tripleC i(i): 28-50, 2005
ISSN 1726-670X
http://tripleC.uti.at
The Dialectic of Bottom-up and Top-down Emergence in Social
Systems
Christian Fuchs / Wolfgang Hofkirchner
ICT&S Center – Advanced Studies and Research in Information and Communication Technologies & Society
University of Salzburg
christian.fuchs@sbg.ac.at, wolfgang.hofkirchner@sbg.ac.at
Abstract: In this paper we will present a theoretical explanation
of the relationship between so-called individual emergence and
the emergence of social systems. We want to take as our point
of departure the assumption that from the perspective of
hierarchical systems theory self-organization on the level of
social systems includes a bottom-up process as well as a top-
down process. The bottom-up process refers to what in
sociology is called agency, the top-down process refers to what
is called structure. We will show that it is convenient to suggest
that these processes be linked in a dialectical manner. In this
respect we will discuss problems of determinism and
indeterminism. This is the background against which we will try
to clarify the notion of individual emergence. Our rather general
considerations will be illustrated by how ideology, that is
consciousness in a collective as well as an individual sense, is
conceived of by a number of theories and how it should be
conceived of when aspects of self-organization are included.
We will conclude with a statement that makes clear why
consciousness is a property of individuals that emerges only
when individuals participate in society and why society emerges
only when individuals are endowed with consciousness.
Keywords: emergence, self-organization, self-organisation,
information
Acknowledgement: This paper is a result of research
undertaken in the INTAS-research project “Human Strategies in
Complexity“ (contract number MP/CA 2000-298) and supported
by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and
Culture. It was presented at the conference “Problems of
Individual Emergence” organized by: UK Cybernetics Society,
Systeemgroep Nederland, Lincoln Research Centre, Center for
Innovation and Co-operative Technolog; Amsterdam, April,
16th-20th, 2001.
1. Emergence and Self-Organization
Emergence has diachronic as well as synchronous connotations. In the literature they are usually
separately referred to as specification and scalar hierarchies among others (Salthe 1996). But it can be
shown that both hierarchies are only the two sides of the same coin. A stage concept of systemic
evolution may reconcile both of them.
The first connotation of emergence refers to evolutionary development paths where processes of self-
organization show so-called meta-system transitions (Heylighen). In the course of evolution one system is
linked to another--the old to the new--by emergence, i.e. the first one gives rise to the second and
disappears (see Figure 1).
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SELF-
ORGANI-
ZATION
SELF-
ORGANI-
ZATION
SELF-
ORGANI-
ZATION
System
Meta-
system
Phase n
t
Phase n+1 Phase n+2
Fig. 1: Diachronic Self-organization
Emergence as the forward loop of self-organisation cycles brings about the change from one system in
one phase of evolution to another system in another phase. It moves the historical sequence of the
systems.
The second connotation is applied to nested hierarchies of systems in which processes of self-
organization take place. The upward process links a system unit to a super-system unit by emergence, i.e.
new features appear at the level of the respective super-system unit by virtue of activities at the level of
the respective system unit. This kind of emergence is accompanied by a downward process. This
downward process is a kind of domination or assertion of superiority. In this way the super-system level
both enables and constrains activities at the lower system level (see Figure 2).
SELF-
ORGANIZATION
Super-
system
System
Level m
Level m+1
Complexit
y
SELF-
ORGANIZATION
Level m+2
Fig. 2: Synchronous Self-organization
The levels in question may also be referred to as system and subsystem levels. Emergence as an
upward loop of self-organisation cycles effects the progression from one system level to a higher system
level in encapsulated systems. It propels the structural build-up of systems.
The clue is that both meanings of emergence can be brought together insofar as systems that produce
other systems in diachronous processes do so by interlocking their behaviour, in other words by coherent
interactions; the new system has a hierarchical character enabling synchronous processes between the
two levels; i.e., meta-systems turn out to be super-systems in which the systems that diachronously
constitute the new holistic entity are in the Hegelian sense synchronously ”sublated” (”aufgehoben”) as
tripleC 3(2): 28-50, 2005 3
0
constituent parts. That is, the old system is overcome, but conserved by the new one. Thus, a stage
model which combines both so-called specification and scalar hierarchies can be sketched (see Figure 3).
It is a phase model and a layer model in one. The dimension left to right represents the diachronous
aspects and the dimension bottom to top, the synchronous ones. The shift from one phase to a
subsequent phase is tantamount to a shift unto a new layer. The new system includes this additional layer.
It encapsulates what previously were autonomous systems as subsystems and shapes them to reflect the
dominance relation. However, the newly formed system will always depend on the functioning of its
subsystems. When they cease to support the system, it will break down. Emergence brings forth new
systems and sustains their build-up.
An as yet-to-be-developed theory of evolutionary systems would seek to show reality to be the totality of
the systems that have given rise to one another, continue to influence each other, and remain in a state of
constant development. From this perspective of systemic evolution, the world may be understood as a
system of systems that organises itself, i.e. that created itself and continues to develop itself. The systems
have subordinate subsystems and are themselves components of higher level systems. Together they
form a layered structure in which the systems that arose at later stages of the evolutionary process are
found at higher levels, just as the older systems are found at lower levels. The higher levels of the
systems rest on the lower ones both structurally and as processes; the lower ones allow for further
development at the same level and (when the performance of system-specific functions there reaches its
limit) the higher organization of the systems at the next level may or may not be realized by the systems.
The lower levels form quasi-potential preliminary stages for higher level development, but they do not
determine the development at the higher level in detail.
Stages
of
Systemic
Evolution
Whole
EMERGENCE
DOMINANCE
New
Whole
New Parts
Old Parts
EMERGENCE
DOMINAN C
E
?
?
?
?
Parts
Fig. 3: Stage Concept of Self-organization
Emergence and self-organization are contingent events. That is, a theory of evolutionary systems must
rest upon a less than strict determinism. As science unravels the natural world, strict determinism
describes systems at or near thermodynamic/chemical equilibrium only. It does not hold for systems
exposed to fields in which the uneven distribution of energy flux density exceeds a critical level. Such field
.
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31
potentials force energy to flow in a non-linear and interdependent manner. It is here that the systems
demonstrate self-organization, i.e. the build-up of order out of fluctuations via dissipation of high-entropic
energy as Prigogine (1980) discovered. A touch of indeterminism enters causal relationships that involve
self-organizing systems, for the systems themselves select one of the several possible ways to react.
