tripleC 9(2): 141-153, 2011 , year
ISSN 1726-670X
http://www.triple-c.at
CC: Creative Commons License, 2011.
Selling You and Your Clicks: Examining the Audience
Commodification of Google
Hyunjin Kang
1
and Matthew P. McAllister
2
1
College of Communications, The Pennsylvania State University, huk142@psu.edu
2
Department of Film/Video & Media Studies, College of Communications, The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, mattmc@psu.edu
Abstract: Using a political economy perspective, this paper argues that Google’s surplus value from advertising results from
its extensive and transformative commodification of users. The unique features of Google as an advertising venue intensify
the commodification of its users as compared to traditional media in several ways. First, the simplified valorization process
of Google’s advertising methods enables Google to earn significantly more surplus value than those of traditional media.
Also, Google’s personalized advertising strategies, its precise measurement of advertising costs based on users’ behaviors
represented as “the number of clicks,” and the unclear distinction between advertisements and serviced content commodify
its users’ online activities. Lastly, this essay asserts that Google commodifies the aggregated consciousnesses of its users
because it sells keywords for advertisers to attach advertisements to search-data output, which are priced in accordance
with their popularity. This “click-through” form of behavioral commodification has significant implications for the future of
media.
Keywords: Audience commodification, Political Economy of Media, Google, AdSense, AdWords
Maurice Saatchi, the well-known advertising guru, once argued that a business’s brand would only
be successful when a particular word comes to be associated with the business in the public’s
imagination. In this sense, the huge success of Google can be understood as its symbolic owner-
ship of the word “search” in the English language (Dai, 2007). As this illustrates, Google became a
major phenomenon of the new media era. People often use the word “google” as a generic verb for
online searching, a practice that was signaled by the addition of this term in the Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary to depict the act of Internet keyword
searching (Bylund, 2006; Harris, 2006). Google explains that the origin of its company’s name is
related to the word “googol,” which means 10
100
, thereby connoting the meaning of infinite digital
information in cyberspace. As the company itself highlights, Google has a supercomputer network
that chooses what is to be displayed in response to a search query, evaluating more than five mil-
lion variables in just milliseconds (Google, 2011).
Google was founded in the late 1990s by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, two Stanford University
graduate students in California. They developed their online search engine using an innovative
search algorithm. In addition to the search engine, Google started to offer a variety of free applica-
tions for its users and thus established Google as the dominant new media brand. Google news,
launched in 2002, aggregates and displays news from more than 4000 news sources all around the
world, and is joined by Google map, Google reader, Google talk, and Google analytic. In 2006,
Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion in a stock-for-stock transaction (Google, 2006). In addi-
tion, Google has successfully entered to mobile service market by introducing Android, mobile op-
erating system in 2007.
Those services are provided to its users seemingly for free. Most of Google’s revenue comes
from advertising not from the direct selling of its online services or applications (Google, 2011).
Google’s influence on new media financing, in fact, results not just from the scope of its branded
applications, but also from the way it has shaped digital advertising through its lesser-known sub-
sidiaries and advertising practices. In 2000, Google launched AdWords, which offers personalized
online ad strategies for marketers, with just an initial 350 customers. Nine years later, Google
(2010) reported that 96.7% of its total revenue came from advertising. With its 2007 acquisition of
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DoubleClick, an online advertising company, Google’s revenue outperformed what analysts esti-
mated even in the economic downturn (Guynn, 2008). Currently, Google has half of the U.S. mar-
ket share in the Internet search market, with total revenue reaching $236.5 billion in 2009 (Google,
2010). According to Advertising Age, Google’s revenue in 2009 topped all digital-media companies
and was 13th among the 100 top media companies (Johnson, 2010). Google’s size, multi-task
applications, and influence on web financing has changed how advertisers, media industry players
-- and media scholars -- view the relationship between audiences, advertisers and media technol-
ogy.
One especially apt perspective for understanding Google’s altering of the media landscape is
Smythe’s (1981) audience commodification model. This model argues that media audiences who
watch advertising while they consume media content actually work for advertisers by watching the
media -- and especially the advertising -- during their supposed free “leisure” time. This perspective
argues that the labor of ad-supported media audiences become commodified -- through such
measurement techniques as Nielsen ratings -- and sold to advertisers. However, given what seems
to be a very different economic model for new media, what precisely is the commodity (or com-
modities) is complicated and controversial; in addition, the traditional distinction between producers
and users becomes blurred in digital media such as the Internet (McQuail, 2010). On the one hand
this later point seems to grant a certain power and activity to the audience, but on the other it builds
in nearly instanteous feedback mechanisms that enhance the “labor” capacity of media audiences,
not just as content creators but also as data sources about their media consumption. The essay,
therefore, analyzes the logics of Google’s advertising system, how it commodifies and sells audi-
ences to advertisers as illustrated by this audience commodification model. Following research
questions were proposed to guide our analysis:
RQ1: How might the process of Google audience commodification be understood?
