345 Tian-qing Qiao
CC: Creative Commons License, 2011.
3. Essence of information and correct research direction
Those languages we can understand (including words we can read) convey information. But one
cannot say that languages we cannot follow (including words we cannot read) have conveyed the
same information, nor can one say the interpretations of such languages have conveyed the same
information. Therefore, there is different interpreted information when we can understand a lan-
guage or not.
When reading a book, seeing a movie, attending a lecture, or listening to music, someone may
be moved or stirred, then one cannot say he does not communicate information with words, pic-
tures and languages. When you explore the substances of words, pictures and languages, you
may be aware that this is the changes between man and natural phenomena, and the communica-
tion between man and his social activities, but not the communication of information between the
lines of words, the vibration frequency and intensity of sound in a language. If the same information
is expressed in strange words and languages, or so-called aliens’ art which man does not know,
nobody is certainly moved or inspired.
Therefore, we can infer a conclusion: information, conventionally understood, is in fact the inter-
action among man, other beings and various matters. When they interact, different things have
different information.
Information can be both material and mental, existing or conscious, produced or received, true
or false, real or fictitious, right or wrong, remembered or forgotten, known or unknown; it can exist
objectively but cannot be perceived subjectively, or vice versa; and it can be powerful or weak,
have tangible or intangible value, and so on. True information is mingled with false, and sometimes
it appears while sometimes it disappears. So, here is another conclusion: information, convention-
ally understood, is self-contradictory.
Wiener introduced the concept of information in the theory of communication to philosophy, a
move that has been considered a breakthrough. However, he failed to anticipate complicated new
ideas and technologies (emerging one after another in today’s society) that have ultimately chal-
lenged our conception and definition of information. His ideas have been diluted by the myriad (and
often confusing) ways in which people have used the concept of information. I am afraid that the
study of information could be placed in the same difficult position as when people were seeking
“the ether” at the end of the 19th century. As a result, the academic community has been unable to
reach a consensus as to the meaning and definition of information.
Focusing on the attributes of things (including beings), we are able to resolve the contradiction
inherent in information, as commonly understood, by distinguishing information from the various
attributes of things. For example, the instruction of a generic product is the same as that of a
brand-name product, but the function of the generic product is not the same as the brand-name
one.
Presently, the concept of information remains self–contradictory and confusing. One is certain to
run into problems while trying to give a philosophical or scientific definition of information. It is im-
possible to state the precise ontological meaning of “information”, just as one language, English or
Esperanto, is unable to unify 4300 languages in the world.
Information, customarily understood, is essentially the most ancient interaction in nature, so, as
in Hegel (1976, pp. 203-223), interaction is the ultimate cause of matter and interaction happens
only between attributes of things.
Languages and words are tools to distinguish between things themselves or connections be-
tween them. Customarily-stated information which languages and words convey lags behind the
attributes of things which result in customarily-stated information. A thing is cause whereas a lan-
guage is effect. Viewed from causality according to time priority order, effect certainly lags behind
cause, too. When someone speaks, his sound is not the thing it expresses or describes. Language
functions to express matters only when it forms the corresponding mechanism in man’s brain.
Language exists both as an artifact in the external world —a collection of symbols in admissible
combinations—and as the embodiment in the brain of those symbols and the principles that deter-