask the social catastrophes and con-
tradictions produced by the unrestrained pursuing of major private interests. The use of Greece
masks the position of the banks and other financial institutions as the main attributors of public
money, and again, diverts public discussions on the role of the banking system in the global eco-
nomic crisis.
A lengthy quote by Badiou (2012), from a text signed also by a number of prominent French in-
tellectuals, provides a thorough description of the reality and the perspectives of crisis politics in
Greece: “At a time when one Greek youth out of two is unemployed. Where 25,000 homeless wan-
der the streets of Athens. Where 30% of the population has fallen under the poverty line and where
millions of families are forced to place their children in the care of someone else in order for them
not to die of hunger or cold, where refugees and the new poor compete for trashcans at the public
dump, the “saviors” of Greece, under the pretext that “Greece is not trying hard enough”, impose a
new aid plan that doubles the lethal administered dose. A plan that abolishes the right to work and
reduces the poor to the most extreme misery, at the same time as it makes the middle class disap-
pear. The goal is not about “saving” Greece. All economists worthy of their name agree on this
point. It’s about gaining time in order to save the creditors at the same time it leads the country into
deferred collapse. Above all it’s about making a laboratory of social change out of Greece that, in a
second generation, will spread throughout all of Europe. The model experimented upon Greece is
one where public social services, schools, hospitals, and dispensaries fall into ruin, where health
becomes the privilege of the rich, and where vulnerable populations are doomed to a programmed
elimination while those who work are condemned to the most extreme conditions of impoverish-
ment and precarity … in short, it is the widespread looting, characteristic of financial capitalism
which here offers itself a really beautiful institutional consecration. To the extent that sellers and
buyers sit on the same side of the table, we have no doubt that this enterprise of privatization is a
real treat for the buyers. But all the measures taken so far have only dug Greece into deeper sov-
ereign debt. With the help of rescuers who lend at exorbitant rates, it has literally exploded into free
fall in approaching 170% of GDP, while in 2009 it represented not more than 120%. It is likely that
this cohort of rescuers - whenever presented as "final" - had no other purpose than to weaken fur-
ther still the position of Greece so that, deprived of any opportunity to propose itself the terms of a
restructuring, is reduced to yield to all its creditors under the blackmail of "disaster or austerity."
4. The Role of Mass Media in the Politics of the Economic Crisis
Contemporary democracies are based upon civic consensus. Consensus is grounded on the
provision of information for decision making on issues that usually elites pose as important for so-
ciety (Ellyl 2011/1977). The role of media is therefore crucial for the mediation of the political inten-
sions and discourses of social elites to the general public and for the construction of social consen-
sus. The complex and remote character of political issues and events across the globe increase
the mediated relation of citizens to politics.
Critical scholars stress the relation of mainstream media to social elite interests and elite dis-
courses. As contemporary societies rely on civic consensus, media are important tools for agenda
setting as well as for the dissemination of hegemonic discourses in society. The discussion of the
mass media’s role in the current economic crisis involves the consideration of two interrelated pa-
rameters. On one hand, mass media are noted to relate to economic and political elites, to amplify
their voices in society, to set the public agenda and the frames defining the public understanding of
issues of public concern. On the other hand, mass media are industries themselves and profit from
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 655
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
public spectacles. The interests of media are connected to those of political and economic elites. In
that sense, the mass media representation of the particular crisis is politically and economically
prosperous.
Mass media perform a central role in informing the general public on what the particular crisis is,
how important it is, what its stakes are, who is responsible for it and what should be done about it.
Media are important international corporations that have close ties to political and economic elites.
Harvey (2010, 134) argues that the aspect concerning meaning making and social beliefs is only
one component out of several others relating to the ways that capitalism evolves. The “educational”
aspect of the crisis is crucial for the political restructuring that the capitalist and the political class
are developing and mass media are central in this “educational” process. Different scholars stress
the key social role of media in establishing the cultural, political and social values and facts of ne-
oliberalism among the general public (Freedman 2008, 47). Neoliberalism is not an economic sys-
tem but a cultural and political system as well (McChesney 2009, 285).
4.1. The Economic Crisis as a Media Spectacle
In a televised discussion entitled: “what does it mean to live? The crisis of capitalism”, for the
Greek Parliament’s television network in 2008, Alain Badiou (echoing Debord) argued that the on-
going global economic crisis that started in 2008 is –among other things - a public spectacle: “Capi-
talism becomes spectacularized. Most people watch this current crisis as a spectacle. Most people
are not financial economists, they are not merchants and they are not bankers. They can do noth-
ing in reality so they observe the particular crisis with fear, worry, hope; in the end it is a structural
spectacle. We have to analyse and explain this spectacle; it is our prime duty to explain it as a cri-
sis of capitalism and a collapse not only of the financial and monetary system but of a particular
way of seeing the world. This task is in the scope of our powers and it will have consequences,
because according to the dominant propaganda of the last 20 years, this system is the best and no
other system exists. But if this system is the best, we need to search at least for something else.
Perhaps, we can enter into a new sequence of the process of truth in politics. But clarity is re-
quired… the particular spectacle, if anything is educative. In the form of a spectacle, capitalism
presents its own nullity.” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUTsPXFWUD4&feature=related ac-
cessed on February 29, 2012).
Mainstream mass media of different Western countries succeeded in organizing a crisis dis-
course by objectifying the crisis as something caused by the supposed reckless, exploitative and
sly behaviour of specific people. Such a rationale was organized on the premise of the systemati-
zation and instrumentalization of popular, exotic stereotypes of people and localities by media
spectacle. A front cover image
2
from the German magazine “Focus” portraying the famous statue
of Milos’ Aphrodite pointing the finger to the Greek people “for betraying the Euro family” (sic) re-
ceived worldwide attention and triggered equal spiteful public reactions by Greek mainstream me-
dia and Greek publics. British, channel 4’s, launched a weekly docusoap in 2011 entitled “go Greek
for a week” (sic), simulating the hegemonic Greek crisis discourse, through the production of condi-
tions for “British people and families (sic) to experience the patterns of tax evasion, corruption and
mismanagement that have helped to sink (sic) the Greek economy” (Channel 4 2011).
For Debord (1986/1967), the spectacle is a process of mediation affirming the existing state of
social affairs, which does not allow possibilities for political intervention. The spectacle provides a
simplistic and illusionary unity of an increasingly fragmented, late modern world whose sense mak-
ing becomes increasingly complex and a difficult process. Kellner (2003) expands Debord’s ideas
and uses them to analyse contemporary developments of the spectacle and its socio-political impli-
cations. Kellner (2005, 23) argues that “the cultural industries have multiplied media spectacles in
novel spaces and sites and that the spectacle itself has become one of the organising principles of
the economy, polity, society and everyday life”.
Kellner (2003, 21) notes that spectacularization occurs through the mass production of media
content. Reports, shows, documentaries, articles, videos, all produced from both professionals and
amateurs, are continuously channeled in the global mediascape, focusing on the crisis. Although
important critical content has also emerged, mainstream economic crisis frames, stressing cultural-
ist explanations of the particular crisis, dominate the public understanding and the public discussion
of the economic crisis.
The role of the spectacle is economic but also political. The media are important industries to-
day (Hesmondhalgh 2007), producing virtual commodities for new markets related to symbolic
2
A copy of which can be found here: http://neoskosmos.com/news/en/German-magazines-offend (accessed on July 5,
2012).
656 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
consumption. The role of the spectacle is to “dazzle” consumers into particular forms of realities,
behaviours, mentalities, ideas, truths and social relations. On the political side, the spectacle is
establishing particular ways of seeing the world, which are highly ideological. Kellner (2005, 31)
mentions the “terror war spectacle” to stress the different forms of information and cultural products
produced by media and cultural industries, like films, news coverage, documentaries, books, televi-
sion series among others.
The economic aspect intersects with the political in different ways. On one hand media indus-
tries – and in general economic elites - are connected to political elites. On the other hand, the
social identities and subjectivities produced by consumerist culture are threats to citizenship (Dean
2003; Bauman 2005, 126). Media spectacles reproduce socio-political ignorance and indifference
to social affairs. “In such a landscape” writes Bauman (2005, 127), “it is easy to feel lost and hap-
less and easier still to be lost and hapless without feeling it”.
Kellner (2003: 22) reminds us that the Euro currency was launched in the Eurozone countries
through its celebration by massive public spectacles back in 2001-2, at the expense of critical pub-
lic dialogue. In countries like Greece, no referendum was done for the introduction of the Euro cur-
rency. Instead the Euro was launched in the country through different media and public spectacles
supported by the time’s Greek government and the European Union
3
. Critique instead rose ten
years after the realization of the Eurozone. Critique was organized in offensive terms, due to the
fraud that particular people committed, despite the fact that the Euro had disastrous consequences
to the Greek macro and micro economy and weakened the country’s economic and political posi-
tion towards Northern European and other monopolistic interests, with everyday life consumer
goods’ prices doubling while wages remained practically the same.
Again, despite the critique of corrupt Greek politicians and undemocratic Greek people, most
European governments were against a referendum or elections that would allow Greek people to
decide for important issues for their present and their future. In the face of growing internal dissent
over the extreme austerity that is enforced on the country’s lower and middle classes, the EU gov-
ernments and the Troika favoured the construction of a government of experts, headed by the for-
mer Vice President of the European Central Bank, Lucas Papademos, the head of the Bank of
Greece during the time of the county’s inclusion in the Eurozone.
4.2. The Tabloidization of the Crisis
The commercial character of media industries had important effects on media content. Infor-
mation on political issues has assumed an entertaining character. Political analyses and extensive
coverage of political and social issues have been replaced by “lighter” forms of media content pro-
duction (McChesney 2009, 265). Tabloidization of politics is a term that describes the spectacular-
ized mediation of politics by mainstream media organizations. Tabloidization refers to the genre of
tabloid press, mass consumed publications across the world that blend information with entertain-
ment, producing personified and spectacle orientated publicity.