Thus, an ontological quality gap remains between cause and effect that cannot be bridged by
epistemological prostheses. In strictly determined events, mechanisms are at work that necessitate the
transformation of particular causes into particular effects. Here causa aequat effectum or actio est reactio-
-as Newton’s dictum may be applied (Fleissner and Hofkirchner 1997). In events that are not strictly
determined, as is the case in self-organizing systems, the effect is not predictable because it is the system
that intervenes in the chain of cause and effect and introduces a degree of freedom that cannot be forced
into a single alternative. The effect is emergent, it is promoted by the self-organization of the system, and
it produces something new--a new entity. Thus, causa non aequat effectum, actio non est reactio. In this
case formal science runs short of methods that perform transformations which are not of the one-to-one
type. What is needed is reasoning beyond formal reasoning. If the objective relationship seems to be non-
mechanical here, i.e. dialectic, then non-formal, i.e. dialectical, reasoning seems to be an adequate
intellectual approach (see Hofkirchner 1998). Dialectical reasoning, however, since it does not lead to
clear-cut explanations, does not provide clear-cut predictions either.
2. Emergence and Social Systems
The rethinking of the central issue in social science–the issue of how agency and structure are to be
related in terms of dialectic, emergence and self-organisation--may refer to and integrate important ideas
and insights of those recent attempts to overcome the dichotomy in social theory which (with the exception
of, e.g. Artigiani, 1991) do not explicitly refer to an evolutionary systems theory of society (e.g. Giddens
1984; Alexander 1995; Mouzelis 1995; Reckwitz 1997). It promises a solution to the problem of how to
deal with indeterminacy in the object domain of science.
From the perspective of self-organisation in the framework of evolutionary systems theory (see Figure
4) the self-organisation cycle working in social systems may be conceived of as shown in Figure 5 (for a
discussion of how the mutual production of actors and structures conceived as social self-organization is
connected to the social theories of Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu cf. Fuchs 2003a, b).
system
elements
dominanceemergence
self-
organization
Fig. 4: Self-organization in Evolutionary Systems
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structures
agents
constraining and enabling
acting
social
self-
or
g
anization
Fig. 5: Self-organization in Social Systems
There are two levels, the micro- and the macro-level. The elements or agents of the system are located
at the micro-level. These agents perform actions. The interplay of these recurrent individual actions
produce fairly stable relations among the agents These relations gain relative independence from the
interactions in the form of regularities which concern allocative and authoritative resources, and in the
form of rules or values, ethics and morals. Such structures emerge at the macro-level, where they--insofar
as they, in turn, influence the agents--exist in their own right. On the one hand, they constrain the
individual agent by setting conditions that limit her scope of action; and, on the other hand, by doing so,
they provide her with the potential for realizing options she otherwise wouldn’t have. Nor can dominance
control the outcome insofar as the structures do not determine directly and therefore cannot determine
completely whether or not these options will be realized, since the actions are performed by individual
agents. The structures are impressed upon the individual agents by an endless process of socialisation
and enculturation. The resulting engrams serve as cognitive tools for the anticipation and construction of
ever new actions which may or may not fit regularities and renew allocative and authoritative resources,
and which may or may not obey rules and accept values and recognise ethics and follow morals and thus
may or may not reproduce the structures. Either way, interaction reflects upon the conditions of its own
emergence and may consciously be directed at the structures in order to maintain or alter them. In this
sense only--that is, because in their recursive actions the agents refer to the structures--do these
structures play the dominant role in the relation of bottom-up and top-down causation. Nevertheless none
of the relations in this causal cycle lead to unambiguous results. Each influence--bottom-up as well as top-
down--has consequences which due to the inherent indeterminacy cannot be foreseen. In this way and
only in this way is qualitative change possible.
As far as the underlying ontological assumptions are concerned, there are, apart from this dialectical
view of the relationship between individuals and society, three archetypical perspectives: one that reduces
society to (the actions of) individuals, one that projects (system properties of) society onto individuals, and
one that dichotomizes society and individuals (see Table 1).
.
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Relationship between
Individuals... and Society
I
NDIVIDUALISM
,
A
GENCY
T
HEORY
, C
ONSTRUCTIVISM
(B
OTTOM
-
UP
D
ETERMINISM
)
sufficient conditions
resultant
S
OCIOLOGISM
,
“S
YSTEM
T
HEORY
,”
S
TRUCTURALISM
(T
OP
-
DOWN
D
ETERMINISM
)
resultant
sufficient conditions
I
NDIVIDUAL
-S
OCIETY
D
UALISM
(I
NDETERMINISM
)
independent
necessary,
but not sufficient
conditions
emergent
I
NDIVIDUAL
-S
OCIETY
D
IALECTICS
(B
OTTOM
-
UP AS WELL AS
T
OP
-
DOWN
E
MERGENTISM
)
emergent
necessary,
but not sufficient
conditions
Tab. 1: Ways of Relating Individuals and Society
3. The Generation of Information in Social Systems
3.1. The Individual in Modern Society
The concept of the individual as we know it today arose with the emergence of modern, i.e. capitalist
society. This concept is related to ideas, such as that of free will and of subjects that act rationally and
responsibly, that were developed during the course of the enlightenment. The enlightenment was an
integral element of the process establishing modern society. The concept of the modern individual is also
one which has been made possible by casting doubt on religious eschatologies which postulated an
unalterable and god-given fate for mankind. The rise of this modern notion of the individual has also been
related to the rise of the idea of free entrepreneurship in a free market society. Freedom has been
conceived in this sense as an important quality and the essence of the modern individual. The idea of the
modern individual can be seen as a logical consequence of liberal capitalism. According to this concept,
morally responsible and autonomous personalities flourish in the economic and political freedom
guaranteed by modern society. It also stresses that society guarantees individualism by removing
obstacles to individual freedom, as well as rational and reasonable behaviour. In modern society,
individualism is characterized by the pursuit of economic self-interest. Egoism and selfishness are often
fetishised by assuming that they are natural characteristics of all individuals and products of rational and
autonomous thinking. But it can also be argued that our modern society is not rational because it does not
guarantee happiness and satisfaction to all human beings, in fact these characteristics can only be
achieved by a small privileged elite.
Nowadays individuals are not only considered to possess free will, it is also generally assumed that free
will can be exercised in order to gain possession of material resources and capital in order to realize
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individual freedom. So freedom is seen as something that can be achieved by striving for individual control
of material resources. This shows that the concept of the modern individual is inseparably tied to the idea
of private property. The idea of the individual as property owner has dominated the philosophical tradition
from Hobbes to Hegel and still dominates philosophical thinking about the essence of mankind. But this
concept could never be applied to all human beeings in our society because the majority of the world
population still does not participate in all these idealistic aspects of freedom and autonomy, this majority is
rather confronted with the disciplinary mechanisms of compulsions, coercion and domination that have
been considered typical of capitalist society by Foucault and others (see e.g. Foucault 1976). Hence the
modern idea of the individual can be seen as an ideology that helps to legitimize modern society. The idea
of the individual as a naturally autonomous being may be an agreeable ideal, but today it must still be
regarded as nothing more than the product of imagination and self-deception.