RQ2: Is user commodification model of Google more intense than audience commodification model
of traditional media? If so, in what ways?
To answer the proposed research questions, the first section of this paper reviews the literature
related to audience commodification in traditional media, such as television and newspapers, and
how scholars have examined audience commodification in other new media forms. In addition, the
study examines the advertising services of Google, such as AdWords and AdSense. Based on
these analyses, the essay will dissect the mechanism of audience commodification via Google and
identify the specific components of this commodification process.
1. Audience Commodity of Traditional Media
Commodification is “the process of turning use values into exchange values” (Mosco, 2009, p.
129). Use, as defined by individual or social needs, becomes monetized in a capitalist system,
which enables the commodity to be sold in the marketplace (Mosco, 2009). Marx (1976) empha-
sized the distinction between the exchange value and the use value of the commodity. He explains
that “the utility of a thing makes it a use-value” (p. 126). The ‘exchange-value’ of a commodity is
determined by the abstraction of its use-value so that it can be compared with other commodities
and exchanged on the open market (Marx, 1976). A modern capitalist may view this transformation
as “monetization,” where a usable good becomes a monetized and economically exchangeable
commodity. A capitalist society can commodify just about everything, especially human labor. Sur-
plus value -- or profit -- can be greatly enhanced when in the commodification process the ex-
change value of labor for the laborers is much less than the exchange value of labor for the capital-
ist.
Commodities, in fact, become reified in capitalism, appearing “as autonomous figures endowed
with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race” (p.
165). Related to this Marxist notion, Mosco (2009) explained that commodities also become fet-
ishized, resulting in a symbolic power potentially becoming even greater than religion because of “a
double mystification” (p. 144): the commodity makes the socially defined relationship between capi-
tal and labor appear to be natural (that is, the commodity becomes separated from the actual
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means of production), and the commodity itself takes on its own “life,” which governs the social
sphere, such as in the case of packaging and the symbolism in advertising (Mosco, 2009).
Garnham (1979) elaborated on the process of media commodification in modern society. He ar-
gued that there are two principle aspects of media commodification. Media products (i.e., media
content) can directly become commodities (movie ticket sales and DVDs, for example). However, a
second commodification process is the focus of this essay. He argued that audiences are the most
important commodity of in advertising-supported mass media. Smythe (1981) also suggested that
audiences not only buy commodities and services but are also produced and sold as commodities
through mass media to advertisers. Media companies produce content that attract audiences and
encourage, trick, or seduce viewers to watch the accompanying advertisements. Consequently, the
cost that companies pay for advertising spots is ultimately used for buying the audiences that
watch the spots.
Therefore, it can be argued that audiences are also a form of commodified labor on television
(and other ad-supported media) in modern capitalist societies. Smythe (1981) asserted that, aside
from sleeping, every hour for an individual is "unfree work time" (p. 248). Jhally and Livant (1986)
developed this “audience-as-labor” concept, arguing that “‘watching as working’ is both a real eco-
nomic process, a value-creating process, and a metaphor, a reflection of value creation in the
economy as a whole” (p. 125). By using the metaphor of “working” for watching television, they
articulated the process by which leisure time can be used to regulate the demand of goods, thus
reducing the costs of storage and distribution while simultaneously "paying" audiences with sup-
posedly free media content that is often commodity-friendly itself but seems autonomous from the
advertising. Additionally, because advertisers are the "customers" for this "audience-product labor,"
the ad-supported media industries’ logic is such that the products these customers find most desir-
able are attracted, sought out, and sold to the advertiser. Some audience commodities, then, are
more valuable than others according to the audience’s socio-economic status and their likelihood of
consuming these products and being persuaded. In this way, Smythe broadened the narrow con-
cepts of capitalist “production” by incorporating distribution and consumption processes in a serv-
ice-oriented economy.
On the other hand, Mosco (2009) clarified the meaning of commodification by comparing it with
commercialization and objectification. According to him, commodification and objectification are
broader terms than commercialization. Commercialization mainly refers to the relationship between
an advertiser and the audiences who that advertiser targets and the integration of advertising and
promotional logic into different aspects of society. Clearly, then, audience commodification is
strongly related to commercialization, but commodification itself may involve other forms of com-
modification besides those found in an advertising-based system. However, audience commodifi-
cation concerns of the treatment of humans as reified objects; thus, it is a form of audience objecti-
fication in broader processes, such as the commodification of labor (Mosco, 2009). How the indus-
try constructs audiences through bottom-line characteristics that are valuable to economic inter-
ests—characterizations of audience size and demographic categories, for example—illustrates
both the objectification of viewers as well as that process's economic logic.