A great deal of asymmetry can be noted in the ways that different crisis-struck countries are
treated by international media. Greece in particular was the country concentrating international
media’s focus. Greece was also the crisis-struck country that concentrated the most negative me-
dia coverage.
The primacy of German economic interests and German politics in the Eurozone marks the
German popular media as crucial in any critical study of the European economic crisis. German
political and economic elites as well as German mass media organized the hegemonic frames of
the particular crisis that were also reproduced by mass media in other parts of the world. The criti-
cal study of a popular daily tabloid like “Bild-Zeitung” – described as “the prototype of tabloid jour-
nalism in Germany” (Klein 1998, 81) - is crucial due to the increasing “tabloidization of politics” that
scholars (Klein 1998, 79) have seen emerging, in the progressive advent of spectacle in all aspects
of social life. “Bild-Zeitung” is a publication of the Axel-Springer- Verlag House, a publishing com-
pany that had once concentrated mass protests by the social movements of 1960’s and 1970’s in
Germany (Berardi 2009, 66). Bild-Zeitung is Germany’s most popular daily publication and the
largest daily in Europe (Klein 1998, 81) according to its sales. Bild-Zeitung focused on extensive
3
An image that can be found at http://www.occupiedlondon.org/blog/2011/11/10/lucas-papademos-is-the-new-prime-
minister-in-greece-the-bank-detat-is-now-complete/ provides a hint of the spectacular introduction of the Euro currency in
Greece. The picture shows the 2002’s head of the Bank of Greece Lucas Papademos, together with then-Prime Minister
Simitis, at the moment when the latter drew the first Euro notes from an ATM machine in the New Year’s Eve of 2002, cele-
brating the advent of the Euro in Greece and in the EU as well as the inclusion of Greece to the ‘hard economic core’ (sic) of
the EU.
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 657
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
reports and commentaries on the “Greek crisis”, as soon as the crisis was publicly announced by
political and economic technocrats.
Bild-Zeitung’s coverage of political issues follows conservative ideological discourses (Klein
1998, 84). The article studies the representation of Greece as it appears in the headlines and sub-
headlines of articles from Bild-Zeitung, focusing on Europe’s financial crisis. The frames come from
articles’ headlines published in the period between December 10, 2009 and May 31, 2012, with
particular focus on main events concerning the politics of the crisis related to the negotiation of
austerity politics and the growth of popular resistance against austerity, while Greece’s social con-
ditions deteriorated. Selected articles are also studied in order to further unfold the discourse pre-
senting Greece to the German public.
In Bild-Zeitung’s online search engine at www.bild.de, under the search title “Griechen Pleite”
(Greek Bankruptcy) - a categorical title frequently used in Bild-Zeitung’s articles on crisis-struck
Greece (http://www.bild.de/suche.bild.html?type=article&query=griechen+pleite&resultsStart=440
&resultsPerPage=10 Accessed on June 20, 2012) - one finds 486 related articles. A search using
“Griechenland krise” as key words (http://www.bild.de/suche.bild.html?type=article&query
=Griechenland-Krise Accessed on June 20, 2012) results in 942 related articles. One can notice
that regular articles on Greek-related issues, linked to the economic crisis, started to appear fre-
quently from the 10
th
of December 2009 and onwards up until the present, while articles related to
Greece appeared quite more rarely before the particular date. The generation of popular infor-
mation on the particular issue seems to be erupting in a form of a “shock”, a case that confirms
Naomi Klein’s (2006, 427) thesis on the role of media in the strategic establishment of particular
“facts” in public opinion, which relate to economic and political interests and in the spread of social
panic over particular events in order to advance politics of “no alternative”.
Research on the articles appearing in Bild’s online search engine under the headline “Griechen
pleite” selected 57 headlines and their sub-headlines focused on articles written in particular events
that were central to the course of the crisis politics in Greece since late 2009. Such events concern
the degrading of Greece by financial institutions during early 2010, the recourse of the Greek gov-
ernment to the EU for financial support in April 2010, the negotiations between the Troika and the
Greek government concerning loans and austerity politics, economic crisis related EU summits,
popular protests in Greece against austerity, the passing of a second referendum on a second
wave of austerity in October 2011, the appointment of the technocratic government of Lucas Pa-
pademos and the May 2012 national elections in Greece. The headlines are analysed with frame
analysis.
Frames are cognitive settings to organize and understand events and issues. Frames provide
the conceptual foundations for people to perceive social realities. Different topics of public interest
relate to different social functions of framing. In the context of politics, ideological positions related
to the social agents producing public frames, organize the semantics of frames. Mainstream media
are noted to reinforce existing forms of knowledge and reproduce discursive frameworks and exist-
ing outlines of interpretation of social certainties. Klein (1998, 83) cites Entman to address the
communicative importance of framing: “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations for
the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe”. (Entman 1993, 52).
4.3. Analysis and Findings
The analysis of Bild-Zeitung’s crisis-related headlines, discloses five, broad, interrelated catego-
ries that organize the hegemonic meaning making of the European economic crisis and the posi-
tion of Greece in this crisis. These categories are the following: 1) the economistic one, concerning
the imperative of austerity policies 2) the eschatological-drama frame, stressing catastrophic crisis-
scenarios, mystifying the economic crisis as a phenomenon operating according to natural princi-
ples 3) the “narcissist” frame presenting austerity and enforced loans as “help” and “fight” against
the crisis, stressing national unity between German people and German businesses, while both are
framed as “victims” 4) the culturalist frame, producing “Greece” as a “natural wonder”, naturalising
the discursive mystification of the country and its people by elite and commodity culture discourses,
blaming Greeks as responsible for the local, European and global extensions of the capitalist crisis
5) the spiteful frame where Bild speaks as a representative of German tax payers, expressing fury
and anger over the financial burden they have to face for the “salvation” of bankrupt others. The
concept of reification is the main analytical category in the analysis and critique of Bild’s crisis-
frames. The critical discourse analysis’ (Fairclough 2003, 98) four categories of discursive legitima-
658 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
tion are used to critically analyse the discursive constructions of the particular frames. Social theory
is used to critically discuss the political importance of the particular semantic frames.
4.3.1. The Economistic Frame
The “economistic frame” concerns the politico-economic “biases” of Bild-Zeitung. Couldry (2010,
73) argues that media amplify neoliberal values and thus normalize mechanisms important to ne-
oliberalism. Bild’s crisis reports and analyses reproduce elite discourses that reify the economic
crisis as a palpable, objective entity. As such they publicly establish the economic crisis as an ob-
jective reality, and legitimize its hegemonic diagnosis as well as the “solutions” proposed by politi-
cal and economic elites.
10.03.2010. GREECE-VIRUS: WHICH COUNTRIES ARE NEXT? GREEK PRIME MINISTER
PAPANDREOU WARNS AGAINST A GREEK VIRUS. OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE AF-
FECTED. A NEW ECONOMIC CRISIS.
15.03.2010. EU FINANCIAL EMERGENCY PLAN FOR BANKRUPT GREEKS. THE FINANCE
MINISTERS OF THE 16 EURO COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED IN THE PRINCIPLES OF A
BAILOUT PLAN FOR THE HIGHLY INDEBTED GREECE.
25.03.2010. EU SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS. VICTORY FOR ANGELA MERKEL! FATEFUL DAY
FOR THE BANKRUPT GREEKS AT THE EU SUMMIT: THEY HOPE FOR SALVATION. AND
ANGELA MERKEL WAS ABLE TO PREVAIL WITH THE IMF PROPOSAL!
11.04.2010. UP TO A 30 BILLION EMERGENCY LOAN FROM THE EU IS BEING PREPARED
FOR THE GREEKS. TO SAVE THE GREEKS FROM BANKRUPTCY, THE EU AND THE IMF
HAVE PUT TOGETHER A RESCUE PACKAGE. THE BANKRUPT GREEKS GET THE NECES-
SARY BILLIONS OF CREDIT.
28.04.2010. CRISIS SUMMIT; IS GREECE A BOTTOMLESS PIT? WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE
SEES EUROPE'S FINANCIAL STABILITY AT RISK BY THE BANKRUPTCY OF GREECE. MER-
KEL EVEN WARNS AGAINST A WORLD-WIDE CRISIS.
28.04.2010. GREECE AND SPAIN THREATENS TO BUST. NEW SHOCK-MESSAGE: THE
RATING AGENCIES HAVE NOW DOWNGRADED SPAIN'S CREDIT.
02.05.2010. DECIDED! 110 BILLION RESCUE PACKAGE FOR GREECE! THE AID PACKAGE
FOR THE BANKRUPT GREEKS DECIDED BY THE FINANCE MINISTERS OF THE EURO-
GROUP IS 110 BILLION EUROS OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS.
21.06.2011. CRISIS IN GREECE; PAPANDREOU WINS CONFIDENCE VOTE. WE DID IT!
GEORGIOS PAPANDREOU IS PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE! RAZOR-THIN VICTORY IN THE
VOTE OF CONFIDENCE.
29.06.2011. EURO CRISIS AVERTED; GREEKS SAY YES TO SAVE MONEY! THE GREEK
PARLIAMENT SAYS YES TO SAVE! THE POPULATION WILL FACE TOUGH CUTS. VIOLENT
RIOTS IN ATHENS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
27.09.2011. GREEK PRIME MINISTER GEORGE PAPANDREOU IN BERLIN: "YES WE CAN!"
A FIERY SPEECH! IN BERLIN, GREEK PRIME MINISTER GEORGE PAPANDREOU FIGHTING
TO SAVE HIS COUNTRY…
Objectivity is constructed according to main strategies of discursive legitimation (Fairclough
2003, 98), such as authorization and rationalization. Authorization concerns references to dis-
courses of authority such as politicians, technocrats, financial agents and economic experts. Bild’s
frames “echo” such discourses, while enthusiastically reproducing formal economic crisis politics.