3.2. Constructivism, Structuralism or Interactive Dualism
When explaining how the consciousness of an individual emerges, one must recognize clearly that
individuals are social beings and that they can only exist as participants in social relationships. On the
other hand, society is not possible without individual actors who relate their behaviour to that of other
actors. The question of how consciousness emerges is a question that is closely connected to the
question of how being and consciousness are interrelated. In fact, Friedrich Engels said that the basic
question of philosophy concerns this relationship of being and consciousness: “The great basic question
of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and
being” (Engels 1886: 274). Engels used the term reflection to describe the materialist argument that being
determines or dominates consciousness, but he did not work out an epistemological framework.
Nonetheless he asked some basic questions that still are very important for epistemology today: “In what
relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable
of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a
correct reflection of reality?” (Engels 1886: 275).
According to the view of the relationship between individuals and society shown in Table 1, there have
traditionally been three different positions in relating the categories of thinking and being, well-known
today under the labels constructivism, structuralism and interactive dualism.
An epistemological tradition that concerned itself with this question is formed by the types of
epistemological constructivism represented e.g. by Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Heinz von
Foerster, Ernst von Glasersfeld and Paul Watzlawick. Constructivist approaches share the view that
cognition is constructed in an autonomous manner and is not determined by social/ physical reality.
Maturana and Varela (1984) have put forward the idea of living systems as autopoietic ones that can
reproduce and maintain themselves and they have laid the groundwork for Radical Constructivism in
epistemology by describing the brain as structurally coupled to its environment. By structural coupling they
mean that the brain works in such a way that the environment, i.e. society, can not determine cognition, it
can only perturbate structural changes in consciousness. Maturana and Varela conclude that
consciousness can be developed relatively autonomously from society, that reality is always a subjective
construction and that there is no objective reality. Maturana criticises that traditionally scientific, religious,
ideological and political institutions and movements have said that they can objectively claim what is true
in order to legitimize existing power-structures (see Maturana 1988). Maturana and Varela say that the
brain works autopoietically in such a way that a particular condition of the neurones leads to the next one.
Hence it can reproduce itself and cognition, and consciousness emerges.
Constructivism can be seen as a reductionist conception that does not consider the dialectical
relationship of the individual/consciousness and society/being. It does not take into account the limitation
and structuration of individual action, and the thinking in social relationships. If reality, cognition, and
.
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consciousness are solely seen as autonomous constructions, existing social pressures, coercion,
domination, and manipulation are not sufficiently taken into account.
Structuralism conceives the relationship of being and consciousness in a structuralist manner by
assuming that being determines consciousness. Particularly Structuralist Marxism and the theory of
reflection, which can be seen as a type of Marxist epistemology, have influenced such assumptions
considerably. For example, Lenin already assumed that the economic basis of society determines the
superstructure and that economic structures are reflected in philosophy, religion, politics and individual
consciousness.
The Frankfurt School also conceived this relationship in a structuralist manner. One of their main theses
was that capitalist society manipulates individual consciousness in such a way that members of society
identify themselves more and more with society. In this respect they particularly stressed ideological
mechanisms of manipulation that can be found in aspects of mass culture and cultural industry.
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) analysed the mechanisms of the cultural industry and concluded that it is a
mechanisms designed to keep the masses in a state of helplessness: “The culture industry as a whole
has molded men as a type unfailingly reproduced in every product. All the agents of this process, from the
producer to the women's clubs, take good care that the simple reproduction of this mental state is not
nuanced or extended in any way. [...] Pleasure always means not to think about anything, to forget
suffering even where it is shown. Basically it is helplessness. It is flight; not, as is asserted, flight from a
wretched reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance” (Horkheimer/Adorno 1972).
Theodor W. Adorno particularly, saw the possibility of society being transformed by self-conscious
individuals very pessimistically: “Human beings would be required in order to change the stiff conditions,
but those have carried themselves so deep into the human beings – at the expense of their lives and their
individuation –, that they hardly seem to be able to develop the spontaneity on which everything would
depend” (Adorno 1970: 147). Adorno stated that human beings can not be seen as individuals in capitalist
society because an individual would be able to decide for herself and she would possess self-
consciousness. In capitalism, Adorno does not consider human beings to possess self-consciousness. He
says that people are, rather, estranged from themselves--that they are not themselves but others. He says
that in modern industrial society, human beings are persons, not individuals.
To describe the being of a person in modern society, Adorno uses Marx’s concept of the character
mask.
1
He says that there are no individuals in modern society, only persons that fulfil specific functions
and roles in capitalism. The human being as a person is seen “as a moment of the relationships, in which
he lives, before he might be able to determine himself” (Adorno 1956: 42). “The fixing of the human as
person implies that within the social relationships in which he lives, he always finds himself in specific
roles next to others. By them he is what he is in relationship to others: the child of a mother, the pupil of a
teacher, the member of a tribe, the bearer of a profession” (Adorno 1956: 43). Character or social masks
that have traditionally been seen as typically in capitalist society according to Marxist theory are the
capitalist who is forced by economic structures to act in a way that guarantees the endless process of
1
In translating Marx to English, the German word Charaktermaske was not translated directly, so there is no English term for it in
the English editions of Marx’s writings. But if you look up the parts where Marx used the term in the English editions, it is also clear
what he meant by this term. E.g.: “No matter, then, what we may think of the parts played by the different classes of people
themselves in this society, the social relations between individuals in the performance of their labour, appear at all events as their
own mutual personal relations, and are not disguised under the shape of social relations between the products of labour” (Marx
1867: 91f). Or: “In the course of our investigation we shall find, in general, that the characters who appear on the economic stage are
but the personifications of the economic relations that exist between them” (Marx 1867: 100).
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capital accumulation and self-expansion of capital as well as the workers who are forced to sell the only
commodity they have–their working power–on the labour market in order to survive.
If the theoretical problem of relating being and consciousness is solely approached in a structuralist
manner, the dialectical relationship of society and the individual is not sufficiently considered. Individual
actions and consciousness are not only being structured by society, they are also a basis for social
change that comes about by individuals socially relating their actions and thinking. Orthodox structuralism
today seems to be a mechanistic method for solving the problem of how being and consciousness are
related.