Given the dependence on the commodified-labor audience for the economics of television, how
the audiences are measured becomes critical. Meehan (1984) proposed the central role of “ratings”
in the process of audience commodification. She argued that the “something” that is exchanged by
the process of audience commodification is neither the media messages nor the audiences them-
selves, but “ratings.” Audience ratings, which have traditionally been conducted by consumer re-
search companies, such as A.C. Nielsen, report the characteristics of media audiences, including
size, demographic patterns, and media-usage patterns. What Meehan (1984) claimed was that
rating information is exchanged by media companies and advertisers and that ratings are, there-
fore, the primary commodity of the media, not the audiences themselves. Of course, Nielsen uses
various sampling methods to acquire ratings data, and these methods are then extrapolated to
what is assumed to be larger audience-viewing patterns, including the watching of specific pro-
grams and the commercials within those programs. In fact, because this information is so crucial to
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the day-to-day activities of ad-supported media and its measurements are contested if collected by
self-interested parties, companies like Nielsen have been able to function as monopolies, providing
one set of commodified data to which both media and advertisers may subscribe (Meehan, 2005).
Nevertheless, these important audience-commodity measurements for television and radio con-
tinue to be a contentious area as competition for audiences increase and digitization offers addi-
tional measurement criteria.
Mosco (2009) explained that one reason Meehan’s idea of ratings as the center of media com-
modities is valuable is because it highlights the issue of the “cybernetic nature of the commodifica-
tion process” (p.150). Audience ratings function to monitor the process of commodification and
serve as a measurement necessary for commodity production. In this sense, ratings are a critical
part of commodification because this information is used in making media content attractive to the
target audiences (such as promotions for programs that assert “The Number One Show in Amer-
ica!”) and, consequently, help media create additional audience commodities.
Based on the literature, there are at least five organizations or groups of people involved in the
"cybernetic" process of traditional ad-supported media audience commodification: advertisers, ad-
vertising agencies, consumer research companies, media, and audiences. These groups are or-
ganically connected to each other by each group’s industrialized necessities, and these connec-
tions eventually function to commodify media audiences. Advertisers buy advertising services from
advertising agencies, and they buy consumer information from consumer research companies.
Audiences, in turn, watch “free” media content as well as advertisements delivered along with
them, and some of those who are persuaded by the advertisements eventually buy the advertised
products. Those audiences measured in the current ratings system have their demographic and
behavioral data transmitted to consumer research companies, which then processes this data as
meaningful information—namely ratings—which is sold to advertisers and media. This audience
commodification process can be visually depicted, as in figure 1.
Figure 1: Process of traditional media audience commodification
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2. Audience Commodity of New Media
Thanks to the rapid advancement of media technologies, media audiences now can enjoy various
kinds of media content and forms. However, using the notion of political economy, media scholars
(e.g., Andrejevic, 2006, 2009; Cohen, 2008; Terranova, 2000; van Dijck, 2009) argue that today’s
most popular websites, including Facebook, YouTube, and Google, lead to the extensive commodi-
fication of their users in diverse ways.
Recent interactive media technologies, such as remote controls, digital video recorders (DVR),
and the Internet, seemed to have transformed media “audiences” into “users” who can control and
even produce the media content they consume to a greater degree than ever before. For example,
thanks to these technologies, media users no longer have to passively view the advertisements
delivered to them along with media content. Therefore, some suggest that these new media tech-
nologies challenge the forced advertisement-viewing assumptions of TV (as reviewed by Carlson,
2006), which was considered to be the basic premise of “labor” under the political economy per-
spective. Ironically enough, however, the more agency media technologies render to users, the
more intensified and diversified is the free labor that users provide to media industries. In other
words, passive advertisement viewing is not the only “commodifiable labor” in modern media indus-
tries because the interactive nature of new media makes it possible to commodify various user
activities, especially the information users produce by such activities.
One notable difference of Web 2.0 from that of traditional media (e.g., television) is that the dis-
tinction between producers and consumers has become obscured. There is no clear cut between
what is being produced and sold on the Internet (Bermejo, 2009). This led to recent controversial
debate on whether or not Smythe (1981)’s audience commodification model can be equally applied
to the new media environment (McQuail, 2010). Unlike most traditional media, Web 2.0 largely
depends on content, information, and even networks that are created and uploaded by users. For
example, media audiences voluntarily produce and distribute self-created media content via You-
Tube, actively input personal information on their MySpace profiles, and construct and display their
social networks on Facebook. Such voluntary and excessive activity performed on the Internet not
only generates sellable personal information but also cultural content, including personal tastes and
preferences, and other forms of user-generated content, from which Internet companies create
capital value (Terranova, 2000) by attaching ads to this content and facilitating market research.