References to institutional knowledge and action rationalizes the crisis and its politics, publicly legit-
imising emergency policies that by-pass democratic rules, popular sovereignty, social injustice as
well as the key position of non-elected technocrats in political decision making.
The crisis is thus objectified as a measurable entity that even allows predictions. Likewise, the
economy is also reproduced in simplistic terms, as something that anyone can understand through
everyday life experiences and domestic housekeeping. The positive spinning of crisis politics is
also evident in Bild-Zeitung’s frames. Emergency economic policies are enthusiastically promoted
by Bild-Zeitung. Austerity is presented as “saving money” implying “the wasteful lifestyle of the
Greeks” (sic). Loans that are provided to the Greek government are introduced as “help”, despite
the fact that the particular money return to various banks and thus replace the private character of
the Greek debt to a public one, owned by the public funds of Eurozone member states. Finally, the
restructuring of the political institutions of Greece through emergency politics and the lowering of
living conditions for the majority of the country’s population are presented in heroic terms, as a
“fight” (sic) “against the debt”.
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 659
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
4.3.2. The Eschatological Frame: Crisis as the “Armageddon”
Elite discourses presented the economic crisis in eschatological terms. Eschatology is a discur-
sive, imaginary construction of the future that implies existential threat. The objectification of an
eschatological threat legitimizes unprecedented, emergency measurements that bypass institution-
alized procedures and rights. The no-alternative doctrine of continuous austerity politics, an-
nounced by politicians and technocrats in the EU, is reinforced by Bild-Zeitung, legitimized by au-
thoritarian discourses as well as by eschatological myths of the crisis.
11.02.2010. GREECE: WHAT DOES THE EURO- CRISIS MEAN FOR US GERMANS? THE
EURO COUNTRIES ARE FIGHTING FOR OUR CURRENCY! BUT WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THE
CRISIS? WHAT DOES THE CRISIS MEAN FOR THE EURO?
04.03.2010. SHOCKED GREEKS: "GOD, HELP US". THE GREEKS ARE IN A COLLECTIVE
STATE OF SHOCK. THE SAVINGS PLANS HAVE CAUSED PURE TERROR. NEWSPAPERS
TITLES: "GOD, HELP US!"
24.03.2010. THE CRISIS IN GREECE. EURO-BOMB IS TICKING! EXPLOSIVE ATMOS-
PHERE IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS! BEFORE THE EU SUMMIT THEY ARE ALL WAITING
FOR A SIGNAL TO RESCUE THE BANKRUPT GREEKS. THE EURO EXCHANGE RATE AT
RISK.
30.04.2010. ECONOMY GREEK CRISIS, "IT'S ABOUT SURVIVAL" WITH A DRAMATIC
SPEECH, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU HAS PREPARED THE GREEKS FOR A HORROR-
SAVING PACKAGE. EU AND IMF AIM TO TINKER WITH A SHOCK LIST.
21.04.2011. BANKRUPTCY-FRUSTRATED PAPANDREOU THRUSTS TO GREEKS LIVING
ABROAD. NEW BANKRUPTCY ANXIETY: EXPERTS FEAR THAT GREECE IS NOT OVER THE
SUMMER. PREMIER PAPANDREOU INFLATED GREEKS LIVING ABROAD.
10.05.2011. GREECE THREATENS TO COLLAPSE LIKE DDR? THE EURO IS IN FREE
FALL. THE GREEKS ARE GUILTY. ECONOMISTS AND POLITICIANS DEBATE THE CONSE-
QUENCES.
16.06.2011. GREEK CRISIS FROM BANKRUPTCY: WHAT NOW COSTAS? GREECE-
HORROR WITH NO END! BILD.DE EXPLAINS HOW MUCH MONEY WE HAVE ALREADY GIV-
EN TO THE GREEKS AND WHAT THE COLLAPSE OF THAT STATE WOULD COST US.
16.06.2011. EURO CRISIS TEARING THE GREEKS INTO THE ABYSS? NATIONAL CRISIS
IN GREECE. THE GOVERNMENT IS TOTTERING. THE PEOPLE REBELLED. CRASH WARN-
INGS FROM THE U.S.
21.09.2011. DEBT CRISIS’ LAST CHANCE FOR THE GREEKS. GREECE AND ITS MAJOR
CREDITORS HAVE CONVERGED AGAIN. BANKRUPTCY EXAMINER WILL RETURN TO ATH-
ENS NEXT WEEK.
06.09.2011. HOW DEEP IS THE CRISIS IN GREECE AND HOW DEEP ARE WE STUCK IN
THE DRACHMA-MUD? GREECE PROCEEDS TOWARD THE ABYSS: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
THE GREEKS ACTUALLY GO BANKRUPT - HOW DEEP ARE THE GERMAN BANKS STUCK
WITH DRACHMA?
03.11.2011. DEADLINE WITH THE GREEK CHAOS. CHAOS DAYS IN GREECE. HELLAS
MAKES THE WHOLE WORLD ASTRAY! HERE ARE THE HEADS OF 20 MAJOR INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD WHO HAVE ENOUGH PROBLEMS ALREADY.
Drama narratives of the economic crisis and its impact legitimize the imperative rationales of
emergency politics. Mythopoesis (Fairclough 2003, 99) is the legitimation strategy used to objectify
the capitalist crisis as a natural catastrophe of eschatological proportions and unknown conse-
quences. Existential threats (survival, chaos and abyss) and metaphysical references (God) organ-
ize the magnitude of the crisis. An incomplete picture suggesting the certainties of catastrophic
scenarios that are nevertheless unpredictable legitimizes exceptional policies. The constant updat-
ing of the catastrophic scenario urges “fast” solutions of the problem. Austerity politics, loss of so-
cial, political and even human rights are legitimized by the ontological imperative of eschatology.
“TINA”, the neoliberal “no alternative” doctrine is recontextualized in the supposedly unprecedented
context of another capitalist crisis. The time of crisis is organized as shock; deliberation or thought
are downplayed as time consuming and excessive due to the velocity of the crisis. Berardi (2009,
107) argues that communication overload, particularly in the digital era, produces constant mobili-
zation that prohibits critical thinking and autonomous decision-making. Crisis narratives produce
ontological fears, which organize the consensus towards economic imperatives. As we will further
see, fear combined with narcissism, further triggers public spite against the Greek people, por-
660 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
trayed as the perpetrators of the global economic crisis. Shock politics of the economic crisis aug-
ment chasms among European people living in similar precarious conditions (Berardi 2009, 194).
4.3.3. The Narcissist Frame
Narcissism is a socio-psychological state characterising late modern subjectivities. Different
scholars (Lasch 2001/1979; Bauman 2005; Berardi 2009) stress the influence of commodity culture
in the development of introvert, infantilized social characters that do not assume social responsibil-
ity and are reluctant to perform political praxes. The lack of political thought further asserts the
common-sensual versions of the world, where things are “what they are” (Lukacs 2001/1923).
The Greek people are presented as responsible for the effects of the capitalist crisis on the
German people. EU’s political decision to provide German public funds for the redemption of pri-
vately owned debt, largely caused by the unrestrained and speculative economic strategies of pri-
vate banks, is presented as altruistic sacrifices that the German people are forced to make for the
ungrateful others who were not economically responsible. The effects of crisis politics on the Greek
people are trivialized. Moral and material superiority is advanced in nationalist terms, while the
effects of crisis politics are legitimized in moral terms (Fairclough 2003, 98).
04.03.2010. GREEK CRISIS: BANKRUPT GREEKS WON’T GET A CENT FROM US! GREEK
CRISIS: BANKRUPT GREEKS WON’T GET A CENT FROM US! GREEK PRIME MINISTER PA-
PANDREOU COMES TO GERMANY TODAY, INVITED BY CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL.
SOLE THEME: THE DRAMATIC FINANCIAL CONDITION OF GREECE!
21.04.2010. GERMANY IS TO PAY € 18 BILLION! GREECE IS FOR THE GERMAN TAXPAY-
ER A FINANCIAL NIGHTMARE! 18 BILLION EUROS FROM GERMANY FOR THE BANKRUPT
GREEKS.
23.04.2010. LOAN ASSISTANCE OF THE EU. WHAT DO THE BANKRUPT GREEKS COST
US? THE GREEKS HAVE OFFICIALLY ASKED FOR AN EU ASSISTANCE LOAN. BUT, WHAT
DO THE BANKRUPT GREEKS COST US?
24.04.2010. GREECE-HELP. EXPERT MIND: WE WILL NOT SEE OUR MONEY AGAIN. ALL
OF EUROPE IS TALKING ABOUT GREECE! BILD.DE SPOKE WITH IFO CHIEF HANS-
WERNER SINN ON THE FINANCIAL AID FOR THE GREEKS. HE WARNS US!
27.04.2010. GREEKS’ BANKRUPTCY: FEAR FOR OUR MONEY! ARE THE BANKRUPT
GREEKS TEARING DOWN ALL OF EUROPE? GREEK GOVERNMENT BONDS ARE REGARD-
ED AS TRASH FROM YESTERDAY.
01.05.2010. 25 BILLION FOR THE GREEKS. AND WHAT ABOUT US? GERMANY LENDS
THE HIGHLY INDEBTED GREECE ABOUT 25 BILLION €. WHAT IF THE GREEKS GO BANK-
RUPT? AND WE JUST HAVE TO SUPPORT THIS.
04.05.2010. GREEK PRESS HATE-SPEECH AGAINST OUR CHANCELLOR. YOU GET
MONEY FROM US. A LOT OF MONEY! AND WHAT DO THE BANKRUPT GREEKS DO: THEY
SWEAR AGAINST OUR CHANCELLOR. THERE ARE EVEN STASI-NAZI COMPARISONS!