A third way of approaching the micro-macro relationship of consciousness is in the tradition of what is
labelled “interactive dualism.” Unlike the mainstream of mind-body philosophy, Popper draws a distinction
between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge (Popper 1972). He considers subjective
knowledge to be that which exists in each of us, and is related to the individual person and his/her
particular experiences and intellectual abilities. Objective knowledge, on the other hand, means to Popper
knowledge on a super-personal level, which is still developed from an individual’s background, but then
acquires an independent existence and exists separately from the person. It develops further and then
turns the tables, dictating the nature of the personal knowledge from which it arose. Understanding means
nothing more than adopting super-personal knowledge for oneself, or taking down wisdom from a higher
level for one’s own use. Popper never tired of saying that objective knowledge has a characteristic that
subjective knowledge lacks: in his view, a new theoretical discovery trails a whole tail of related problems
behind it, which only gradually become apparent to us, and which we may never fully appreciate.
Popper’s objective knowledge belongs to World 3, and his subjective knowledge to World 2 of his three-
world conception. The physical constituents make up World 1. Worlds 1 and 3 are connected only via
World 2. Popper noted an upward causation and a downward causation, thus creating both an
evolutionary theory and a layer theory. With the help of upward causation, the creation of the world can be
imagined genetically, as the world of physical objects, including living organisms (World 1), which brought
about the world of sentience and self-awareness, as well as that of the awareness of death (World 2),
which in turn led to the world of the products of human thought: language, artefacts, science and
technology (World 3). These worlds are built up as layers, one on top of the other, marked by downward
causation.
However, the question may be asked as to whether the cosmos can be divided into the three parts
Popper envisaged; apart from this, the inconsistency between World 3 as a human creation and World 3
as the permanent home of the intelligibilia, cannot be overlooked. An analogous inconsistency holds for
the relation between Worlds 1 and 2. As a result of this inconsistency, he does not offer any resistance to
the view that souls exist and that God’s work is involved in the downward causation; in fact he wrote a
book with a proponent of such a theory, the Catholic Eccles (Popper/Eccles1977). His theory thus displays
a dualistic shortfall. It differs in one aspect from traditional dualism, which postulates the separate
existence of entities, his dualism of interactionism, i.e. the possibility for the entities to mutually influence
each other.
The problem of relating thinking and being can not be solved completely by constructivist, structuralist
or dualistic approaches. A solution that takes into account both the effects that society has on the
individual and those that the individual has on society can be achieved by a dialectical and emergentist
approach that brings together the concepts of information and self-organisation.
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3.3. A Dialectical and Emergentist View
3.3.1. Individual Information
The problem of relating being and individual consciousness can be resolved dialectically by assuming
that consciousness is neither solely an individual construction nor solely a reflection of society. We argue
that cognition has an objective as well as a subjective character. On the one hand, individuals transform
society by acting consciously, on the other hand social structures influence consciousness. Contrary to
orthodox forms of Structuralist Marxism, Marx himself already stressed the dialectical relationship of being
and action/consciousness. Whereas Engels rather liked to talk about objective economic laws that
determine the course of history in a linear fashion, Marx often pointed out that society can and should be
transformed by self-conscious and critically thinking/acting subjects. On the one hand he clearly saw that
individuals are objects of the structural categories of capitalism and that their thinking is being influenced
by these structures, but on the other hand, he also stressed that these structures must be changed by
subjects who become self-conscious in order to transform society and transcend capitalism. In his Theses
on Feuerbach, Marx outlined this dialectical relationship of being and consciousness/action: “The
materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances
are changed by men .... [T]he human essence ... is the ensemble of the social relations .... The
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx 1845,
Theses on Feuerbach).
Marx summarized this dialectical relationship of structure and action, e.g. in a famous passage from
“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as
they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1852: 115).
Herbert Marcuse, just as Horkheimer and Adorno a representative of the Frankfurt School, also
conceived the relationship of being and consciousness/action dialectically. Concerning the emergence of
critical consciousness and self-conscious subjects that are able to radically transform society, he was
much more optimistic than Adorno. Like Adorno he stressed, on the one hand, that ideological
mechanisms manipulate individual consciousness (see e.g. Marcuse 1967), that control which is
exercised by society is introjected into individual consciousness, and that this results in the direct
identification of the individual with society as a whole (what he termed mimesis, see Marcuse 1967: 30).
But on the other hand he also pointed out that society, nonetheless, can be transformed by new, i.e. self-
conscious and critical individuals, in such a way that a new society emerges in which the happiness of
mankind can be achieved, in which penury and famine can be overcome, and a maximum of free time
realized by making use of modern technologies and by developing the forces of productivity in an
ecologically and socially sustaining manner. Especially the emergence of the revolutionary movements of
68 convinced Marcuse that a sustainable humanising transformation of society would be possible and that
a new subject of transformation was about to emerge (see e.g. Marcuse 1969). Although basic social
change may seem impossible today, and although the new movements of social change have been
institutionalised in many ways, there is no need to be pessimistic about the possibilities of social change.
In fact, it is necessary and realistic to remain as optimistic as Marcuse: “[The rebels of 68] have revoked
the idea of revolution from the continuum of oppression and connected it with its true dimension–the one
of liberation” (Marcuse 1969: 243). The liberation of the individual and of society is still possible, and it is
still necessary.
We think that the emergence of individual consciousness can be best explained dialectically in the
framework of a theory of self-organization and evolutionary systems. A yet-to-be-developed Unified
Theory of Information (see e.g. Fenzl/Hofkirchner/Stockinger 1998, Hofkirchner 1999b) that is based on
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the theory of self-organisation seems to be able to explain the emergence of individual and social
information in a dialectical manner. We now want to point out some basic assumptions and theses that
could form initial elements of such a unified theory (for further and more detailed explanations see
Hofkirchner 2000, Fuchs 2000, 2001).
In social systems individual values, norms, conclusions, rules, opinions, ideas, and believes can be
seen as individual information. Individual information does not have a static character, it changes
dynamically. Individual opinions and values, for example, change permanently because of new
experiences. This does not mean that individual information is necessarily always unstable and that the
reflection of ideologies in individual information, for example, does not exist. Instead, new experiences
enhance and consolidate existing opinions, but they can also radically change them. Hence it can be said
that individual information as a lower level of information in social systems has an unstable character.
When we reach higher levels (as we will see in the case of social information that is constituted in social
relationships), the complexity as well as the stability of the information increases. The higher level
phenomenon plays the role of the order parameter vis-à-vis the lower level phenomenon. The constitution
and differentiation of individual information can be described as follows (see Figure 6 as well as
Hofkirchner 1999a):
Fig. 6.: The generation and differentiation of individual information (see Hofkirchner 1999a)
Cognition is always bound up with the outside world, a subject relates itself to events and states of its
environment. The informational happening can be described as layered; levels of higher and lower quality
can be distinguished. A transformation of information from lower to higher levels takes place. The
generation of individual information starts with the reception of signals from the environment. The update
of the signals starts with a particular state of experience of the cognitive system. Receiving applies to the
uptake of signals which come from the perceivable environment. Conceiving is dedicated to the
registration and bringing together of the signals to a “view” of some aspects of the environment.