Coté and Pybus (2007) defined such free labor in which “subjects engage in on a cultural and bio-
political level” (p. 90) in social networking sites as “immaterial labour 2.0.” Obviously, in this case,
user labor enters the system much earlier than in traditional media. Because users of social net-
working site are producers and consumers of cultural components that such websites provide, it
can be said that their labor in Web 2.0 begins during, not after, the production and broadcast of
media content (Cohen, 2008).
The interactive nature of the Internet not only requires and encourages users to provide exten-
sive labor for creative activities, but it also facilitates surveillance—the fundamental mechanism of
audience commodification in new media. As mentioned before, interactive websites commodify
socio-cultural components that users voluntarily create and input in almost every activity on social
network sites. Therefore, commercially oriented surveillance of user activity on websites is the most
crucial and fundamental mechanism that enables companies to establish profitable business mod-
els. For instance, Facebook—the most popular social networking site in the United States—
commodifies its user through extensive surveillance (Cohen, 2008). According to Cohen, surveil-
lance enables web service providers not only to aggregate but also render its users’ information for
third-parties so they can perform precisely targeted marketing activities.
In sum, compared to other traditional types of media, the interactive nature of the Internet both
allows for and depends on its users to be engaged in extensive—and perhaps economically ex-
ploitative—uploaded activities from providing personal information to the production of content.
Also, media companies create capital value out of web user activities via the extensive surveillance
that is enabled by current computer technologies. That is, user data generated by interactive activi-
ties on the web are stored in mass storage devices, and then the stored data are processed to
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provide meaningful information through data mining, thereby creating revenues of such website
providers.
3. Audience Commodity of Google
Although Google—primarily known for its influential search engine—is not commonly classified into
Web 2.0, it also inculcates its users as part of the system of a commodified “extensive labour 2.0”
(Coté & Pybus, 2007). Applying ideas from the previous sections, this study argues that identical to
how Web 2.0 intensifies audience-labor commodification, Google commodifies its users through
extensive surveillance by utilizing interactive technologies but with a streamlined and influential
model that actually intensifies the level of audience commodification.
Since the early days of industrialized media, the search engine is arguably the most important
technological development for advertisers because it enables advertisers to precisely target indi-
vidual consumers given their inputted interests, which may in turn be connected to advertised
products or services (Spurgeon, 2008). Google has been at the center of the development of
search-based advertising since its onset and is making enormous profits out of advertising associ-
ated with keyword searches. In one sense, the Google search engine exploits the collective labor
of the Internet since search engines are only attractive if there is a large amount of web information
to search, web information that Google did not create itself. This is what Vaidhyanathan (2011)
largely meant in his phrase the "Googlization of everything"—namely, that Google works by “har-
vesting, copying, aggregating and ranking of information about and contributions made by each of
us” (p. 83).
In addition, as in the Web 2.0 audience commodification model, online activity surveillance is the
core mechanism underlying Google’s advertising strategy. In fact, Google’s most important busi-
ness purpose is not to facilitate searches but to sell spaces for advertisement; more precisely
speaking, Google sells its users’ cognition, including attention (Vaidhyanathan, 2011), to the adver-
tisements targeted to their search behaviors, an attention that, in turn, is able to be operationalized
through users' measurable behaviors subsequent to their searches, as detailed below.
3.1. Advertising Services of Google: AdWords, Adsense and DoubleClick
Most of Google’s revenues come from pay- (or cost-) per-click advertising services (Perez & McMil-
lan, 2007). To provide an advertising service that precisely targets users who have interests related
to the advertiser’s product and service, Google employs a unique ad program, named AdWords.
With AdWords, search keywords entered in the Google search engine are automatically associated
with targeted advertised products or services through text-based advertisements on the Google
results pages. Google does not limit smart advertising execution to its owned application web
pages; it also runs a global advertising program called “AdSense.” Anyone who owns a website
can register the website on the Google network. Using the AdWords program, Google places ad-
vertisements for external websites on websites with similar content. For example, if a registered
website contains information about French recipes, you may find an ad for websites about French
restaurants or cooking wares that are labeled as “Ads by Google.”
The cost of the keyword-matching advertising service and the revenue from those who partici-
pate in the AdSense program are based on the keyword-bidding system. Advertisers can choose
any keywords that they want to link advertisements, and bid an amount they are willing to pay for
each click (i.e., cost-per-click (CPC)) on the advertisement displayed on Google or one of its part-
ner’s sites. The higher the amount of the bid, the greater the chance the advertisement appears on
the first page of the search result, or on a good location of one of web-pages participating in Ad-
Sense program.
