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ics like income inequality, labour rights, job security, social security, welfare, etc – it ignores the
topic of class and class critique. The main effect is the ideological legitimization and celebration of
neoliberalism.
For Georg Lukács, ideology “by-passes the essence of the evolution of society and fails to pin-
point it and express it adequately” (Lukács, 1972, p. 50). An ideology is a claim about a certain
status of reality that does not correspond to actual reality. It deceives human subjects in order to
forestall societal change. It is false consciousness (Lukács, 1972, p. 83). One may therefore add
that the new spirit of networks is an ideology precisely in Georg Lukács’ sense of the term as false
consciousness: it proclaims that reality looks like in a certain way and that this reality is positive,
whereas the reality of life in capitalism as such is precarious for many and is shaped by deepened
class relations. It proclaims the substitution of class by a democratic world of labour, whereas in
reality neoliberalism has deepened class inequality. There is a difference between claims that
dominant actors try to communicate to the public and actual reality.
The history of modern media has also been a history of ideologies that mythologize information
and communication technologies and thereby on the one side create moral panics that stress only
negative effects for society and on the other side only celebrate positive consequences. They have
lacked a dialectical understanding of the media and society (for the concept of the dialectical an-
alysis of the media and society see: Fuchs, 2011, chapters 2+3). Take for example radio broad-
casting, an information technology established in early 20
th
century. The new medium resulted in
both techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic speculations. So on the one hand commentators for
example in a celebratory tone claimed that the radio “extends the hearing power of the human ear
around the earth, or will do so, to enable anyone to listen to audible sounds anywhere else. Some
day in the future man may even go out from his own planet and beyond his own atmosphere and if
other planets are inhabited by sentient beings, he and they may find it possible to communicate”
(Popular Mechanics, October 1926, p. 652). Others advanced cultural pessimistic assessments,
saying for example that the effect of radio on children is that they “are actually frightened, or grow
so nervous they can’t go to sleep afterward” and that they do not “set the table or do their home-
work” (The Rotarian, November 1938, p. 12).
Similar one-sided claims that neglect the complex dialectic of the media and society are today
made about social media. Let’s return to the example of the UK riots. On the one hand there was
the techno-pessimistic claim that the Internet caused the riots when commentators spoke of “Twit-
ter mobs” and “Blackberry mobs”. On the other hand, there were reports about the emergence of
an Internet “broom army” that “sweeps in to reclaim streets” in order to “clear up the debris”.
“Armed with broom, brushes and rubber gloves, London’s defiant middle classes turned out in force
to reclaim the streets after the most widespread night of violence on its streets for decades. They
responded in their hundreds to calls on Facebook and Twitter, as well as radio and TV, to help to
clear up the damage caused by looting, arson and violence by mobs on Monday night” (The Times,
August 10
th
, 2011, p. 3). Claims about the “Facebook and Twitter-broom army” reflect exactly the
“spirit of network” that “revolves around connectivity, flexibility, cooperation, decentralization, de-
hierarchization, spontaneous ordering, creativity and play, ad hoc assemblages, and, most promi-
nently of course, the very notion of networks […] At the center of the spirit of networks […] is net-
work technology” (Fisher, p. 211). The myths about social media in the UK riots (and other rebel-
lions, such as the political revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia) are surrounded by the techno-optimism
that Eran Fisher characterizes as typical for the new spirit of networks as well as by a techno-
pessimism that has throughout the history of modern media accompanied techno-optimistic claims.
Both ideologies are similarly deterministic. Eran Fisher’s book is a ideology critique of Internet fet-
ishism.
4. Revolution!
Maria Bakardjieva (2011, p. 61) argues in her contribution to the Handbook of Internet Studies that
Critical Internet Studies in contrast to statistical and interpretative approaches seeks answers to
normative questions relating to the Internet’s role in empowerment, oppression, emancipation, al-