Perception unites conception and reception: it is an unceasing movement, an oscillation between
reception and conception. An act of perception involves the reception of signals and the conception of
impressions, i.e. a new whole that is called data. Perception is a process that reflects and potentially
changes the current cognitive structure. The emerging structure is the starting point of the next
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perception. The whole can acquire a new emerging quality which the previous one did not have. Thus, on
the first level, signals are made into data by perception, an act that involves reception and conception.
On the next level, the data is interpreted; meaning is given to the data. Thus knowledge is formed. The
process of interpretation involves the interplay of projection and introjection. It starts with a certain state of
interpretation/knowledge, which is the basis for the emergence of new knowledge. Projection means that
first the system projects its cognitive structures onto reality, i.e. the current state of knowledge is applied to
the data. Introjection means that the data can be interpreted in such a way that the structure of knowledge
changes–new knowledge emerges. The system has introjected reality into its structure. New areas of
reality, new experiences have been brought into the system. As on the first level reception and
conception, there are two opposing processes: projection and introjection. They form part of the motor of
the endless movement of cognition.
Here the question raises itself whether knowledge is constructed relatively autonomously from the
environment in order that data as perceived signals from the outside can only perturbate but never
determine changes in the cognitive knowledge-structure or whether knowledge as a representation
corresponds to the environment of the cognitive system. It can be said that the environment can never
determine cognition entirely, knowledge, is, however, also not wholly autonomously constructed without
reference to the environment. Arguing dialectically, we can say that reflection and construction require and
contradict each other. The formation of knowledge as the interpretation of data involves projection as an
element of construction as it does introjection as an element of reflection. Knowledge as the result of
interpreted data can be seen as the level which involves experiences and facts.
On the third level, knowledge is evaluated and sense is made of it. Individual information such as
values, norms, rules, opinions, ideas, and believes is created by the fact that the subject puts its
knowledge into the context of its goals. This action is seen as evaluation, which is made up of the
elements of description and prescription. The process starts with the current state of individual information
in a particular situation where an individual must act in order to solve a problem. Description means that
on the basis of the current individual information structure the individual is looking for solutions. The
situation and the solutions refer to the knowledge at the lower level, which represents facts and laws. In
the prescriptive phase a decision is made about the implementation of a solution. A solution considered
good, beautiful, and just is selected. At this upper level the process of cognition cumulates to practical
wisdom which is seen as individual information that allows an individual to create situations that he/she
experiences as good, beautiful, and just. The existence of individual wisdom does not necessarily mean
that the decisions taken by individuals are socially wise ones.
When problems are solved by evaluating knowledge, and by acting on the basis of experience, facts
(knowledge) and the current individual information in order to select a good solution to a problem, new
individual information may emerge. This is neither a necessity nor an impossibility. It is impossible that we
act and try to find solutions without enhancing and changing our individual values and norms. In fact, this
is the case in most of our actions. In such a case individual information remains unchanged. But in other
situations it might be different, new individual values, norms, rules, opinions, or believes emerge on the
basis of new experiences when we perceive signals from the environment as data, interpret the data as
knowledge and establish new individual values, norms, opinions, and believes by acting and making
decisions on the basis of knowledge and the current individual information structure.
The signals on the lowest level can refer to trivial objects in our daily life such as a flower, but the object
of reference can also be social information which is constituted in social relationships. This establishes a
relationship between individual and social information. When a sign is considered to be the product of an
information process, data, knowledge, and wisdom can be regarded as the three types of interrelated
signs that appear in the process of formation and differentiation of individual information.
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3.3.2. Social Information
We have to distinguish between different levels of self-organisation, i.e. self-organisation has aspects
that are common to all types of systems as well as aspects that are particular to each concrete type of
system. So self-organisation is related to a dialectic of difference and identity.
In physicochemical systems, self-organisation means the spontaneous emergence of order in a system
that is far from its thermal equilibrium. If a certain threshold of a specific control parameter is crossed,
fluctuations intensify and order emerges. The Bénard convection-cells are an example. This process of
self-organisation in physicochemical systems is based upon dissipation because low-entropic energy is
imported from the environment of the system and high-entropic energy is exported from the system. This
enables the system to gain order, energy carrying high entropy is dissipated.
In living systems, self-organisation refers to the autopoiesis of such systems. That is, they can maintain
themselves by reproducing their parts and hence the unity of the system permanently. An autopoietic
system can maintain and reproduce itself and it can set up its own borders. All living systems are
autopoietic ones. Autopoiesis functions on the basis of dissipation.
In a social system, self-organisation refers to the so-called re-creation of such a system. Re-creation
means that social systems do not only have the capacity to modify themselves (as dissipative systems do)
and to maintain themselves (as autopoietic systems do), but they also have the capacity to re-invent
themselves, to shape themselves, to produce a specific character by which the individuals that are parts of
a social system can strive to realize themselves in a more or less self-determined way.
A sign, then, can be seen as the product of an information process. An information process occurs
whenever a system organises itself, that is, whenever a novel system emerges or a qualitative novelty
emerges in the structure, state, or behaviour of a given system. In such a case information is produced. It
is embodied in the system and it may then be called a sign.
Pattern formation in dissipative systems is the most rudimentary way to form signs. A stimulus from the
system’s environment is reflected by its activity and a pattern is formed. This can be seen as the
production of signs on a protosemiotic level. In autopoietic or living systems, responses are no longer
simple patterns. Instead they become something with the attribute of an activity-oriented meaning for the
system in question. This something shall be called a proxy. Thus sign production at this stage of evolution
turns from pattern formation to the formation of proxies, that is, as far as cognition is concerned,
sensations and motivations. On this level of self-organisation, the information that emerges has para-
syntactic as well as para-semantic pragmatic aspects. In re-creative, i.e. social, systems which have the
capacity to transcend themselves signs appear as, so to say, “not-yets”. On this level self-organisation
produces not only individual information as cognition with full-fledged threefold semiotic dimensions but
also what can be termed social information of which individual information is part of: The word "social" in
the term social information denotes that such a form of information is constituted in the course of social
relationships between several individuals. According to Max Weber a social relationship is established if
an interrelated reference exists between two actors. Social acting is orientated around meaningful actions
of other actors. Social actions are a necessary condition of a social relationship, but not a sufficient one
because social acting doesn't necessarily require the actors to mutually refer to each others actions: One
actor can refer to the actions of another without the latter referring to those of the first.
