tripleC 9(2): 377-384, 2011
ISSN 1726-670X
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Foundations for Science of Information: Reflection on the
Method of Inquiry
Marcin J. Schroeder
mjs@aiu.ac.jp, Akita International University, Akita, Japan
Abstract: The paper considers necessary conditions for establishing information science as a scientific autonomous disci-
pline. The lack of a commonly accepted definition of information is not as threatening as it may seem, as each study within
the discipline may choose an own definition, as well as an own philosophical framework, when there are some alternatives
to choose between. More important is the development of a common methodology of inquiry and some range of standard
questions regarding the concept of information. Also, it is important to develop some standards of inquiry, which would
make information scientific studies accessible to philosophical analysis and reflection. In turn, contributions of information
science to the resolution of problems identified within philosophy will give the best measure of maturity for information sci-
ence as a discipline.
Keywords: Methodology of Information Science, Philosophy of Information Science, Definition of Information
Information does not have yet a commonly accepted, generic, context independent definition. This
is not as disturbing as it may seem for the emancipation of information science. After all, empirical
disciplines do not start from precisely formulated definitions, but from the evidence of reoccurring
patterns of phenomena and attempts to build appropriate conceptual framework to analyze them.
What actually is necessary for a rising discipline of information science in order to secure its
identity are a widely accepted range of instances of the occurrence of information or information
phenomena and a common agreement regarding the earlier results of inquiry, usually carried out
within other fields, that should be either adopted into the new discipline, or at least explained by it.
For instance, it is difficult to imagine science of information disregarding completely Shannon’s
entropy as a measure of information, although further developments may replace it by a more suit-
able measure.
Thus, even if the temperature of the discussions on the definition of information is continuously
high, there is little disagreement regarding what phenomena should be considered as information
related, and which results qualified as studies of information have lost relevance for the future dis-
cipline.
Accepted as a matter of fact, current lack of commonly accepted definition of information is by
no means a justification for disregard of the importance of the search of such a definition, or pos-
sibly definitions which could direct more domain specific studies of information. Even more import-
ant is that no study should avoid clear statement of its way of understanding of this fundamental
concept or resort to casual, common sense, ill defined, but catchy explanation of the meaning.
In this paper, there will be frequent references to author’s own definition (Schroeder, 2005)
introduced in the past, but many theses discussed here are independent from the specifics of this
definition. The references to this definition and to the philosophical foundations on which it has
been built serve rather as exemplifications of what is presented in more general manner allowing
for different understanding of information.
Philosophical foundations for the study of information are mentioned above not accidentally. To-
gether with the choice of a particular definition of information, in every information-scientific study it
should be clear what conceptual framework is used, and this requires that some philosophical
foundations are established. Too frequently, papers about information addressing fundamental
issues, in apparent attempt to preserve generality, avoid specification of the meaning of fundamen-
tal concepts, which at best is the result of reluctance to declare own position to avoid controversy,
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at worst of intellectual poverty. In the consequence, frequently in one paper there are references to
the results coming from works built on contradictory assumptions threatening consistency of the
reasoning.
Although it is not necessary (not even desirable or possible) for scientific discipline, in distinction
from its particular studies, to be funded on a unique philosophical platform, it has to have a definite
methodology (including a register of basic questions) and its theses should allow for philosophical
interpretation and reflection. Its maturity can be measured by the number and extent of its contribu-
tions to philosophical inquires, especially those motivated by questions of independent origins.