Google’s advertising software scans and processes the text on the results pages of each key-
word search and enables Google to target ads precisely related to the site’s content and ultimately
each web user’s needs. Google places advertisements, which they call “sponsored links,” on the
upper right hand side of the search results page. Because these links are very similar to users’
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search results in both appearance and content, many users may not even realize that the space for
those advertisements occupies almost one-third of the page. Moreover, Google’s Gmail system is
similarly coordinated so that users are exposed to targeted advertisements when they read an
email. The AdWords program analyzes the texts in users’ personal email messages and places
advertisements that match the text. For instance, when one reads an email about a trip to Chicago,
one is also provided with links that lead to websites for hotels and restaurants in Chicago. In addi-
tion, following the analysis of van Dijck (2009), YouTube, the Google-owned video-sharing site, is
similarly commodified and includes the placement of targeted “Promoted Videos” at the top left of
the search results.
In addition to keyword-matching ads, Google has been providing banner, graphical and video
ads services since they acquired DoubleClick in 2007. DoubleClick, founded in 1996, provides
services and tools to display both rich media ads and search engine-based pay-per-click ads. This
acquisition seemed to be made because Google had been lagging behind other portal sites such
as Yahoo in these multi-media online ads, although Google was huge successful in keyword-
matching text based ads (Perez & McMillan, 2007). Alsp, DoubleClick provides data about behav-
iors of users on other websites to Google by collecting and networking such data. Consequently,
DoubleClick plays an important role to help Google’s ads to target users precisely through exten-
sive surveillance (Fuchs, 2011).
To maximize marketing decisions based on website data, another sub-brand, Google Analytics
functions similarly to both media planning advertising agencies and the television rating system but
at a much more sophisticated level. It analyzes user preferences, allows advertisers to target po-
tential consumers whose interests match the advertised products, and automatically places ads on
advertisers’ websites who use Google Analytics. Unlike the traditional data offered by Nielsen,
Google Analytics literally analyzes each individual user’s interests—at least as manifested by web
surfing—not an anonymous and constructed group of people who, based on data from a limited
sample, may share similar interests or demographic characteristics. Therefore, Google’s keyword-
matching ads play a central role not just in Google's audience commodification but also in refining
the techniques of audience commodification of media in general.
We can understand the process of commodification of Google users by examining how these
programs function in relation to advertisers, Google, and its users. The process of Google’s audi-
ence commodification can be described visually as in figure 2.
Figure 2. Process of Google’s audience commodification
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As figure 1 and figure 2 illustrate, the procedure of audience commodification is streamlined for
Google as compared to the television model. This more precise and, in many ways more auto-
mated, process of audience commodification increases the surplus value of advertisers. As men-
tioned earlier, Jhally and Livant (1986) argued that speeding up the valorization of a commodity is
the key role of television commercials for creating surplus value; it makes the movement of goods
much more efficient. Therefore, the efficient and extensive the process of a commodity’s valoriza-
tion, the more surplus advertisers can acquire because streamlined advertising processes enable
advertisers to significantly decrease cost and increase commodity information. Reduced cost from
the simplified procedure of commodity valorization results in creating surplus value, some of which
eventually contributes to Google’s revenue.
In the process of Google user commodification, we can observe that there is no need for a con-
sumer research institution, such as A.C. Nielson. This is because Google monitors users’ online
behaviors (including the search terms they input) and exposes them to advertisements simultane-
ously. Google’s advertisement programs enable advertisers to precisely target audiences who
might be interested in the advertised products or services based on their behavioral measures.
Google acquires strong indications of users’ interests by analyzing the words they enter in Google’s
search engine, the email texts that they receive via their Gmail accounts, and the website content
they read. Therefore, the user interests that are analyzed by Google are much more precise than
television program rating systems. Rating systems analyze the demographic make-up and media
usage patterns of a sample of the television audience. Based on this information, advertisers and
media companies make reasonable ”assumptions” about the audience’s interests and even atten-
tiveness toward the ads. Because this analysis is based upon a sample and the assumption that
program viewing equals ad viewing, it cannot precisely predict the interests of individuals within a
larger group, as many errors would ultimately result. However, advertisements executed via Ad-
Sense do not target groups of people but rather targets individuals and targets them because of
specific individual behaviors (typed words) instead of assumed behaviors (viewing patterns based
upon a Nielsen sample).
