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Praxiologically, information is treated as object of practical action of humans whatsoever, i.e., in
the context of social (cultural, political, economic) steering and intervention, in environmental man-
agement, in the usage and the design of technology. It is a something that can be handled, in par-
ticular, stored, retrieved, distributed, transmitted, received, processed. This is “objectivism”.
Ontologically, this something is conceived as an object of the real-world, be it in the realm of
human society or in the wider physical world, but it needs not necessarily to be a substance in its
own right like matter is said to be in order to qualify for a materialistic ontology. It is sufficient to
look upon it as a derivative of matter, that is, as a property of matter like structure is usually con-
ceived which holds for signal transmission as well. So it’s considered a material object. This is “ma-
terialism”. It’s worth noting that the nature of information in this context is perceived as rather fixed
and static than fluid or dynamic.
Epistemologically, this material object is the object of inquiry by empirical and formal-scientific
methods all of which are carried out in the so-called third-person perspective which means, from
the point of view of an outside observer. Formalisms are developed for measuring the structure of
matter or signals. This is “externalism”.
2.2. Information projectivism
Projectivism projects a particular meaning of information to all the other meanings. The projectiv-
istic way of thinking information is to approach it as a “soft” phenomenon. That is, in analogy to that
subjective human action that is carried out by human actors and esteemed an information process,
subjective activity of the same kind is postulated to be carried out by any agents that are said to
populate the world (Table 3, line 2).
This is, praxiologically, a projection of human subjectivity in information processes onto pro-
cesses with nonhuman entities the degree of subjectivity of which might be put into question –
“subjectivism”.
This is, ontologically, a projection of a presumed intentional nature of human information pro-
cesses onto the nature of processes caused by nonhuman entities the intendedness of which is
questionable – “idealism”. Hence the fluidity and dynamicity of all information in an idealistic view.
This is, epistemologically, a projection of subjective methods of gaining insight into the phenom-
enon of information in humans onto the study of nonhuman information processes – “internalism”.
2.3. Information disjunctivism
Disjunctivism disjoins every meaning from any other meaning of information (Table 3, line 3). The
disjunctivist way of thinking information reserves a distinct category for the subjective (human) ac-
tion of information, praxiologically, in the context of a social discourse made up of humans only;
ontologically, as a human phenomenon only; and, epistemologically, as subject to subjective inter-
pretation only.
2.4. Information integrativism
We found an objective view with reductionism that treats information as object with an exclusive
focus on the structural aspect and a subjective view with projectivism and disjunctivism that regard
information as an agent’s subjective action or activity with an exclusive focus on the process as-
pect. Integrativism reveals information as a subjective process that is constrained and enabled by
information as an objective structure that is produced by information as a subjective process. Pro-
cesses process structures and structures structure processes. That way the processual and the
structural views are prompted to run together as much as the subjectivistic and objectivistic, idealis-
tic and materalistic, internalistic and externalistic views are mediated and the two cultures of the
“soft” and the “hard” sciences are made for bridging (Table 3, line 4).