1. Scientific Methods of Information Studies
The explosion of interest in information started from Shannon’s epoch making paper on his Theory
of Communication. It is quite clear that he was writing about communication and that his work was
not a theory of information, although he is using this expression when introducing “[q]uantities of
the form H = - Σ p
i
log p
i
[…] as measures of information, choice and uncertainty” (Shannon,
1949/1998). The word “information” appears there in the compound of “information source which
produces a message” and it is information source which is modeled mathematically as a Markoff
process, not information. But the fact that something is measured, be it information, chance or un-
certainty, gave existence to the new concept and at the same time new entity, something which
exists independently and which has a quantitative characteristic called entropy. It is not a message,
as in the process of communication it is changed into a signal from which it is later reconstructed
as a message again. It would be strange to consider choice or uncertainty moving or being trans-
formed, so without clear statement in Shannon’s work this entity has been identified with informa-
tion. Shannon’s entropy acquired dozens of generalizations, but remains a fundamental, although
not unquestionable measure of information. Present author’s view is that it does not measure in-
formation, but the capacity of a carrier to acquire information (Schroeder, 2004).
For several decades the study of information has been dominated by the exploitation of the
quantitative characteristics of information, including attempts to make it independent from the
probability measure which has to be pre-defined for the purpose of introducing of the concept of
entropy or its generalizations. The attempts to study of information as a structural concept have
acquired relatively little attention, at least among those interested in information as a fundamental
idea, due to open disregard for immense volume of results based on the quantitative approach.
However, the actual theory of information must provide not only quantitative description, but also
model or models of the concept itself. It is not enough to say that entropy measures information, if
we do not have any mathematical (or other) representation of the concept itself. Can we say that a
probability measure is information? Entropy is just a single numerical characteristic of a probability
measure. If we do not agree that probability measure is information, then what it is?
Here we have the point where the need for methodological reflection becomes clear. What are
the characteristics of information different from its measure? What do we want to know about in-
formation?
We have to start from the recognition of the possibility that there are some other quantitative de-
scriptions of information. Kolmogorov-Chaitin algorithmic measure is an example, although not
perfect, as we can find its close correspondence to the original one. Both are measuring size of
information. We may have quantitative measures which are not related to the size, such as for in-
stance ill-fated measure of semantic information developed by Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1952/1963).
Development of other quantitative characteristics requires prior answers to the questions what do
we want to measure and how? But this question should be considered only after we can clarify
more general issue of characteristics which may have only qualitative expression.
Thus, what kind of questions can we ask about information? What are the main features of this
concept? We can try to use experience of another discipline, but closely related, semiotics. It is
natural to inquire about structural characteristics of information analogical to those considered in
syntactics of a symbolic system, i.e. the ways information is build of some structural units. Another
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perspective can be given by consideration of localization, and corresponding to it distribution, of
information, both referring to either the spatial (geometric, topological, or other,) or temporal de-
scription. Yet another approach would be an analogue to formal logical analysis of information. In
this case it would be necessary to develop a concept of informational consequence.
Different direction, based on the analysis of the meaning of information, has been already initi-
ated right after the publication of Shannon’s paper. Very early attempts of Bar-Hillel and Carnap
belong to this direction, but the lack of convincing results inhibited the development of semantic
analysis. Success of such an approach requires an answer to the question about the information-
scientific understanding of symbolic representation which is in the core of the problem. The present
author has proposed an approach based on a new concept of the symbol as a representation of big
volume of information on one carrier by a smaller one on a different carrier (Schroeder, 2010).
Pragmatics of information is probably at present the most active and developed direction of
study, at least when it is understood in terms of the use of information in human collectives, or al-
ternatively in terms of its use in computer technology. The approach could be generalized to the
question of functioning of information in the external context of information and informational pro-
cesses.
The attempts to answer the questions about characteristics of information should start from
some analysis of the manifestations of information. Shannon’s measure of information has been
based on the choice of manifestation which can be called selective. Information source is selecting
(making choices in Shannon’s words) of specific options out of predetermined collective according
to some probability distribution. This dependence on a probability distribution has been a source of
opposition among those who were more interested in information which can be called structural,
and which is reflected in the mutual relationship of the elements of some collective (Schroeder,
2005). Kolmogorov-Chaitin concept of algorithmic information investigates structural characterist-
ics of the code, but is limited to very limited type of structural relationships which do not deviate
from the original concept of a message. Structural characteristics may go much further in the direc-
tion of geometric, topological, or even more general relations.