Therefore, the value of the “immaterial labor” of Google users is determined in a concrete and
precise way. With traditional television ratings, several assumptions must be made: (1) the Nielsen
sample accurately represents the desired audience market, (2) those watching the programs also
watch the ads, (3) those watching the ads will be persuaded by them, and (4) this persuasion in the
home leads to purchasing behavior. With the Google model of audience commodification, the ef-
fectiveness of an advertisement is determined by whether users click the provided link or not. Un-
like traditional media, the "click through" is not a guess about whether the audiences are watch-
ing—let alone being persuaded by—the advertisement. How precisely Google adds value to its
users’ labor through the click-through measurement is found on Google’s web page, which de-
scribes how they determine the rank of ads for display:
AdWords ranks ads for display in one of two ways: either by CPM (cost per thousand) or a by
combination of the maximum cost per click (CPC), which is set by the advertiser, together with
clickthrough rates and other factors used to determine the relevance of the ads. This process
favors the ads that are most relevant to users, improving the experience for both the person
looking for information and the advertiser looking for interested customers (Google, 2011).
As the statement reveals, to gauge the cost of advertising depends on “the number of clicks.” This
fact also makes additional audience research less necessary or at least adds much to the data of
how audiences relate to ads. Advertisers who use traditional media as the conduit for their adver-
tisements spend a great deal of money measuring the psychological effectiveness of advertise-
ments, such as attitudes and behavior intentions. However, by completely restricting the measure-
ment for an advertisement’s effectiveness to behavioral consequences, measuring psychological
effectiveness is largely unnecessary for Google and its advertisers. The fact that Google measures
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advertising effectiveness exclusively by behavioral factors indicates that users as commodities
actually have a concrete value according to the number of times they click advertisements. This
behavioral measurement does add a new complication: the danger of "click fraud" from competitors
or websites looking to boost revenue (Spurgeon, 2008, pp. 31-32). However, AdWords also ad-
dresses ways to ameliorate such practices in its help literature ("How does Google detect invalid
clicks," n.d.), and the potential "noise" such practices create are well within tolerance levels given
the usefulness of the data.
Consequently, audience analysis, advertisement exposure, and users’ reactions to the adver-
tisement can occur in mere seconds. This extremely simplified procedure of commodity valorization
saves advertisers the production costs normally associated with television commercials. Because
targeted users’ exposure to advertisements and website visits can occur almost simultaneously,
Google and its advertisers do not need to be concerned about ad recalls or attitudes toward the
advertisement itself. Therefore, advertisers do not need to invest money in creating eye-catching or
memorable advertisements as much as TV advertisers do. Additionally, when a user clicks through
an online ad, not only is this evidence that the user was attracted to the ad, but it typically takes the
user to an online retail space where purchases can immediately follow.
As a result, virtually every Google user becomes a producer of information for Google. Google
users input their interests by putting keywords in the Google search box in order to retrieve infor-
mation about their interests that is available on the web. Such data are gathered by the Google
system and then provides meaningful information—namely “trends” to the advertisers. Not only
does this program offer the most effective “keywords, ads, referrals and campaigns” that contribute
to the advertisers’ revenue, but it also gives information about “where visitors come from and how
they interact with your site” (Google, 2010). Google provides advertisers with much more precise
information about the target audience than normal consumer research companies can provide.
Also, this Google advertising system has significantly reduced the time required for a company to
earn revenues from its advertisements. By providing advertisements in the form of website hyper-
links, Google makes it easy for users to visit the website immediately after they are exposed to the
advertisement.
Moreover, the “click-through” model will not necessarily be limited to the Internet as other media
forms, such as television, become increasingly digitized and interactive; in fact, Google has ex-
plored movements into television (Andrejevic, 2009). This expansion has implications both for
changing the economic logic of television and for the “stickiness” of ad campaigns that may follow
us across media platforms (Andrejevic, 2009).
3.2. Google’s Audience Commodification—Privacy, Activity, and Cognition
Google’s targeted advertisement strategy severely threatens users’ privacy—the dark side of per-
sonalized advertisement enabled by technological surveillance. Google claims that its goal is to
make users who are exposed to these personalized ads find them useful (Google, 2011). It cer-
tainly is possible that a large number of people would feel convenience or even self-fulfillment from
the advertisements that serve their interests. However, Vaidhyanathan (2011) pointed out that
Google’s privacy policy actually focuses more on retaining its right to utilize user information for its
own interests than protecting it. This policy even states that Google may collect IP (Internet Proto-
col) addresses, search histories, and Web browser settings and preferences and information
(Vaidhyanathan, 2011). Although this information seems to be trivial for individual users, when they
are aggregated and processed by Google, they come to have exchangeable value.
However, just as television commercials may be annoying, to what extent are users significantly
annoyed/distracted by Google's advertising and data-collection practices? Are users even aware of
the fact that they are being deprived of their privacy at the cost of receiving advertisements that
represent their own interest? Lester (2001) criticized the business sector's indifference to the fact
that new information technologies are imposing a significant threat to people’s privacy. In 1999,
Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy rebuked the public when he said “You have no privacy, get
over it” (Lester, 2001, p. 27). In modern society, it seems that people cannot function as a member
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150
of society without exposing private information willingly or unwillingly. They expose their information
on a daily basis by exchanging emails, using credit cards, and browsing the Internet.
