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described by Zlotina as “polysemantic (ambiguous) determinism”. Hence creation is shown to be the
process of dialectical freedom / necessity contradiction being solved: creation is free activity regulated by
objective laws. The freedom of creation therefore opposes not inner determinism (owing to which creative
work can be carried out as an activity) but outer regulations: the freedom of creation is in fact “the freedom
from anything incompatible with objective determinants of the creative process” (Zlotina 1987: 99).
Thus, creation cannot objectively exist without any standards, although, Zlotina remarks, separate
activity act (but not its methodological reflection) can assume individual forms of both extremes, activity by
standards and activity by arbitrariness, and can even be theoretically reproduced in corresponding ways of
thinking – ‘dogmatism’ and ‘voluntarism’. However, as an objective process creation never ceases to unite
freedom and necessity. It is not an abstract, but a concrete necessity that becomes actual, being
determined by essence of the object, its activity, and conditions of its development. Criteria of creation, as
stressed by Zlotina, cannot be abstract, they are always concrete: the new as a result of creation is a new
that belongs to a sphere of quite concrete essence. Thus, scientific creation must remain within the limits
of the scientific, artistic – within the limits of the artistic, etc., otherwise the new created would not be
considered by us as new at all.
The knowledge also appears as theoretical process, as reflection of actuality, as a subjective way of
solving the subject-object contradiction. In the course of the knowledge process universal methodological
development laws are being reflected in the cognitive abilities of subject. That is, for Zlotina, “Being
determined by laws of an object, cognition as the process of interaction of subject and object reproduces
these laws in its own motion in accordance with subject’s peculiar properties and finally reflects these laws
as objective laws of real actuality” (Zlotina 1969: 281). Zlotina describes the general regularity of the
knowledge process as dialectical motion from appearance – to essence – and to their unity, from
experience (as living contemplation) through theory (as abstract thinking) toward practice.
Perceptive, rational and practical are the three ‘stages’ of cognition, according to Zlotina, and that’s the
distinctive feature of her dialectical system, for traditionally in Soviet philosophy practice was opposed to
knowledge, and the latter was limited to two stages – empirical and theoretical. However, Zlotina
demonstrates that practice is not only ‘the third phase’ but also the ground of the knowledge process, its
‘beginning’ (as empirical experience) and its ‘end’ (as experience passes through its transformation into
theory’s other-being, as spiritual reproduction of experience, and reaches the level of deliberate realization
of theory). Experience is perceptive material activity; its result is reflection as perceptive concrete image of
object. Theory is a process and a result of spiritual transformation of object reflected in the notion as
theoretical image. Practice is “a process of objectification of theoretical knowledge that also gives a
practically reproducible ‘image’ of an object” (ibid.: 284). The motion of object’s image reproduced in the
knowledge process is carried out from direct actuality – through ideal actuality – toward real actuality.
This logical order of stages also describes the process of cognitive relation of subject to object, and the
process of historical development of science, and the process of resolution of subject-object contradiction.
As stated by Zlotina, the motion from object – to subject – and to their unity is realized in accordance with
specificity of stressing one of indicated ‘stages’, however within each of them there is also a similar motion
taking place. Knowledge can appear only as the unity of sensation, thinking and practice, and each one of
these stages is included in the truth formation process. On the one hand, interaction of sensation, thinking
and practice is continuous cognitive process as the contradiction being resolved. On the other hand, as
discontinuous, due to predominance of one of the three moments, this motion appears in each of the three
stages in its specific form.
However here again, as it was noted earlier, the ground for the motion is practice that is also the ground
of transition from living contemplation to abstract thinking. Thus, empirical sensation while reflecting a
thing represents it as a sum of singularities. In the course of practical verification the sensation itself
discovers inconstancy of the singular. And here human knowledge, Zlotina says, grasps something that
abides, something that exists outside sensations. On the ground of this contradiction there is a leap from
sensation to thinking, from perceiving singular to perceiving general, which is mediated by practice.
© Vienna University of Technology 2004.