Looking at the way information has been exploited by other civilizations, we may think about a
type of information manifestation which could be called “taxonomic”. Majority of cultures have ac-
cumulated experience by grouping particular instances of information around representative proto-
types. Such “ethnoscientific” information systems studied mainly with the use of linguistic tools,
sometimes acquired level of very high sophistication exceeding that of the western style scientific
disciplines. Frake (1962) gives example of Hanoonoo tropical-forest agriculturalists of the central
Philippines who classify their plant world into more than 1600 categories, whereas systematic
botanists classify the same flora into less than 1200 species. There is of course a question whether
this information structure is a reflection of the characteristics of information inherent in the envi-
ronment or rather human, cultural invention resulting from the necessity to deal with the rich and
unorganized volume of information overflowing genetically transmitted mechanisms of information
processing.
There is no reason to believe that the three types of information manifestations, selective, struc-
tural, and taxonomic are the only possible or worth of attention. Whether the list will include other
types of manifestation or not, every comprehensive study of information should be able to deal with
all types.
The next topic for the study of information is its dynamics. When Shannon gave the name en-
tropy to his measure of information on advice from Von Neumann based on formal analogy of the
formulas, he was not aware of the fact that the foundations for the bridge between physics and
information science have been already set in the analysis of “Maxwell’s Demon.” It was a long way
to Landauer’s assertion “Information is physical,” but even those who insisted on separation of the
disciplines had to accept the fact that Boltzmann’s analysis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics
has to apply to every information system implemented in physical reality. Thus, information has
become a subject to temporal development leading to its destruction. It is a quite unusual situation,
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as in the past the fundamental measurable concepts have been entering scientific consideration
typically through some conservation laws.
However, physical analysis of information systems and reversed informational analysis of phys-
ical phenomena is not the only direction of the study in information dynamics. Another direction
started from Turing’s study of computation. In both cases the fundamental concept is of a physical
state. Any form of computation requires a system with multiple states, and typically it is understood
that they are physical states. Thus, it is natural to expect that in information science the study of
the relationship between the concept of a physical state and information is a necessary introductory
step to the analysis of dynamics. With or without clarification of this issue, a general study of inter-
action between information systems can be expected as a main subject of information science. At
present, there are multiple examples of such studies carried out within the limits of more specific
disciplines, such as genetics, ecology, social sciences, economics, etc. The general approach is
thus far limited to “kinematics” of information in the form of Maximum Entropy Principle, where de-
velopment of one isolated system is considered. There is also considerable interest in open sys-
tems and systems far from equilibrium, but mathematical obstacles make the development of such
theoretical systems slow.
The study of information dynamics requires a development of understanding of the relationship
between information and causality. There was a considerable interest in the issues of causal rela-
tions involved in the analysis of information and its transmission or transformation. Another way to
approach the relationship is to explain causality in terms of information.
2. Examples of Philosophical Contributions to the Inquiry of Information
Discussions of the problems in understanding the meaning of information are frequently influenced
by the scientific mind-set of participants who believe that something which we call “information”
exists independently from our inquiry in the real world and our role is just to discover what it is and
to find its appropriate description independent from the descriptions of other objects of our experi-
ence. The active role of inquirer in creating possible multiple conceptualizations of information is
usually excluded, and the discussion of the definition is limited to the question “who is right and
who is wrong?” Thus, the interest is mainly in the literary understanding of the question “What is
information?” without a reflection how this concept fits our understanding of all reality.