11.06.2011. EXPENSIVE EUROPE: WE PAY THE MOST! THE NEW BILLION DOLLAR AID
TO GREECE AND HAVE DECIDED TO CHARGE THE CONTAINER OF THE EU. BILD.DE EX-
PLAINS: WHO PAYS FOR EUROPE REALLY ... FOR HOW MUCH LONGER?
27.10.2011. EURO-RESCUE: WHAT DOES IT COST - WHO PAYS? THE EURO-
POLITICIANS HAVE SPOKEN: DEBT RELIEF FOR THE GREEKS, MORE MONEY INTO THE
BAILOUT FUND. BUT: HOW MUCH MORE IS IT TO ME AS A WHOLE?
27.10.2011. THE GOOD GODMOTHER OF EUROPE, MERKEL WAS ABLE TO REJECT ANY
OFFER. AT EU SUMMITS, THE ONE WHO HOLDS OUT LONGEST WINS. AND THE ONE WHO
IN THE END MAKES THE "OFFER" THAT ONE CAN NOT REFUSE. LIKE DONNA ANGELA,
EUROPE’S ...
03.11.2011. GREEK DRAMA: MRS. MERKEL, WE WANT TO VOTE! PRESENT IT TO US
NOW! WE PROVIDE HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS OF EUROS TO SAVE THE BANKRUPT
GREEKS - THIS SHOULD BE CLARIFIED WITH A REFERENDUM.
The German people are presented as a homogenous nation suffering from irresponsible others.
Indignation is produced in un-political terms, where systemic critique and even difference of opinion
are ostracized by (supposedly) overwhelming facts, expert voices and by the moralization of aus-
terity and emergency politics of dispossession as “help” that should even be appreciated. Political
leaders as Chancellor Merkel are presented as symbolic centres (Merkel as the “godmother of
Europe”) unifying the nation. The calls for “referendum” on the provision of “help” (to the banking
system rather than the Greek people) are rallies that aim to the boosting of nationalism rather than
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 661
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
to express any sense of democratic will. Indignation is in every case controversial as the alterna-
tives organized by the German, the Greek and the European Left are discredited as “populist” and
dangerous. Bild-Zeitung’s legitimation of economic austerity as the only “realistic” political option,
along with the manifestation of un-political indignation, aim at mobilising public opinion against the
resisting parts of the Greek society. On a further extend, indignation and nationalist narcissism aim
at disciplining the German public to the socio-political restructuring that the capitalist crisis is ad-
vancing in European societies.
An excerpt from one of Bild-Zeitung’s article on Greece serves to clarify tabloid politics of na-
tionalism in the midst of the economic crisis, further. On a visit to Germany from the former Prime
Minister of Greece, Giorgos Papandreou – the neoliberal politician, Head of the “Socialist Party”
(PASOK), who consented to the quarantining of Greece by the IMF, the EBC and the EU for rea-
sons of “national salvation” (sic) – Bild-Zeitung published an open letter to him:
“Dear prime minister,
If you're reading this, you've entered a country different from yours. You're in Germany. Here,
people work until they are 67 and there is no 14th-month salary for civil servants. Here, nobody
needs to pay a €1,000 bribe to get a hospital bed in time. Our petrol stations have cash registers,
taxi drivers give receipts and farmers don't swindle EU subsidies with millions of non-existent olive
trees. Germany also has high debts but we can settle them. That's because we get up early and
work all day. We want to be friends with the Greeks. That's why since joining the euro, Germany
has given your country €50bn.” (Guardian 2010).
All claims made by Bild-Zeitung in the excerpt above are vulgar generalizations, attempting to
produce a homogenous and “squared” narrative in defence of Bild-Zeitung’s crisis discourse. Bild’s
accusations against Greece, the Greek state and the Greek people have been answered in the
critical discussion of the crisis and Greece’s position, in previous sections of this article. The com-
plexity of such issues however makes tabloid press’ straightforward statements to sound “true”,
grounded on everyday-life, common sense, empirical forms of knowledge and morality. Practical
knowledge though fails to explain the multiple, interrelated layers of transnational economic, politi-
cal and social relations, problems and contradictions. The analysis will focus on the production of
nationalism instead as nationalism sets the foundations for the legitimacy of such claims. In the
excerpt above, the German nation is celebrated through the production of the Other as failure. The
standards to assess failure are everyday life banalities, such as functional assets of consumer so-
ciety (e.g. cash registers in petrol stations), set by the tabloid as symbols of success. The “exposi-
tion” of the Other’s failure is fabricated by the systematic allocation of moments proving his/her
backwardness and failure. As Adorno and Horkheimer (1996/1947) argue, the trajectory of success
is fabricated through the accumulation and exposure of (banal) features and “facts” that are made
to appear as success components. Everyday life banalities (Billig 1995, 61) symbolize the narcis-
sistic pleasures of the nation, that are threatened by the Other and his/her corrupt and potentially
contagious ways.
The Other (who is also responsible for not wanting to be “our” friend) is objectified as inferior
and as guilty, through an arbitrary narrative of nationalist “common sense”, that deploys “facts” and
overemphasizes “small differences”. Differences are propagated in order to be inscribed into the
audience’s memory (Adorno and Horkheimer 1996/1947). The “German people” are thus invited by
Bild-Zeitung to commune to the pleasures of “their” nation, excluding critique on internal social
problems that the country’s middle and lower classes –the main consumers of Bild-Zeitung - face,
related to labour precarity and constancy of wages. Following Adorno and Horkheimer
(1996/1947), the celebration of the nation cultivates an illusion of success that reinforces social
conformity to the ideology obscuring contemporary social inequalities. Again, the call for national
homogeneity has a disciplinary purpose, aiming to ostracize critique to the nation’s class inequali-
ties and to dissociate the public from its identification to the suffering Other in the face of multiple,
global crises humanity as a whole is facing. In short, the nationalistic emphasis aims in distracting
the public to seek a holistic approach to the systemic crisis the globe is facing, as we all live in what
Badiou (2008) describes as “one world”. By diverting the public discussion from a critique of global
capitalism, the culturalist explanations of the crisis legitimize neoliberal emergency politics (There-
Is-No-Alternative doctrines introduced by neoliberal technocrats) for the restructuring of social insti-
tutions in different localities in expense of democracy and in favour of the capital.
662 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
4.3.4. The Culturalist Frame
The culturalist frame produces “what Greece is” and aims at grounding the capitalist crisis as a
crisis that concerns a particular nation state and as a crisis that is caused by the particularities and
the shortcomings of the Greek society. Greece is defined according to popular stereotypes stress-
ing the idle, carefree, and comfortable lifestyle of countries with “warm climate”. Stereotypes are
the crisis’ explanatory foundations.
28.02.2010. GREECE- BANKRUPTCY: THIS IS HOW THE GREEKS BURN THE EURO.
GREECE IS ON THE VERGE OF BANKRUPTCY AND HOPES FOR BILLIONS IN AID FROM
THE EUROPEAN UNION. HERE, THE GREEKS ARE LIVING FAR BEYOND THEIR ABILITIES.
02.03.2010. CRISIS IN GREECE: THIS IS HOW CORRUPT THE BANKRUPT GREEKS ARE.
USURIOUS CORRUPTION IN GREECE: WHOEVER NEEDS A LICENSE OR A HOSPITAL
ROOM TO PAY, MUST BRIBE. 1300 € PER YEAR!
04.03.2010. BILD-TEST; GERMAN BEGS FOR THE BANKRUPT GREEKS. THE GOVERN-
MENT ASKS FOR DONATIONS (TO SAVE) GREECE FROM BANKRUPTCY. BUT HOW HAPPY
ARE THE GREEKS WHILE SPENDING? A BILD REPORTER TOOK THE TEST!
12.03.2010. MASS UPRISING STRIKES: THE GREEKS LOST THEIR DREAMLAND? THE
MASS UPRISING AGAINST THE SHOCK-SAVING PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT
THREATENS TO DESTROY THE IMAGE OF THE GREEKS. ARE THEY STRIKING THEIR DE-
STROYED COUNTRY?
26.04.2010. CLIQUE AND CORRUPTION IS HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS IN GREECE. ONE
COUNTRY, TWO FAMILIES AND THE QUESTION: IS GREECE DEMOCRACY OR DYNASTY?
27.04.2010. STRIKE IN ATHENS, BANKRUPT GREEKS DO NOT WANT TO SAVE. HEATED
ATMOSPHERE IN MASS PROTESTS IN ATHENS. BILD.DE ASKS DEMONSTRATORS WHY
THEY SAY NO TO SAVING. TO FOLLOW: MOB ATTACKS!
29.04.2010. YET BANKRUPT GREEKS CELEBRATE AND CELEBRATE AND CELEBRATE ...
GREECE ON THE BRINK OF BANKRUPTCY. WHAT NOW? PANIC ON THE TITANIC? THE
GREEKS CELEBRATE AS IF THERE WAS NO TOMORROW.
03.05.2010. CRISIS IN GREECE, THE EURO DECEIVED. SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS BY THE
EU AGAINST GREECE: INTERNAL REPORTS OF THE EU COMMISSION WILL NOW SHOW
THE FULL EXTENT OF THE GREEK OFFENSE CRIME.
19.05.2011. MERKEL ESCALATES PRESSURE: GREEKS SHOULD TAKE LESS HOLIDAYS.
THE PRESSURE ON EUROPE'S GROWING DEBT SINNERS: CHANCELLOR ANGELA MER-
KEL WANTS THE PEOPLE TO WORK LONGER IN THE INDEBTED STATES AND TO HAVE
LESS VACATION.
06.06.2011. WHERE ARE THEY GIVING OUR BILLIONS? HOW CAN THIS EVEN BE POSSI-
BLE? DESPITE THE CRISIS, GREEKS PAY RETIREMENT PENSIONS TO THE DEAD. HOW
CAN THIS EVEN BE POSSIBLE? FOR THE FIRST TIME THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS OF-
FICIALLY ADMITTED THAT MILLIONS OF EUROS WERE PAID TO DEAD PENSIONERS.