We consider the scientific-technological infrastructure, the system of life-support elements in the natural
environment and all else that makes sense in a society, i.e. economic dispositions, political decisions, and
the body of cultural definitions like norms and values, laws and rules (the latter do not need to be codified,
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they can also be established in the form of traditions or habits) to be social information. All of them are
constituted in the course of social actions. Individuals must have a common view of reality which is the
basis for their social interactions and social actions. They are elements of a social system. As a result of
their interactions in social systems, social information emerges as a macroscopic structure. Acts of co-
operation are mediated by acts of communication which, in turn, are mediated by acts of cognition.
Individuals act in such a way that they trigger associations and actions of other individuals. Individuals co-
ordinate their actions in such a manner that they produce a common social information structure.
Fig. 7: The generation and differentiation of social information, part I
At a first glance (see Figure 7), you can distinguish three main spheres that form the layers of
hierarchical social systems: the technosphere is dominated by the ecosphere and the ecosphere by the
sociosphere. The technosphere is the sphere in which human beings are active in innovating and applying
scientific-technological tools in the course of social life. An infrastructure of tools, methods and capabilities
which comprise the overall forces of the socially living humans is the base of re-creative systems and at
the same time the simplest quality of social information. The ecosphere is the sphere in which human
beings work, in other words, where they use their tools, methods and capabilities to adapt nature to
themselves in order to survive and construct an umwelt, where they objectify
the life-support conditions of
nature and appropriate nature to assure them of life support. The natural environment in its character of
providing life support is another product of re-creative systems and another quality of social information.
The sociosphere as a whole is the sphere in which human beings perform social actions. Here they
constitute what makes sense to them and realize it. Sense is then another of the higher qualities brought
forth by the re-creation of social systems and social information. In fact, it is the result that constitutes the
differentia specifica to nonhuman biotic, simple autopoietic systems.
Upon closer scrutiny, the constitution and realization of sense can be differentiated further. Usually
economy, politics and culture are the realms in which sense is produced by social actions.
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In his theory of structuration, Anthony Giddens (1997) describes rules and resources as structures that
are both medium and result of social actions (Giddens 1997: 77). He further distinguishes between
allocative and authoritative resources. The former relate to abilities that make the domination over objects,
goods and material phenomena possible. The latter concern the generation of domination over individuals
and actors (p. 86). Concerning the institutions of society, Giddens says that symbolic orders, forms of
discourse, and legal institutions are concerned with the constitution of rules, political institutions deal with
authoritative resources and economic institutions are concerned with allocative resources.
Today power is distributed asymmetrically in the areas of economy, politics and culture, but a wise
society that would be socially, ecologically and technologically sustainable would have to progress
towards a symmetrical distribution of power. Domination in contrast to power can not be distributed, but it
can be overcome.
Our own model of society makes use of Giddens´s distinctions. It is a general one that does not only
cover modern capitalist societies and tries to avoid a naturalisation of relationships of
domination/exploitation/class. Hence it should have a dialectical character: On one level it must be general
enough in order to explain all possible types of societies, on the other there must be specific levels and
concretizations that help to explain specific formations of society (such as capitalism) and different phases
of these formations.
The model outlined here is a general one. It is possible to go one step further in order to describe our
modern society as a capitalist one. On a third level, concrete modes of development can be distinguished
which describe the different phases of capitalism that we have been experiencing. Currently we live in a
post-fordist, neo-liberal and info-societal mode of development of capitalism (see Fuchs 2001).
Fig. 8: The generation and differentiation of social information, part II
In short, in all social systems there are three manifestations of information (see Figure 8): dispositions
over resources, decisions on life conditions that form regularities of the living together and definitions of
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rules like norms/values. They store information about past social actions and simplify future social
situations because by referring to social information the basics of acting socially do not have to be formed
in every situation of this kind. Social information serves as a durable foundation for social actions, even
though it changes dynamically.
It can be found in all subsystems of society–economy, politics and culture.
Economy deals with the production, distribution and allocation of use values and resources. The basics
of each economic process are formed by productive forces which combine the living labour force system,
that is, physical ability, qualification, knowledge, abilities, experience, as well as technology, science,
amount and efficacy of the means of production, and organisational factors, with natural ones that are due
to the umwelt. The disposition of resources which appear as property relations can be seen as social
information on the economic level. Economy means a dual process of production and allocation. Material
resources that are vital to society are produced by making use of the system of productive forces. On the
other hand, resources are utilised in order to ensure the preservation of the members of society in a
process of allocation of economic goods.
Production and reproduction can be seen as the material basis of each type of society. Such a
materialist view is not a reductive one if one considers that though the political and cultural
superstructures depend on economic processes they work nevertheless in relative autonomous ways and
influence economy in processes of downward causation as well. All of them are dialectically related
because economic influences on politics and culture can cause the emergence of new political and
cultural phenomena, and cultural and political influences on economy can cause the emergence of new
economic phenomena.
Politics deals with decisions which refer to the way life conditions are set (including how economic
resources are being used and how they are distributed). The decisions that are being reached in a social
and communicative way in the area of politics turn out to be just another type of social information. Politics
encompasses a dual process of decision-making and authorisation of actions: Decisions are made on the
basis of available resources in order to assure the functioning of society. These decisions either take on
coded or non-coded forms. Once a decision is reached the next step is to execute it. And executing
decisions always means that members of the society are authorised to act in a particular manner.
Culture can be seen as the subsystem of society in which ideas, views, social norms, and social values
are defined within the framework of habits, ways of life, traditions, and social practice. The emerging social
rules are a type of social information that comes into existence in the area of culture. Culture
encompasses a dual process of defining the rules and being legitimised by observing the rules. On the
one hand social norms, values, ethics and morals are constituted and differentiated in relation to decisions
already reached. On the other hand, social norms legitimise acts of the members of society. The type of
participation determines if at all, how, and to which degree individual actors and social groups can
influence rule definitions which affect them.
Neither culture, nor politics are fully determined by economic processes. Each subsystem enjoys
relative autonomy, nonetheless, in modern capitalist societies economic processes dominate. In the area
of culture we follow among others the view that stands in the tradition of the Cultural Materialism of
Raymond Williams (1961), which has had tremendous influence on the whole area of Cultural Studies.
Williams argues that culture includes the “whole way of life” (Williams 1961: 122), including collective
ideas, institutions, descriptions by which society reflects experiences and makes sense of them, and ways
and traditions of acting and thinking, and intentions that result from it. Williams further stresses that culture
involves the formation of values as social categories. Edward P. Thompson took up Williams’ theory of
culture and added the idea that the whole way of life and experience is influenced by class struggles and
social conflicts.
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Williams and Thompson argued that culture is neither independent from political and economic
processes, nor can it be reduced to these areas. Already Antonio Gramsci stressed that superstructures
cannot be reduced to the economic base (Gramsci 1930/31a) and that culture involves the “creation of
(new) world-outlooks” (Gramsci 1930/31b) and morals of life (Gramsci 1934). Materialistic theory that
deals with culture has always stressed cultural information, its relative autonomy and its relationship to
socio-economic processes, only vulgar forms of materialism reduce culture or politics to economics.