There are some exceptions in the study of information in which philosophical reflection is of spe-
cial importance, although we may not be willing to follow the arguments of the authors. For in-
stance, it is difficult to accept the view presented by Paul Young (1987) in the introduction and de-
fended in the content to his book “The Nature of Information”: “[…] in each and every case what we
know as information is the precise equivalent of what traditionally has been referred to as form. […]
information must be viewed as a flow of mass-energy forms. […] it will quickly become apparent
that in all information processes in physical, chemical, and biological systems, the information
stored, transmitted, or manipulated is identical with one or another of the above definitions of form
– shape, configuration, pattern, arrangement, order, organization, or relations – so that whatever
information is, it appears to be in all senses a form phenomenon.” Young is trying to modernize
Aristotelian concept of substance consisting of matter and form by identification of the former with
the relativistic idea of mass-energy, and giving the latter dynamics of a flow. Not only this modern
interpretation of Aristotelian substance is inconsistent, but there is no convincing argument that
information and form should be identified. However, it is interesting to see that his understanding of
form is focusing of structural relations, and is totally ignoring the original paradigm of Shannon’s
study of information involving the concept of probability.
Searching for the conceptual foundation for information in Aristotelian or scholastic concept of a
form has been considered by others too. Raphael Capurro and Birger Hjorland started their inquiry
in this direction from the etymological considerations. The word “information” has its origins in the
idea that the substance acquire its individual, actual being contrasted with potentiality of the matter,
through the process in which the latter is “informed.” Scholastic philosophers viewed the process of
learning as “informing the mind.”
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The argument that the explanative power of this approach to information is supported by the fact
of linguistic tradition is doubtful. The word “information” in this meaning disappeared from the lan-
guage for several centuries. More persistent in the use has been the expression of “materialization
of the form,” than “information of the matter.” Nobody not acquainted with scholastic philosophy
wood be able to guess the meaning of the latter expression, and it is quite sure that when the word
“information” has been revived by Shannon’s work Aristotelian philosophy did not influence the way
people understood it.
Thus, the etymology of the word “information” is irrelevant for our study, unless we have reason
to believe that the revival of Aristotelian or scholastic philosophy can be helpful in building philo-
sophical foundations for our present view of the world.
Since, I do not expect that much from the philosophy of the Peripatetics, my own view of infor-
mation has followed different way. Let’s try to look for what is common for all phenomena which are
intuitively associated with information. The most fundamental common feature is the relationship
between the multiplicity of potential options and the unique actualization.
This aspect of information is very clear in Shannon’s study of communication in which each
character of the message is carrying the amount of information dependent on the probability of its
choice out of the multiplicity of an alphabet. Information here is identified with the selection of one
out of many predefined options. Similar reference to the multiplicity can be found in the passage of
Bateson’s analysis of information, from which comes “any difference that makes a difference” fre-
quently assumed to be his definition of information.
The relationship between one and many does not have to be limited to the selection of the one
out of the many. We can also consider making one out of the many by introducing a structure
which binds the many into a whole. Here we can find a correspondence with a form which gives
individual existence to matter with its multiplicity of the potential forms of existence. Young in the
quotation above “defines” form as one of many structures, each can be used to transform multiple
components into a whole.
What we have found thus far is that whatever context of information is considered, information is
related to the relationship between one and many, and the philosophical theme of the one-many
relationship has probably the richest tradition of all philosophical themes. No philosophical system
was indifferent to the questions relating unity and multiplicity. It is natural to expect that philosophi-
cal reflection on information conceptualized in terms of the one-many relation can be much more
productive than that based on philosophical poverty of concepts such as uncertainty, difference, or
even that based on as reach in philosophical reflection concept of the form.
Thus, author’s own definition of information has been formulated as identification of a variety,
where identification is understood as that which either selects, distinguishes one out of many, or
that which makes the many into one (a whole). The former can be called a selective aspect of in-
formation, the latter structural aspect. (Schroeder, 2005) I have referred to the distinction as to an
aspect of information, not a type, as the closer inspection shows that the “selectivity” and “struc-
turality” of information are always present, and it is only a matter of manifestation of information
which gives its dominating characteristic. Processes of transformation of information (processing)
frequently are changing the dominating aspect.
We could see an example how the philosophical considerations can contribute to conceptualiza-
tion of a subject which itself is of quite specific scientific interest.