27.10.2011. ARE DEBT-SECTION GREEKS SAVED NOW REALLY? WHO IS TO UNDER-
STAND THE GREEKS? EUROPE DECIDES TO CUT DEBT, AND YET THERE IS DOOM AND
GLOOM.
03.11.2011. DEADLINE WITH THE GREEK CHAOS. CHAOS DAYS IN GREECE. HELLAS
MAKES THE WHOLE WORLD ASTRAY! HERE ARE THE HEADS OF 20 MAJOR INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD WHO HAVE ENOUGH PROBLEMS ALREADY.
The “knowledge” that Bild-Zeitung produces on the reasons behind the economic crisis, is
based upon the “knowledge of Greece”. The knowledge reifying “Greece” into a “common sense”,
“known” object, departs from touristic stereotypes. As discussed earlier, the mainstream media’s
visualization of Greece is full of tourist semiotics. References to the corrupting attributes of sunlight
are indicative of the touristic gaze of Bild-Zeitung towards Greece. Stereotypes are not questioned
but taken for granted. Greece and the people inhabiting there are produced in homogenous terms.
Greece and Greeks are reified through Mediterranean and Middle Eastern folkloric stereotypes,
banal historical references to “Greek antiquity”, or references to popular culture constructions of
Greece, Greek culture and Greeks (like “Zorba the Greek” or the blockbuster film “my big fat Greek
wedding”, which built its success by concentrating and selling all widely “known” prejudices and
stereotypes on Greece).
Stereotypes of the Greek people relate to exotic myths cultivated by the tourist industry that is
further developed by the identity of the tourist. As Urry (2002, 132) argued, the tourist focuses on
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 663
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
particular objects that are produced as unique through the fantasy and the narratives producing the
tourist experience and need. The tourist gaze seeks the specific character of particular people and
places. Tourism is a highly individualized activity, practiced by citizens of economically advanced
countries of the global North, and the tourist experiences travelling to remote places as a labour
and consumer right (Urry, 2002). The sites of mass tourist consumption of Greece do not allow
much space for one to explore the internal social and spatial diversity and contradictions of the
particular locus. The tourist industry does not allow identification with the local but focuses on the
activities of touristic consumption. The sense of the touristic space is mediated by consumerist
frames, reifying places and people as palpable entities for consumption. Experience is a great
product “sold” by the tourist industry, with knowledge being central in the economy of the tourist
experience. Knowledge however is commodified, destined to serve the pleasures of tourist con-
sumption. The experience of mass tourism by German citizens in Greece provides the common
frames that produce Greece as a known object. Bild-Zeitung departs from this knowledge by repro-
ducing semantic and aesthetic, verbal and visual features of the tourist industry, in order to produce
and to indeed verify the (already known) “Greek particularity” behind the economic crisis reifying
Greece as exotic and kitsch.
The tourist discourse of Greece is publicly instrumentalized in order to produce a crisis publicity
that would divert public discussion from ideological and structural analysis of the role of financial
institutions, geopolitics, economic antagonisms, international monopolies and contradictions of
capitalism for the particular economic crisis. A re-configuration of the “West”, or a reification of the
“Eurozone” as an identity configuration emerges through different crises constructions by hege-
monic discourses in the globe, re-enforced by dominant political and economic structures. Since
the on-going crisis proves the contingency of different dominant structures and social imaginaries
(e.g. capitalism as the best and only system for human societies), the hegemonic construction of
the West (e.g. secular, capitalist, Protestant Christian) itself becomes a highly contingent symbolic
entity, which requires constant affirmation and constitution. The struggle over codes, symbols and
images is central in the on-going production of imagined communities and key site for the prolonga-
tion and elaboration of social crises (Lentin and Titley 2011, 125). Racism as argued (Wren 2001,
143) is linked to different stages of capitalist development. Different groups of people are classified
according to the needs of particular economies.
Although data from the OECD (table 1) prove that the Greek lower and middle classes work
much longer than other Europeans do and both data and literature indicate that Southern Europe
has a much less developed public sector than the North, mainstream crisis discourses such as
those of Bild-Zeitung conceal them from public light and do not even attempt to challenge them.
“Big state” and large public spending were noted as important reasons for the debt crisis of the
European South, when according to OECD data (image 1), countries from the European South
have much less developed public services and generally much smaller public sectors than those
from the countries of the European North (Crouch 2004, 9). Public discussion is instead focused on
spectacularized re-productions of common sense, on what was supposedly known over the under-
developed, uncivil, corrupt, idle and deceitful ontology of a Greek character, along with abysmal
myths of Greek state’s “huge public spending” and “huge unproductive public sector”.
664 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Table 1: The reality behind the propagandistic myths of “lazy” Greeks and Southern Europeans,
reproduced by tabloid press, popular television programs, economists and politicians throughout
the world. OECD data state that Greeks work almost twice as much as Northern Europeans do.
The table does not include information on the difference in labour conditions between the European
North and the European South (OECD 2010).
Figure 1: A graph taken from OECD’s “Government at a Glance 2011” publication (Chapter 21 –
Data) showing the percentage of public employment in countries across the globe. For Greece, the
percentage of employment in the general government and in public corporations was 7,9 for 2008.
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 665
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Likewise, problems related to minimalist democratic institutions and public accountability, are
instrumentalized by neoliberal technocrats to attack the notion of the public. Reification of the “pub-
lic” further serves to mystify it publicly and to further discredit it. For instance, in an LSE public lec-
ture on 28/3/2012 framed with the title “can Greece get out of the crisis?” (sic), Poul Thomsen, IMF
mission chief to Greece stated that: “Greece must deal with its own taboos… so far there has been
a taboo to let staff go in a mandatory manner from what is a highly overstaffed public sector. There
has also been a taboo to close entities that are no longer needed.” (Reuters 2012)
Thomsen does not specify “what is needed” for people, or who decides for that. The public sec-
tor of Greece is thus a “taboo” for the country (possibly part of Greece’s “inherent particularities”)
that needs to “break” while promulgating the violent imposition of mass privatizations in Greece, the
further suppression of lower and middle incomes, the forced redundancy of people with no provi-
sions for economic and social inclusion. Likewise, the crisis has also been attributed to the people’s
“habit” of not paying taxes, an oxymoron argument when in fact free market ideologues are strong
opponents of taxation and through lobbying and political pressure, they did succeed in reducing
taxation to the higher incomes around the world (Harvey 2010, 45) or to create tax-free “paradises”
(sic) in remote spaces across the globe.
4.3.5. The Spiteful Frame
25.02.2010. TO BAN CASH FOR BANKRUPT GREEKS. THE GOVERNMENT - WITH EX-
TRAORDINARY SAVINGS - WANTS TO HAVE THE GREEKS, TO LOSE BY ALL MEANS THEIR
HABIT OF RIOTOUS LIVING AND TAX-BACK PULL.
08.03.2010. PRESIDENT OF THE BUNDESTAG APOLOGIZED TO THE BANKRUPT
GREEKS. WHAT'S THAT? BUNDESTAG PRESIDENT LAMMERT HAS APOLOGIZED FOR THE
"MALICIOUS" ARTICLES ON BANKRUPT GREEKS.
19.03.2010. PAPANDREOU THREATENED: GREEKS WANT MONEY FOR NAZI ATROCI-
TIES. GREECE WANTS COMPENSATION FOR NAZI ATROCITIES. SO FAR, PRIME MINISTER
PAPANDREOU ON THIS ISSUE WAS CAUTIOUS: HE NOW SUDDENLY THREATENS.
04.05.2010. GREEKS IN EURO CRASH MAKE OUR BREAD MORE EXPENSIVE! THE
GREEKS WEAKEN THE EURO. THAT WE DO TODAY: PRICES ARE RISING. EVEN BREAD IS
MORE EXPENSIVE. THE RECOVERY IS IN DANGER!
10.09.2011. EVERY SECOND SURVEY IN GERMANY WANTS TO GO BANKRUPT GREEKS.
A MAJORITY OF GERMANS AGREE THAT WE SHOULD LET GREECE GO BUST. ONLY 43
PERCENT, ACCORDING TO A RECENT SURVEY ARE IN FAVOUR OF MORE FINANCIAL AID
...
20.09.2011. EURO CRISIS: GREEKS BURN TAX BILLS! [WHAT HAPPENS] WHEN THE
GREEKS FINALLY SEE THAT THEY HAVE TO SAVE? YESTERDAY, THERE WERE ALREADY
RIOTS IN ATHENS!
20.09.2011. FIGHT AGAINST BANKRUPT GREECE: 150 000 OFFICIALS KICKED OUT. THE
GREEKS ARE BANKRUPT IN OCTOBER - IF THEY DO NOT SAVE AT LAST! ATHENS WANTS
TO TAKE DRASTIC MEASURES.
21.09.2011. NEW SAVINGS PLAN MUST NOW BLEED THE GREEKS PROPERLY. THE
GREEK GOVERNMENT IS SERIOUS AND STRIKES EVEN MORE PUBLIC SECTOR JOBS
THAN PREVIOUSLY PLANNED.
22.09.2011. FIRST I PAY NO TAX REBEL CENTS FOR BANKRUPT GREEKS! ONE MAN
AGAINST DEBT-EUROPE! MARKUS BAUER GORE, ACCOUNTANT, DOES NOT WANT TO
PAY MORE TAXES FOR INDEBTED COUNTRIES LIKE GREECE.
06.09.2011. SCHÄUBLE: GREEKS SAVE AT LAST, OTHERWISE NO EUROS! BASTA'S
SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT - OUR EURO- MINISTER AT HIS BEST! WOLFGANG SCHAEUBLE
HAS URGED GREECE TO MEET THE SAVINGS GOALS.