Culture as the top level in our hierarchy depends upon economy and politics, it forms the integral whole of
social life that includes the areas and ways of life that we find in ideational and material reproduction
(Marcuse 1937: 62). Political and economic institutions and relationships have their own form of culture.
Although it has a certain degree of autonomy, culture can only be thought of in connection with political
and economic processes. The complex interplay of culture and politics is the area where hegemony–as a
specific phenomenon of societies that are constituted by relationships of domination–is formed.
Figure 8 shows the processes of constitution and differentiation of social information. These processes
form an integrated whole which encompasses the three subsystems of society (economics, politics and
culture) and the manifestations of social information in these areas. Dispositions over resources can also
be termed economic information, decisions on the societal circumstances of life may be seen as political
information and definitions of the rules of living together as cultural information. Together we refer to them
as social information. The productive forces (umwelt alias natural environment and the forces of the
scientific-technological infrastructure) form the base for the emergence of economic information which
itself forms the base for the emergence of political and cultural information. The whole social system
encompasses three cycles of self-organisation which result in the emergence of social information on an
economic, a political as well as a cultural level. On the one hand, economic information influences the
emergence of political and cultural information and political information influences the emergence of
cultural information in processes of bottom-up-emergence. On the other hand, cultural information
influences the emergence of political and economical information and political information influences the
emergence of economical information in processes of top-down-emergence. Nonetheless, economics and
economical information form the base of every type of society.
Social co-operation can be seen as a social relationship in which the mutual references of the involved
individuals (these are social interactions) enable all of them to benefit from the situation. By co-operating
individuals can reach goals they would not be able to reach alone. New qualities of a social system can
emerge by social co-operation. The elements/individuals of this system are conscious of these structures
which can not be ascribed to single elements, but apply to the social whole which relates the individuals to
each other. Such qualities are constituted in a collective process by all concerned individuals and are
emergent qualities of social systems.
Social competition can be seen as a social relationship in which the social interactions as well as the
relationships of domination enable some individuals or parts of society to take advantage of others. The
first benefit at the expense of the latter, who have to deal with the disadvantages of the situation. New
qualities of an observed social system can emerge through social competition. But these qualities are not
constituted collectively by all concerned individuals, they are constituted by parts of society that dominate
others, or can make use of advantages that derive from higher positions in existing social hierarchies.
Thus, social information can have a co-operative or a competitive character. This depends on the way it
is constituted. If social information is established by mutual references of all individuals who are
concerned by its application and if each involved individual has the same possibilities and means of
influencing the resulting information structures in his/her own sense and interest, the resulting
macroscopic structure is a form of co-operative social information. This type of information is collectively
established by the co-operation of the concerned actors involved as an emergent quality of a social
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system in the process of self-organisation. We call this form of social information inclusive social
information. Here self-organisation denotes that the individuals concerned by the emerging structures
alone design the occurrence, form, course, and result of this process. They establish macroscopic
structures via microscopic interrelations.
If social information is not constituted in processes of co-operation by all concerned individuals, but by a
group of members of the relevant social system that dominates others, or can make use of advantages
that derive from higher positions in existing social hierarchies, the resulting structures possess qualities
that result from social competition–we speak here of exclusive social information. Exclusive social
information is a new, emergent quality of a social system. It is constituted by social competition and
reflects relationships of domination and the asymmetric distribution of property, power and influence. We
can not say that exclusive social information is established in a process of social self-organisation
because not all concerned individuals can participate in this process and influence it in the same way and
access equally distributed resources and means.
Considering dissipative systems, self-organisation can be seen as the spontaneous emergence of
patterns from the interactions of the system’s elements if a certain threshold of relevant parameters is
crossed. We argue in favour of emergent evolution which can make plausible new qualities of systems
that emerge during the course of evolution and can not be reduced to lower levels of
organisation/systems. Hence social systems are more complex than simple dissipative and simple
autopoietic ones and self-organisation can not have exactly the same meaning as in less complex
systems. In the course of the evolution of systems the complexity of the systems increases and new
qualities of self-organisation emerge. These qualities have some similarities with the old meanings in less
complex systems as well as new aspects. Hence on lower organisational levels we have a broader
meaning of self-organisation. On upper levels this meaning is getting more and more specific because
complexity increases. Therefore we argue in favour of an understanding of social self-organisation that not
only considers the relationships of elements, but also looks at the qualities of these relationships. Thus
class relationships as well as relationships of power and hegemony have to be considered.
A hierarchy is made up by a sequence which is ordered by the priority function. Individuals who are
located at upper positions of a hierarchy have more capabilities of disposal over resources, of decision on
societal matters and of definition of rules than individuals on lower levels. Hierarchies in society are
characterised by the asymmetric distribution of capabilities. In our capitalist societies, scientific-
technological, ecological, economical, political and cultural information are formed in exclusive and
asymmetrical ways. The scientific-technological development embodies interests of domination. The
degradation of the natural environment is due to the short-sightedness of not taking into account the
interests of all contemporary and future generations. Resources are owned and controlled by privileged
and dominating classes. Value is being produced by dependent classes and groups which have no or
minimal control over the productive forces, the means of production and material resources. In our
western society which is politically formed by the model of representative democracy, the asymmetric
distribution of power prevails. Last, not least there is an uneven access to the means of influence in
cultural terms resulting in the hegemony of ruling classes.
Capitalist societies hence must be seen as class societies which are made possible by the exclusive
control of social information. In capitalism, social information has an exclusive character and so we have
to speak of exclusive economical, political and cultural information which is formed in a way that can not
be considered self-organising in the full sense of the word.
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social
information
individual
information
Fig. 9: Self-organisation in social systems: The dialectical relationship of individual and social information
Considering the relationship between individual and social information on the basis of self-organising
processes, it can be said that by relating actions and hence individual consciousness of subjects socially,
social information emerges. Social information can be seen as a type of social consciousness that
emerges from the social relations of the individual consciousness of participating subjects in a social
situation. A social system organises itself permanently in order to maintain and transcend itself and it
permanently produces and changes social information. As shown in Figure 9 this is a dialectical process:
Social information emerges from individual information. The subjects of society create and change social
systems by relating their actions and hence their consciousness. New patterns emerge from this process.
On the other hand we have a process of dominance: Individual consciousness can only exist under the
umbrella of social processes and social information. Social information constrains and enables individual
consciousness and action. In this dialectical relationship of individual and social information, we have the
bottom-up-emergence of social information and the top-down-emergence of individual information. On the
macroscopic level of the social system, new social information can emerge during the permanent self-
organisation/re-creation of the system. On the microscopic level, social information makes an effect in a
process of dominance and new individual information can emerge. So dominance can be seen as a type
of top-down-emergence. The endless movement of individual and social information, i.e. the permanent
emergence of new information in the system, is a two-fold dialectical process of self-organisation that is
inherent to social system.