3. Between the Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Information
Standard One of the most “philosophically loaded” domains of scientific inquiry of information is the
study of consciousness. The concept of information has been for years a favorite tool in the at-
tempts to identify and to understand the mechanisms responsible for conscious experience. With-
out doubts, the main reason for this choice has been the computer metaphor of the brain workings.
Although in my own opinion the analogy between computation or computer processing and the
work of the brain in the cognitive functions is deceiving, or even false, it is a clear fact that most of
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attempts to understand consciousness have been based on the assumption of some form of simi-
larity in the architecture of the brain and computer. However, no matter whether the computer
metaphor provides appropriate paradigm for the study of consciousness, there is no better way to
investigate the subject, than to search for the mechanisms of information processing in the brain.
There is one characteristic of the conscious experience which from the early time of psychologi-
cal research has been distinguished, its uniformity or wholeness. William James described it in
short: “The perception is one state of mind or nothing.” (James, 1896) Even earlier, the unity of
cognitive processes has been expressed in the concept of apperception introduced by Gotfried F.
Leibniz, which in the 19
th
Century J. F. Herbart has made a central subject of psychological study,
and which emphasized the view that the mental experience is not composed of separate bits but
forms a unity. One more step back takes us to Descartes and his center of common sense (sensus
communis) integrating contributions of senses into a coherent perception, which of course has
been inherited from Aristotelian study of the common sense and common sensibles. Actually, we
can go back to the beginnings of European philosophical tradition to find the view similar to that of
James presented by Xenophanes “If the divine exists, it is a living thing; if it is a living thing, it sees
– for he sees as a whole, he thinks as a whole, he hears as a whole.” (Barnes, 2001: 43)
In modern psychology, the question of the unity of consciousness diverged into many more spe-
cific fields of study such as a cross-modal sensory integration, the inherited from the Gestalt psy-
chology question of the priority of the perception of a whole over the parts, the face recognition,
etc.
It should not be a surprise, although it was very pleasant one for the author, that James in his
search of the unity of consciousness has made quite extensive diachronic and cross-cultural study
of the tradition of the one-many philosophy, which he identified with the opposition of pluralism and
monism: “The alternative here [of the one and the many, mjs] is known as that between pluralism
and monism. It is the most pregnant of all dilemmas of philosophy.” (James, 1911/1948: 113)
It is a natural question to ask how this unity can be expressed in terms of information or informa-
tion processing. The awareness of importance of the unity of consciousness has accompanied all
modern development of psychology, but only quite recently first hypotheses of the possible models
of information unity or integration have been presented.
Research on the unity of consciousness made by neuro-psychologists has not produced much
material for theoretical considerations. Edelmann and Tononi (1998) with their collaborators have
provided evidence of the correlations between firings of neurons and analyzed them in terms of
entropy. However, the temporal correlations or identification of the regions of the brain cooperating
in producing conscious experience do not tell us much about the mechanism which are responsible
for the correlation. Also, the fact that the processes can be described in terms of entropy does not
constitute evidence for any specific form of information processing. At best, we may be convinced
that integration of information happens in the brain, but we do not have any clue how it happens.
Another approach, purely theoretical, was based on the assumption that cognitive processes
must involve the only physical phenomenon clearly involving integration of the states of its compo-
nents, the quantum-mechanical superposition. This approach culminated in the Hameroff-Penrose
model of information integration in the brain. However, the years are passing and there is no con-
vincing evidence that the relatively large regions of the brain responsible for cognitive functions
could be considered quantum mechanical systems maintaining coherence for the time long enough
to influence consciousness. (Tegmark, 2000)
Present author has proposed different approach which incorporates quantum-theoretical for-
malism into mathematical structure modeling information integration in the brain, but without ne-
cessity to assume that the brain or its parts are actually quantum-mechanical systems. (Schroeder,
2007&2009) The approach is based on the assumption that important is not involvement of quan-
tum mechanics as a physical theory describing the brain as a mechanical system, but the proper-
ties of the structure used in its formalism which can be used in the building of the model describing
information integration. Since it is possible to identify a mathematical structure similar to that under-
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lying quantum formalism in the models of information processing, it is possible to transfer the con-
cept of quantum coherence into the model of information processing. (Schroeder, 2006)
Search for explanation of the unity of consciousness and the attempts to describe or to model in-
formation integration in the brain are bringing a new theme into the study of information, its level of
integration. The theme is of course of considerable interest for philosophical reflection.