06.06.2011. DESPITE THE CRISIS, GREEKS PAY RETIREMENT PENSIONS TO THE DEAD.
HOW CAN THIS EVEN BE POSSIBLE? FOR THE FIRST TIME THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
HAS OFFICIALLY ADMITTED THAT MILLIONS OF EUROS WERE PAID TO DEAD PENSION-
ERS.
05.06.2011. WITH A SWASTIKA! GREEKS RIDICULE EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, THEY
GET BILLIONS! WHAT IS THE WILLINGNESS OF EUROPEANS TO HATE SPEECH AND
SWASTIKA POSTERS BY THE PLAYFUL, BANKRUPT COUNTRY OF GREECE?
The “spiteful” frame, expresses the indignation of “the Germans” towards “the Greeks” that is
produced and mediated by Bild-Zeitung. According to Bild’s discourse, the Greeks are responsible
for their own suffering. The Greeks are also responsible for the dangers that the crisis poses to
666 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
other Europeans. Bild-Zeitung offers its public a purposefully confused version of the facts related
to Greece’s position in the global economic crisis. Bild’s version of the crisis discredits people’s
resistances against the degrading of their lives, as something irrational and even ungrateful, while
celebrating the loss of jobs in the particular country and the closing down of Greece’s minimal so-
cial provisions. The culturalist frames of Greek people and the crisis legitimize the particular spiteful
claims. Any hint to Bild-Zeitung’s public or journalist responsibility is silenced or confronted with
indignation. Simultaneously, historical disputes related to the war crimes and atrocities of Nazi
Germany to the Greek people (Mazower, 1995) that are connected to Germany’s unpaid war repa-
rations to Greece –included the “forced occupation loans” that the German and Italian occupying
forces imposed to the time’s Greek collaborationist government (Keep Talking Greece 2012) - are
silenced as historical taboos or as issues that Germany, Greece, Europe, or humanity itself, have
(supposedly) resolved, belonging to a (fictional) deep historical past. Max Horkheimer in his 1939
article entitled “the Jews and Europe” critically discussed the connections of capitalism, crisis and
fascism. Fascism in that sense is a historical possibility that can rise from different capitalist crises
and in particular from the instrumental and antagonistic rationalities and values that capitalist socie-
ty produces.
The expression of public spite and not identification and solidarity to the suffering others, is
connected to political disempowerment and to consumerist alienation. A society of spite rises ac-
cording to Diken (2009), due to the destruction of sociality, praxis and action. Political disempow-
erment is connected to the diminishing of political praxis by late capitalist governance. Alienation is
connected to the inability to live happily with others and also with the self, caused by extreme con-
ditions of uncertainty and individualism imposed by the late capitalist processes of value production
(Berardi 2009, 109).
In his book on “nihilism”, Diken (2009: 5) argues -as Bauman (1998) and Sennett (2006) do -
that contemporary society “systematically produces losers, while at the same time depicting this
condition as fate, as one’s own fault”. A society of spite relates to widespread class and existential
worries, inflicted by precarious social contexts, narcissist anxiety evoked by consumer society and
by the broadening of the scope of uselessness (Sennett, 2006). Berardi argues that the predomi-
nance of work in individual life and the prevalence of economic rationales in social life diminish
pleasure in life. “Eros” the element of pleasure is distorted by social relations of antagonism. The
failure of the Greeks serves to boost the narcissistic confidence of the German lower and middle
classes which is challenged by the anxieties of the extreme antagonistic and precarious rules
posed by contemporary capitalism (Berardi 2009, 99). The Other is perceived according to the
rules of competition, as danger, risk and limitation and not as a source of experience and enrich-
ment (Berardi 2009, 80).
The Greek people are being accused as responsible for the crisis that struck their country but
also for the crisis striking Europe. The Greek people are being accused for being deceitful in order
to enjoy the pleasures of consumerism. The Greek people are also guilty of “tolerating” their corrupt
governments. The particular discourse that places responsibility on people and not on systems
relates to neoliberal-consumer society principles, where it is up to the people not to support unethi-
cal or corrupt governments, business, or individual habits (Crouch 2011, 26). The power of the
“consumers” is thus elevated to its highest degree, while the power of structure and ideology re-
mains unchallenged.
New media affordances are also used by individual users to expand the (pseudo-) knowledge
disseminated by hegemonic social institutions. New media users get active to express their spite
against the failed Greeks in particular, prompting the unpolitical spirit that characterizes contempo-
rary societies (Dean 2009, 39). People do express a genuine interest in informing themselves on
the crisis, yet the lack of political perspective diminishes the criteria to assess information and
events. Journalists of mainstream media, bloggers, vloggers and amateur producers, commenta-
tors in websites and different media uses in general are producing forms of (pseudo-) knowledge
on Greece and the crisis, departing from the mainstream frames of the economic crisis and the role
of Greece. Such “knowledge” seems to verify what is already “known” by common sense fetishism.
Articles on “open” topics framed as “are Greeks European?” (http://www.ibtimes.com/articles
/246127/20111109/ accessed on March 8, 2012) are produced through an “eclectic” use of frag-
ments and dispersed ‘facts’ compiled from genetic, historical and cultural arguments –often sup-
ported by “expert” voices - verifying ‘European-ness’ in terms reminiscent to Huntington’s “clash of
civilizations” thesis, with Greeks being positioned to his “Eastern Orthodox” tectonic plate of the
“world’s civilizations” that Huntington mapped. One can also find topics like “are Greeks white?”
(http://www.topix.com/forum/world/greece/T3JH3BBB31QO6QG6L accessed on March 9, 2012) in
online discussion forums, with a couple of thousand posted replies, while virtual “wars” occur on
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 667
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
You Tube, Facebook, online platforms and social media, on related topics. Finally, it is important to
note that the fetishized discourse of “Greece”, creates abject identities in real life situations: as a
friend recently mentioned, a Danish colleague told him (in the usual form of a “joke”) “not to Greek
his chair”; in a different context, he was presented to a third person by his colleagues –while physi-
cally present- as “although he is Greek, we still let him be here”. The issue of media representation
and public perception of the economic crisis requires a thorough study. The particular article only
provides certain hints on the production of the European public opinion on the economic crisis by
mass media and politico-economic elite discourses.
5. Concluding Remarks
In the paper’s final section, I will refer to the main findings of this study and I will also refer to the
current political situation in Greece and to the prospects of European citizens through a different
understanding of the economic crisis.
The analysis shows that the hegemonic discourses that produce public explanations of the Eu-
ropean economic crisis reproduce the neoliberal social values and express the interests of the
capitalist class. The German tabloid “Bild-Zeitung” amplifies political and economic elite discourses
to the general public. As such its discourses are highly ideological. The critical analyses of the
frames of Bild-Zeitung disclose a systematic concealment and distortion of information explaining
the structural issues relating to the crisis. Bild-Zeitung’s frames conceal facts (e.g. the OECD data
of table 1) that relate to the actual effects of the crisis politics to people. The lack of any structural
understanding of the crisis constructs people, the Greek people in particular as the scapegoats for
the destruction that capitalism produces globally. The vilification and racialization of the Greek
people augments nationalism and triggers spite, due to the anxiety that the global effects of the
capitalist crisis triggers to German people as well as to people all over the world. Furthermore, Bild-
Zeitung facilitates a discourse that is sensational and spectacular, un-political and un-democratic.
Such passionate and depoliticized discourses are noted (Mouffe 2004) to turn people towards the
extreme right. Bild-Zeitung’s manifested position against the enforced loaning policies that the
German government and the EU follows towards Greece –in defence of the German taxpayer’s
public funds - is also controversial as simultaneously it refuses to recognize that alternatives sug-
gested by the political Left are possible. Bild-Zeitung’s, along other German as well as Greek and
non-Greek mainstream media’s continuous attacks on the Greek Left and its leadership are also
notable
4
. The main current of the Greek Left, the party of Syriza, is against the continuation of EU
loaning to Greece in order to serve a debt that is largely odious, and it is particularly against loans
coming from public funds. Bild-Zeitung, along other mainstream media, are identifying the interests
of the average German people to those of the German and international capital that is profiting by
the further indebtment of Greece. Bild-Zeitung’s politics is therefore a class politics that express
unpolitical indignation as a public spectacle that is meant to comfort its audience - the German
middle and lower classes – and to support German capitalists.
Media are central tools for the cultivation of a neoliberal subjectivity and social ethos. The spec-
tacle of the crisis normalizes, reifies the capitalist crisis as a natural, taken for granted, object and
produces public discipline to the new work ethics that the emerging form of capitalism requires. On
a further extend, the publicity of the crisis produces surplus value for cultural industries. As Debord
(1986/1967) argued, the spectacle legitimizes divisions: divisions of people with common interests,
the division of labour itself, but also divisions of consciousness and an abolishment of critique by
the cultivation of fantasies. The result of this process is for Debord, the proletarianization of the
world. The restructuring occurring in Greece, celebrated by mass media spectacles, aims towards
the proletarianization of the Greek people and the creation of conditions of primitive accumulation.
A successful proletarianization of Greece would also mean the export of the particular ‘model’ of
social governance in further indebted countries, attacked by the speculative activity of the financial
“markets”.
4
On the 14
th
of June, 2012, three days before the Greek national elections, the “Financial Times of Germany” published
a provocative and disdainful article entitled “resist to the demagogue” (sic) in Greek language
(http://www.ftd.de/politik/europa/:wahlempfehlung-antistatheite-sto-dimagogo-widersteht-den-demagogen/70050480.html,
July 10, 2012), asking Greek citizens not to vote for the Coalition of the Radical Left Party, Syriza, by performing a personal
attack to the party’s leader Alexis Tsipras, thus concealing the political and social background of the rise in left politics. The
particular initiative was one of the many propagandistic interventions in the internal affairs of Greece, disregarding and
attempting to manipulate and to patronize the free will of the particular country’s citizenry, in an anxious defense of the failed
austerity politics that take place in a country foreign to the particular publication and its public. The sole difference of the
supposed “serious” press from tabloids like “Bild-Zeitung” seems to be a stylistic one; mainstream media use the same
hegemonic discourses as “Bild” that reify capitalism and discredit people in class and culturalist frames.