Andrejevic (2006) argued that the nature of new technology’s interactivity is, in fact, causing a
significant loss of privacy among non-equal parties. Interactivity implies a somewhat positive con-
notation in that it is a “two-way, symmetrical, and relatively transparent communication”; however,
the strategically assimilated form of interactivity that occurs through Internet businesses are
“asymmetrical, nontransparent forms of monitoring and surveillance” (Andrejevic, 2006, p. 393).
Similarly, Meyrowitz (1985) cautioned that the loss of privacy in and of itself may not be as trou-
bling as the “nonreciprocal loss of privacy” where citizens do not have “the ability to monitor those
who monitor us” (p. 322). The nonreciprocal loss of privacy can easily be detected in the relation-
ship between Google and its users. The users give their information either voluntarily or without
their knowledge while using Google applications. For example, users search for information about
a disease and its symptoms about which they are concerned via a Google search; they exchange
summer vacation plans with friends via Gmail; they put their addresses and their travel destinations
to get maps via Google Map. Yet, we do not even know the basic algorithm behind Google’s
search engine because this search algorithm is their top business secret.
Interactivity of the Internet is at the heart of the commodification of digital audiences. Andrejevic
(2006) criticized the irony of new media’s interactivity, stating that “the labor of detailed information
gathering and comprehensive monitoring is being offloaded onto consumers in the name of their
empowerment” (p. 393). According to Andrejevic’s notion, the commodity that Google produces
and sells is not only its users’ private information but is also its users Internet activities, such as
browsing web pages, inputting personal information, writing emails, and so on. The longer a user
stays on a certain web page, the greater chance there is of that user visiting advertisers’ websites
through the links provided by the AdWords program. This is the reason why Google provides its
users with various applications and constantly develops applications that may attract other users.
Those free applications can be compared to a “free lunch,” which is how Smythe (1981) metaphori-
cally described free media content provided to audiences by media companies. However, as
Smythe also implies, the free lunch in such economic exchanges is a myth; there is a cost to the
viewer/user that is often hidden but sometimes made explicit. As compensation for watching adver-
tisements and voluntarily giving their information, Google users enjoy free services, such as free
Gmail accounts and instant/precise information searches.
In addition, “the number of clicks” has more value for Google than may initially seem. The more
profound value that lies underneath “the number of clicks” can be found in the process that adver-
tisers use to determine the budget for their AdWords advertising. When advertisers register their
advertisement in the AdWords program, they need to choose keywords that are relevant to their
own business. For instance, if an advertiser is running a coffee business, then he/she would
choose keywords like coffee, coffee beans, and so on. Then, the program would determine the
maximum budget for running the advertisement per day or per month and the maximum amount of
money that the advertiser is willing to pay per click. This cost per click (CPC) will affect the amount
of user exposure to the company’s advertisement. In short, the effectiveness of advertising is de-
termined by which keywords the advertiser chooses and the amount of CPC. If an advertiser
chooses popular keywords and sets a high CPC, then the advertising cost will increase, and natu-
rally, the advertisement’s effectiveness will increase as well. The popularity of each keyword—
more specifically, the degree of information popularity that people seek—is a commodity of Google.
In other words, information that is searched for by many people will earn more money for Google.
3.3. Further Erosion of Labor and Leisure Time
However, the degree to which audiences are purposely laboring through clicking is debatable. Just
as some television ads try to mimic television programs, it seems that Google imposed a wise
strategy to maximize “the number of clicks.” The form of advertisements found on the Google
search page, which they call “sponsored links,” is very similar to the form of the information that we
expect to get from the Google search itself. Therefore, users who do not know the nature of a Goo-
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gle search may click the sponsored links without knowing that these links are actually advertise-
ments. What is more, there is no distinction between the labor time and “free lunch” (Smythe, 1981,
p. 243) time on Google. For example, users can have free and instant information through a so-
phisticated search engine and can use a free email account that offers more than 6,000 MB for
each account. However, while they enjoy these free Google applications, the automated systems of
Google read users email, analyze keywords that are inputted in search boxes, and give personal-
ized advertisements. While watching traditional advertising in exchange for programming may be a
fairly clear trade, the hidden nature of our commodification on Google (i.e., unavoidable ads the-
matically linked to content, online behavior) and the compensation (i.e., free applications) tends to
deprive users of agency in this process. The commercial/program distinction that was obvious in
the traditional television model is eradicated in Google's version. At least, TV viewers can switch
channels during commercials. As discussed earlier, scholars such as Mosco (2009) argue that
commodity fetishism occurs when the production context of a commodity becomes separated from
the commodity while other cultural meanings are added (often by advertising). The commodification
process of traditional advertising-supported media such as television is fetishized given that the
process is generally hidden from audiences (such as Nielsen ratings measurement practices) while
cultural benefits are touted (as in the miracle of "free television"). Applying this perspective, the
audience commodification of digital media, as defined by Google, is even more fetishized. The
interactive web services are also seemingly free but more customizable, the targeted ads are per-
sonalized and match our interests and web content as if by magic, and how our data is collected,
used and monetized is automatic, instant, and largely masked.