At this point, it is too early to build any comprehensive system of thought based on the ideas of
information integration, but the outlines of its description suggest a field for speculation. For in-
stance, we can think about the distinction between essential properties and accidents (or distinction
of a physical object and its physical states) in terms of the level of information integration. The es-
sence (object) may consist of the information integrated into a whole, while accidents (states)
would be the non-integrated part of information.
4. Potential Contributions of Information Science to Philosophy
There is another perspective in which the relationship between philosophy and information science
can be considered. What kind of contributions can be expected from the latter to the former?
Certainly, the study of consciousness is a natural field of interaction between philosophy and
science. For instance, the model of consciousness based on information integration can help in the
elimination of the homunculus fallacy. (Schroeder, 2006) It is quite clear that this fallacy is a result
of the assumption that the mechanisms responsible for cognition have the form of computer-like
input-output devices, in which there is no essential difference between the information in-coming
and out-coming. If we consider cognition as a process involving transformation of information into
higher and higher level of integration, the process does not have any output. There is no need for
the homunculus watching it.
Another classical source of trouble is the question about the free will. Here too, the model of
consciousness based on information integration can help to eliminate the double paradox of the
conscious subject being either fully, mechanically determined by its physical state, or equally
frustrating possibility of being a completely random in its states. The solution would come with inte-
gration of information, which would make decision a result of integration of all information stored in
the brain acting as a whole, in contrast to mechanical systems whose dynamics is determined by
the current state and the forces of interaction with the environment.
Even more elusive, but still feasible within the range of current speculation based on the idea of
information integration, would be the task to clarify the mind-body relationship. This could be
achieved by making distinction between the physical state of the body identified with the volume of
un-integrated information, and integrated information which would be identified with the conscious
mind.
All examples above are speculative, as they are based on the assumption that we can find com-
plete model of information integration with the identified functional elements of the brain on which
the theoretical structure can be implemented. Thus far, models such as that proposed by the
author are far from giving so specific picture. All what at present can be offered is a mathematical
structure in which some elements can be identified with input channels of the low level of integra-
tion, and some other elements can be identified as carriers of highly or even completely integrated
information. Moreover, it is unlikely, although not impossible, looking at the properties of the math-
ematical structure, that the elements of this structure could be identified with the functional units of
the brain such as neurons. However, this issue requires more study, so hypothesizing about it is
out of the scope of this paper.
5. Conclusion
The paper presented several theses regarding possible and actual developments in the process of
solidification of the new scientific discipline of information science together with a review of meth-
odological questions and a reflection on interactions between philosophy and scientific study of
information.
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It seems that the most promising for acquiring a new perspective on the study of information are
the interactions with the field of the study of consciousness, where the concept of information is
applied to the analysis of mechanisms responsible for the conscious experience. In this context an
interesting for both science and philosophy concept of information integration has been discussed
here.
Information science needs firm foundations in a well defined concept of information. In this paper
one of the possible ways to build such foundations has been proposed. Certainly, other alternative
approaches should be explored.
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About the Author
Marcin J. Schroeder, Ph.D.
educated in Poland and United States in theoretical physics and mathematics. His research interests go beyond these
original fields of expertise and include history and philosophy of science, culture studies, philosophical aesthetics, etc. In
information science, his interests are focused recently on integration of information in all its aspects, from philosophical to
mathematical modeling. Since 2004 Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs at Akita International University, Akita, Japan.