668 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Cultural norms and belief systems play an active part in the reproduction and evolution of capi-
talism and consist of one out of several “spheres of activity” (Harvey 2010, 123) within the trajecto-
ries of capitalist development. Neoliberalism shapes mental conceptions of the world, embedding
particular forms of knowledge under the framework of its core social values, relating to competition,
flexible hard work, entrepreneurialism, free market activity, free trade. Bauman (2009/2000, 291)
argues that the finite basis of the exceptional status of consumer Western societies, may trigger
popular anxieties that could require particular forms of social engineering that lie on the “well-
tested, racist perspective” drawn from the experience of the not too distant past. Recent and distant
history of Europe has many examples of violent scapegoating to demonstrate. The fetishization of
“Greece” and “Greeks” seems convenient to neoliberal social engineering, as it obscures the sys-
temic and ideological foundations of the particular crisis and blocks public critique towards the eco-
nomic objectives and policies managing the crisis.
As Graeber (2011, 321) argues, money is a political instrument, which has the potential to be-
come a moral imperative to itself, according to which, every sort of human relation can become a
matter of a cost-benefit calculation (Graeber 2011, 319), with all aspects of life dominated by the
impersonal power of the market. Cash was initially deployed for relations between strangers or
authority and subordinates. The story of capitalism, Graeber (2011, 332) argues, is the story where
a credit economy (with credit meaning reputation for honesty) was turned into an economy of inter-
est, with the conversion of moral networks by impersonal ones. Money reduces quality to quantity
and extinguishes value differences (Diken 2009, 67). Money incites a cynical view on things, reduc-
ing everything as purchasable and distinction of things as utterly meaningless. In that sense, any-
thing - from islands to people- can be seen and desired as commodities that can be sold and
owned. The logic of money, market rationality, and economistic politics, commoditizes new entities
of the world. Diken notes the rise of two variants of nihilism by such a tedious understanding of the
world. On one hand, Diken discusses a commodity fetish passivism, as things are somehow taken
for granted and cannot change; in this context, infantilized consumers have nothing to fight for be-
sides the pursuing of narcissistic fantasies, and thus oscillate from one desire to the next, with the
promise of fulfilment being constantly deferred by consumer society. On the other hand, a self-
destructive, ecstatic impulse also rises from the same mind frame. The environmental crisis due to
capitalist accumulation and consumerist lifestyle is a clear sign of such nihilism (Diken 2009, 69).
An acceleration of (pseudo-) knowledge on Greece and the (native) people of Greece, seems to
advance in the mediascape, departing from the elite construction of Greece’s exceptional status in
Europe. In the crisis context, Greece is constructed as a problem. The problematization of a given
social entity is followed by its rational explanation and the production of solutions. The “Greek prob-
lem” is explained through the fetishist discourses of Greece and Greeks produced by the cultural
industries. Foucault (1989/1975) demonstrated that truth regimes are being established through the
systematization of dispersed and largely arbitrary statements on particular issues that appear im-
portant at specific time-spaces. Stereotypes and nationalistic sentiments existing before the par-
ticular crisis are recontextualized in the crisis context. They form new beliefs, generating new social
relations between different people. The objectification of a given population under particular char-
acteristics is connected to technologies of governance, based on the knowledge invented, denying
the Other’s autonomy. Production of knowledge on the essence of the Other establishes an archive
of information and a set of guiding, practical ideas on the Other (Goldberg 2009/2000, 227). As
Bauman (2009/2000) notes, stereotypes and racial knowledge are used as instruments for social
engineering by the state or other authorities.
Perhaps though Greek people are not so different than other Europeans; they believe in con-
sumerism as much as others do, they are as susceptible to government or market manipulation as
other people across the globe are. Furthermore, the Greek people are also as capable of challeng-
ing their government as other people in other parts of the world are. Could different European peo-
ple whose government decided to follow the G.W.Bush administration’s wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq stop such decisions despite their opposition? Many Greek people have been struggling against
the Greek government’s choices and power structures in their country fiercely, long before the an-
nouncement of the particular crisis, possibly since the beginning of the Greek state.
Furthermore, the fetishization of Greece obscures the most obvious point: Greek society is a
class society, full of divisions, conflicts of interest and contradictions like all societies. One needs to
consider the December 2008 revolt throughout the country, sparkled by the murder of a teenager
by a policeman. The revolt occurred not only due to the particular incident of cold-blood murder by
the police, but also due to different injustices experienced by great segments of the country’s popu-
lation (Dalakoglou and Vardis 2011; Kouvelakis 2011). The December events were an event
(Badiou 2003) created by a local expression of the transnational multitude of people living precari-
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 669
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
ous lives today. The pseudo-event (Badiou 2003) of the economic crisis was the reaction to events
created by people across the globe. The struggles of many Greek people against the degradation
of their lives, their institutions and their country occurring for more than two years, is another ex-
ample of popular reflexes in Greece against oppression and the irrationality of authority’s rationali-
ty. Possibly, the resistance of Greek people towards the structural adjustment programs imposed
by the “Troikans” – which have been rather passively accepted in Portugal and Ireland, despite
their failure even by their planners’ standards – is a central reason behind the on-going attacks
towards the identity of the particular people. The EU is already producing policy changes that com-
promise democratic and social rights, while further introducing into governance neoliberal agents
who lack democratic credibility and are even hostile to any sense of democracy.
What also needs to be understood is that the majority of the Greek people opposed to the loan-
ing politics of the Greek government, Eurozone governments and the Troika. The mass political
mobilisations of the last two years as well as the electoral results of the May 6, 2012 national elec-
tions of Greece, demonstrated that. The accumulation of defeat of popular struggles, along with the
enormous and sustained political, economic and psychological pressure posed on the Greek peo-
ple by local and global elites and mass media, to accept austerity as something they deserve and
also as a “responsible” strategy with no alternatives, also produced regressive results. An expres-
sion of regressive attitudes was the (thin) 17
th
of June electoral victory of the - largely publicly dis-
credited, along with the Social Democrats (PASOK), as responsible for the failed governing of the
country over the past thirty years- Conservative Party of “Nea Dimokratia” that is devoted to serve
a neoliberal political agenda, favouring privatizations of public assets and prolonged austerity poli-
cies. Further expressions of social regression concern the election of the neo-nazi band of “Chrysi
Avgi” to the Greek Parliament, as well as the escalation of street violence, racism, high suicide
rates and depression in the country.
Global and local mass media, along with politico-economic elites stress that austerity policies
and the continuation of Greece’s indebtment from funds coming from the IMF, the EU and the ECB
are the only way to “salvation”. Alternatives do exist though. They are just in expense of bank inter-
ests and threaten corporate welfare. Alternatives can progressively lead to victories for the strug-
gles of the new proletariat, something that neoliberal hegemony detests as it would challenge its
fundamentalist orthodoxy of “no alternative” and the social imaginary of “capitalist realism”. Per-
haps, instead of passively blaming Greek people, European citizens should begin to think critically
and politically, using the contradictions and paradoxes of contemporary system as opportunities for
thought and political praxis in Arendt’s (1986/1958) terms, as well as to challenge their govern-
ments’ policies that dismantle welfare provisions, while recklessly bailing out the banking system
through the provision of loans to Greek governments. Greece is caught in a vicious circle of debt
and loans. The problem of debt will not be resolved by further indebtment as debt accumulation is
only worsening the situation of Greece and its people. Voices in different countries (yet minoritari-
an) express alternative discourses to the socially catastrophic crisis-policies and express their soli-
darity to the struggles of the Greek people.
To conclude, I deploy Deleuze’s metaphor, “desert islands” in order to defend desert islands
against their commodification and generally, against the privatization of everything. Desert islands
were assets (Hartman 2009) that economic and political technocrats had their eye on, in the
chained by debt politics 21
st
century’s Greece, possibly speculating on profitable investments for
(more) tourist infrastructure in the country, or for the construction of private and secured paradises,
private Disney-resorts of gated communities (Davis 2006) in the face of possible environmental and
social collapse in the near future.
For Deleuze, desert islands symbolize potentialities for new identities, worlds, social relations.
More particularly, desert islands symbolize the possibility to imagine and to actualize a different
future, liberated from the passive/radical nihilist complexes of late capitalist societies. According to
Deleuze (2004, 10): “To dream of islands, whether with joy or in fear, is to dream of pulling away, of
being already separate, far from any continent, of being lost and alone, or to dream of starting from
scratch, recreating, beginning anew.”
A close and holistic analysis of political events, drawing on political economy and cultural cri-
tique, shows that societies are transforming towards the worst (Chicchi 2009, 142). Žižek (2010,
91) argues that the crisis should be turned into an opportunity to produce a better Europe, a Eu-
rope that is the bearer of Enlightened values, liberty, equality, fraternity, other than a Europe that is
based on the formula of “lower costs, higher efficiency”. Balibar (2010, 309) noted that the imple-
mentation of IMF plans in Greece will result in the Eurozone becoming “a zone of fierce and wide
competition among its members”. For Balibar, the results of such a trajectory can prove to be cata-
strophic, unless an alternative understanding and vision for the European economic policy and for
670 Yiannis Mylonas
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
the European social model is found. Perhaps, as a Sonia Mitralia - a member of the Greek Commit-
tee Against the Debt and the Women’s Initiative Against the Debt and Austerity - claimed, Greece
of 2012 is what Spain of 1936 was for the people of Europe.
References
Adorno, Theodor, and Max Horkheimer. 1996/1947. The Dialectic of the Enlightenment. Athens: Nisos (in Greek).