As already mentioned the signals as the starting point in the constitution and differentiation of individual
information do not solely refer to objects of our environment, they also refer to social information. This is
the way of establishing a relationship between individual and social information.
If cognition were solely determined by reflection, the exclusive social information we find in our society
today would almost necessarily be reflected as individual information by everyone. But in fact almost
nobody agrees with all the laws and political decisions. Everyone has a dynamically changing structure of
individual information. But individual information often reflects the dominant conditions, norms, rules,
habits and values of society. This reflection is established in processes of socialisation. Individuals are
confronted with manipulation and disinformation by economy, politics, media, ideologies, and in personal
relations. Because of the existing exclusions, the economically dominant classes control the channels
which mediate information. Nonetheless the establishment of and the access to alternative channels
which distribute underrepresented information is possible if individuals experience alternative forms of
socialisation. But these individuals are confronted with the asymmetric distribution of power in society.
Alternative channels and alternative socialisation can trigger the constitution of individual information that
does not reflect the dominating exclusive social information.
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The epistemological aspect of information in social systems can be seen as the dialectical relationship
between reflection and construction. Both are aspects of cognition. In the society we live in, the reflection
of social conditions in our individual structure of cognition dominates the construction of the individual self.
But such domination can never have a wholly determining character. Today, individual information can not
be established in a self-conscious manner because diverse mechanisms of manipulation exist which
estrange and restrict the self. This means that repressive forms of social information that are exclusive in
character and form an integral part of modern society dominate the self-conscious construction of
individual information. The relationship of individual and social information surely is a dialectical one. But it
can be said that in our modern society exclusive social information dominates information that is inclusive
and mechanisms of social manipulation dominate the self-conscious construction of individual information.
Hence in analysing the relationship of being and consciousness, structuralist approaches like the ones of
Adorno or Marcuse seem to be more realistic than constructivist ones. Nonetheless it is important to
stress that today social structures though dominating self-consciousness, do not determine them, and that
consciousness can not be constructed autonomously or outside social structures. If these assumptions
are not made, one either does not leave room for the possibility of transforming society basically (as is the
case with orthodox structuralism) or one does not consider that society and individuality should be
changed (as constructivism does).
If we again take a look at figure 9 which shows the dialectical process of re-creation in social systems, it
can be seen that in modern society the structuralist aspect of this two-fold process, i.e. the constraining of
individual information by social information, dominates the options of individuals to participate in the
bottom-up-process of establishing social information. In our society, the process of creation and
differentiation of social information is dominated by ruling classes and elites. This is a process that
excludes the majority of the individuals that are affected by social information. This majority participates
only in a rudimentary way in the bottom-up-process, but nonetheless its actions and thinking are greatly
restricted by the emerging exclusive social information.
Relating being and consciousness dialectically involves an emergent approach that on the one hand
considers that society emerges from the social relationships of individuals who relate their individual social
information-structures in order to establish or differentiate social information. This is a bottom-up process
in which social information emerges from individual information. On the other hand social information
transforms individual information in a top-down-process. It both constrains and enables individual
performance and thinking. So new individual information can only emerge in relationship to social
information. The important question is if this relationship of individual and social information is socially
designed in an inclusive or an exclusive manner. And this is clearly dependent upon social, political and
economical relationships. In modern capitalist society, social information has an exclusive character and
negative constraints on individual consciousness, information and action. It is important to stress that such
a dialectical concept of relating society to individuality involves two types of emergent processes: The
bottom-up-emergence of social information and the top-down-emergence of individual information.
Thus far we have not been able to dispose of diverse manipulations in society, which trigger the
domination of social competition and exclusive social information, in order to become self-determining,
autonomous and altruistic individuals that alone can choose and differentiate their individual and social
information. As Marcuse pointed out, a society that allows individuality to flourish freely can only be
established by self-organising individuals (in the political sense): “The individuals who shall live in the
Great Society must be the ones who build it up–they must be free for it, before they can be free in it. No
other power can impose or force their society upon them” (Marcuse 1966: 187).
Individual and collective interests could be compatible without interfering with each other. Egoism is not
a "natural" pattern of behaviour given at birth or encoded in the genes; rather it is brought forth by
processes of socialisation in a system dominated by competition and exclusive social information.
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Individual information and social information could both possess the character of freedom because social
information would emerge as a quality of social co-operation in a process of self-organisation from
individual information. The emergence of individual information would be made possible by inclusive social
information. Nonetheless, individual information would still change dynamically with new social
experiences.
The world-system we live in is in a major crisis. This crisis surely has technological, ecological,
economic, political and cultural causes. Global problems have become a major threat to humanity. We are
at a social and a historic crossroads today: The future development of society is not pre-determined, but if
the path of evolution does not change fundamentally, the end of mankind and the breakdown of our world
system could occur in the decades to come. But mankind has not been abandoned to some kind of pre-
determined fate, because there are alternative evolutionary developments.
Immanuel Wallerstein also points out that this crisis can be seen as a crossroads of the historical
development of society: “...this structural crisis leads us into a dark period of struggle over what kind of
system will succeed the existing one. We can think of this as a bifurcation, and therefore the beginning of
a chaotic period, within which no one can predict the outcome, which is inherently indeterminate. There
will be a new structure, a new order, but it may be either better or worse than the existing one. It depends
on what we all do in the period of acute struggle and how clearly we understand the forces at work”
(Wallerstein 1999b; see also Wallerstein 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999a, 2000; Hopkins/Wallerstein 1996).
One of the factors responsible for the major crisis of the world system is the antagonism of co-operation
and competition, which is characteristic of modern/capitalist society. Competitive processes and the logic
of commodities dominate inclusive and co-operative social relationships. Social information today is
predominantly an exclusive one. A way out of the crisis that points to a qualitatively new evolutionary path
and is socially, ecologically and technologically sustainable could be established by the real self-
organisation of the individuals that are confronted by the negative effects of global problems. The
breakdown of the world system would mean the destruction of society’s permanent re-creation-process. In
order to maintain the re-creation of society, people who are excluded from the bottom-up-process, which
establishes social information, and who are exploited in order to maintain the exclusive character of
society would have to organise themselves, in the political sense of the term. A change of dominance is
necessary in order to solve our global problems and to save humanity from self-destruction: The
dominance of co-operation by competition, of inclusive social information by exclusive social information
has to be reversed. If this can be done, a just, good and beautiful society may be established that
managed to dispose of its global problems. The principles of such a society would be true social self-
organisation and they would include social information.
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