Now it becomes clear that not only Internet users’ labor (i.e., providing their information to Goo-
gle and other Internet activities) but also users’ aggregated consciousnesses are commodities of
Google. Google provides an application called “Google Trend” with which anybody can see the
search patterns of any keyword. This application shows the search patterns of keywords in the
form of graphs so that users can easily get an idea of a keyword’s popularity. It not only provides
the popularity of keywords but also gives the periodical patterns of this popularity. As such, this
application is very useful for current or potential Google advertisers. Based on this information,
advertisers can plan effective advertisement strategies via Google by choosing popular keywords
among those related to their product. Through Google’s powerful search engine service, users’
interests and consciousnesses are aggregated and reproduced into valuable information.
4. Conclusion
Based on the assertions of political economy scholars who discussed the commodification of audi-
ences, this essay analyzed the process by which Google users become its commodities. Google
has made the user commodification process more precise and much intensive than ever, To sum-
marize, its audience commodification process involves:
Google practices much more direct audience commodification than traditional media. By not
relying on estimates of audience use patterns based on sampling from a third-party like Nielsen,
commodification can be instant and more cost efficient
The targeted advertising strategy of Google intensifies the commodification of audiences. Goo-
gle uses behavioral information provided directly by its users of attention to advertising. There-
fore, it can be said that each individual, as opposed to a speculative and constructed aggregate,
is a commodity of Google.
Google commodifies diverse components of its users, including private information, online be-
haviors, and cognitions. The activities through which people willingly or unwillingly give their
personal data while they use the Internet and their aggregated consciousnesses (which is rep-
resented by the popularity of keywords) are also commodities of Google. Thus, it seems that
Google may acquire information about users’ social networks and other lifestyle and financial
indicators. This will result in the commodification of social relations as well. Google’s purchase
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152
of DoubleClick means that Google is developing banner and video ads besides search ads.
In the commodification model of Google, there is even less distinction between leisure and labor
time, given especially the multi-function and multi-entertainment nature of the Internet.
Google’s audience commodification model, if applied to digitized versions of traditional media
such as television, could raise expectations about audience information collected from those
media and the level of integration between advertising and media content.
These characteristics of audience commodification of Google resulted in reduced costs and en-
hanced revenue collection —that is, more surplus value—for Google. Using advanced technology,
the cybernetic commodification of Google users is becoming sophisticated and stealthy but also
wide-ranging. Because of the nature of the business, Google will continuously try to invent new
strategies to increase their profit, which directly links to the commodification of its users. Given the
fact that Google’s growth has been achieved at the expense of the commodification of its users’
personal details, consciousnesses, and social networks, users should be aware of why Google is
providing various applications with no charge. Google has been playing a critical role in establish-
ing norms of information production and sharing on the Internet. As scholars, we can understand
the logics of such audience commodification models, the directions about privacy and advertising
intrusiveness that such logics may take us, and the implications of such logics for our democracy
and needed media policies.
Given the fact that the Internet has its potential to be an effective tool that can liberate people
from centralization of information production and sharing, we can create different information shar-
ing mechanisms that can against Google’s audience logics. Creating media networks among in-
formation workers so that Internet users can acquire information they need without using commer-
cialized Internet mechanisms can be established as, ironically, new media companies like Google
become more visible, powerful, and thus spark user backlash in a system touted as empowering.
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About the Authors
Hyunjin Kang
is currently working towards a Ph.D. in Mass Communications at The Pennsylvania State University. She earned M.A. in
Public Relations (2005) from Michigan State University, and B.A.s in Advertising and Public Relations (2002) and in
Business Administrations (2002) from Ewha Womans University in Seoul, Korea. Her research focuses on effects of new
media technologies on users and society.
Matthew P. McAllister
is Professor of Communications in the Department of Film/Video & Media Studies at The Pennsylvania State University,
USA. He is the co-editor of The Advertising and Consumer Culture Reader (2009, Routledge, with Joseph Turow), and The
Routledge Companion to Advertising and Promotional Culture (forthcoming, Routledge, with Emily West).