Agamben, Giorgio. 2000. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. California: Stanford University Press.
Arendt, Hannah. 1986/1956. The Human Condition. Athens: Gnosi (in Greek).
Badiou, Alain. 2003. Ethics: An Essay in the Understanding of Evil. London: Verso.
Badiou, Alain. 2008. The Meaning of Sarkozy. London: Verso.
Badiou, Alain. 2012. Save the Greeks from Their Saviours! Accessed March 9, 2012.
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/articles/save-the-greeks-from-their-saviors/
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2009/2000. Modernity, Racism, Extermination. In Theories of Race and Racism, Second Edition, edited
by Les Back and John Solomos, 277-293. London: Routledge.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2005. Liquid Life. London: Polity.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2005b. Work, Consumerism and the New Poor. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
BBC. 2012. Greece Debt: Merkel Urges Deal Soon on Second Bailout. Accessed June 8, 2012
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16466135
Berardi, Franco (Bifo). 2009. The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy. Los Angeles: Semiotext(E).
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
Channel 4. 2011. Go Greek For A Week. Accessed March 9, 2012. http://www.channel4.com/programmes/go-greek-for-a-
week
Couldry, Nick. 2010. Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics After Neoliberalism. London: Sage.
Crouch, Colin. 2011. Post-Democracy. London. Polity.
Chicchi, Federico. 2009. On the Threshold of Capital, at the Thresholds of the Common. In Crisis in the Global Economy:
Financial Markets, Social Struggles, New Political Senarios, edited by Andrea Fumagalli and Sandro Mezzadra, 139-
152. Los Angeles: Semiotext(E).
Dalakoglou, Dimitris, and Antonis Vardis, eds. 2011. Revolt and Crisis in Greece: Between a Present Yet to Pass and a
Future Still to Come. London: AK Press and Occupied London.
Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of Slums. London: Verso.
Dean, Kathryn. 2003. Capitalism and Citizenship: The Impossible Partnership. London: Routledge.
Dean, Jodi. 2009. Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics. Duke: Duke
University Press.
Debord, Guy. 1986/1967. The Society of Spectacle. Thessaloniki: Ekdotiki Thessalonikis (in Greek).
Deleuze, Giles. 2004. Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974. Los Angeles: Semiotext(E).
Diken, Bulent. 2009. Nihilism. London: Routledge.
Diken, Bulent. 2009b. Radical Critique as a Paradox of Post-Political Society. Third Text 23 (5): 579-586.
Douzinas, Costas. 2010. The Greek Tragedy. Journal of Modern Greek Studies 28: 285-291.
Douzinas, Costas. 2010b. The Mediterranean to Come. Accessed April 18, 2012. http://macba.cat/uploads
/20101209/qp_24_douzinas.pdf
Ellyl, Jacques. 2011/1977. The Political Delusion. Thessaloniki: Nissides (in Greek).
EU Observer. 2011. Merkel Under Fire for 'Lazy Greeks' Comment. Accessed June 8, 2012.
http://euobserver.com/843/32363
Eurostat. 2012. National Accounts -GDP. Accessed June 25, 2012.
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/national_accounts%e2%80%93gdp
Fairclough, Norman. 2003. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel. 1989/1975. Surveillance and Punishment, the Birth of Prison. Athens: Rappa (in Greek).
Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the College De France 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
Freedman, Des. 2008. The Politics of Media Policy. Cambridge: Polity.
Fuchs, Christian, Matthias Schafranek, David Hakken, and Marcus Breen. 2010. Capitalist Crisis, Communication, & Culture
– Introduction to the Special Issue of tripleC. Triple C 8 (29): 193- 204. Accessed April 7, 2012. http://www.triple-
c.at/index.php/triplec/article/view/228
Goldberg, David T. 2009. Racial Knowledge. In Theories of Race and Racism, Second Edition, edited by Les Back and
John Solomos, 226-252. London: Routledge.
Global Finance. 2012. Greece Country Report. Accessed June 25, 2012. http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-
reports/266-greece-gdp-country-report.html#axzz1 ynfd tqwt
Graeber, David. 2011. Debt, the First 5000 Years. New York: Melville House Publishing.
Guardian 2010. Get Up Earlier, Germans Tell Greeks. Accessed March 9, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/05/bild-open-letter-greece-papandreou?intcmp=ilcnettxt3487
Harman, Chris. 2011/2009. Zombie Capitalism. Athens: Marxistiko Viliopolio (in Greek).
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harvey, David. 2010. The Enigma of Capital And The Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile Books.
Haroche, Claude, and Eugène Enriquez. 2004/2002. The Dark Face of Contemporary Democracies. Thessaloniki: Nisides
(in Greek).
Hesmondhalgh, David. 2007. The Cultural Industries. London: Sage.
Horkheimer, Max. 2006/1939. The Jews and Europe. Athens: Erasmus (in Greek).
Inman, Phillip, and Helena Smith. 2010. Greece Should Sell Islands to Keep Bankruptcy at Bay, Say German MPs. The
Guardian, March, 4.
tripleC 10(2): 646-671, 2012 671
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Keep Talking Greece. 2010. Greek Deputy FM: The German War Reparations Issue Is Still Open. Accessed July 5, 2012.
http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com /2010/12/02/greek-deputy-fm-the-german-wwii-reparations-issue-is-still-open/
Kellner, Douglas. 2003. Media Spectacle. London: Routledge.
Klein, Ulrike. 1998. Tabloidized Political Coverage in Bild-Zeitung. The Public. 5 (3): 79-93.
Klein, Naomi. 2007. The Shock Doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Kotz, David M. 2009. The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A Systemic Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism. Review of
Radical Political Economics 41 (3): 305-317.
Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2011. The Greek Cauldron. The New Left Review 72: 17-32.
Krugman, Paul. 2009. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Lapavitsas, Costas, Peter Bratsis, Stathis Kouvelakis, and Etienne Balibar. 2010. The Greek Crisis: Politics, Economics,
Ethics. Journal Of Modern Greek Studies 28: 293-309.
Lasch, Christopher. 2001/1979. The Culture of Narcissim. Thessaloniki: Nisides (in Greek).
Lentin, Alana, and Gavan Titley. 2011. The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age. London: Zed Books.
Lucarelli, Stefano. 2009. Financialization as Biopower. In Crisis in the Global Economy: Financial Markets, Social Struggles,
New Political Senarios, edited by Andrea Fumagalli and Sandro Mezzadra, 119-138. Los Angeles: Semiotext(E).
Lukacs, Georg. 2001/1923. History and Class Consciousness. Athens: Odysseas (in Greek).
Marx, Karl. 2008/1947. The Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One. Athens: Sychroni Epochi (in Greek).
Mazower, Mark. 1995. Inside Hilter’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941-1944. Yale: Yale University Press.
McChesney, Robert. 2009. The Political Economy of Media. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2004/2000. The Democratic Paradox. Athens: Polis (in Greek).
Milios, Yiannis, and Dimitris Sotiropoulos. 2011. Imperialism, Financial Markets, Crisis. Athens: Nisos (in Greek).
Mitralia, Sonia. 2012. Spain 1936 – Greece 2012: Peoples of Europe Unite! Accessed March 20, 2012.
http://takethesquare.net/2012/02/27/spain-1936-greece-2012-peoples-of-europe-unite-add-your-signature-to-the-
statement/
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2010. Annual Hours Actually Worked Per Worker. Ac-
cessed March 20, 2012. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?datasetcode=anhrs
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2011. Government at a Glance 2011. OECD Publishing.
Accessed March 20, 2012. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2011_gov_glance-2011-en
O’Hara, Phillip A. 2009. The Global Securitized Subprime Market Crisis. Review of Radical Political Economics 41 (3): 318-
334.
Resnick, Stephen, and Richard Wolff. 2009. The Economic Crisis: A Marxist Interpretation. Rethinking Marxism: A Journal
of Economics, Culture and Society. 22 (2): 170-186.
Reuters, 2012. Greece Must Tackle Job Cut Taboo to Escape Crisis – IMF. Accessed March 30, 2012.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/uk-markets-greece-imf-idukbre82r17j20120328
Sennett, Richard. 2006. The Culture of New Capitalism. London: Yale University Press.
Sevastakis, Nicolas. 2012. The Tyranny of the Obvious. Thoughts on the Time’s Psyche. Athens: Oi Ekdoseis Ton Enthe-
maton Tis Avgis (in Greek).
Stiglitz, Josef. 2008. Time for a Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Urry John. 2002/1995. Consuming Places. London: Routledge.
Varoufakis, Yanis. 2011. Crisis’ Lexicon. Athens: Potamos (in Greek).
Vasudevan, Ramaa. 2009. Dollar Hegemony, Financialization and the Credit Crisis. Review of Radical Political Economics
41 (3): 391-304.
Ward, John. 2012. Greek Deficit: How Berlin Encouraged Papandreou to Big-Up the 2009 Greek Deficit. Defence of Ger-
man Banks a Key Factor. Accessed July 4, 2012. http://hat4uk.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/greek-deficit-how-berlin-
encouraged-papandreou-to-big-up-the-2009-greek-deficit/
Wren, Karen. 2001. Cultural Racism: Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Social and Cultural Geography 2 (2): 141-
162.
Žižek, Slavoj. 2010. A Permanent Economic Emergency. New Left Review 64: 85-95.
Žižek, Slavoj, 2012. Save Us from the Saviours. Accessed June 29, 2012. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n11/slavoj-Žižek/save-
us-from-the-saviours
About the Author
Yiannis Mylonas
is a Post Doctoral Researcher at the Media and Communications’ Department, Lund University. He has a background in
Philosophy, Social Psychology and Media Studies. His research interests depart from the theoretical foundations of Critical
Theory and Post Structuralism and relate to the study of media and politics. He has published studies on discourse analysis
of war representations, political subjectivity, civic cultures and on the political economy of copyrights.