with objective empirical research” (pp. 13-18).
Karl Popper (2002) attributes to good theories
the functions of causal explanation and of de-
duction of predictions. Hubert Blalock (1969,
1982) argues that sociological hypotheses are
mathematical formulas and that social meas-
urements lead to explanation and prediction.
The key words in this approach are laws or
general principles, universality or causal neces-
sity, measurement or calculation of simple and
understandable cause-effect chains, and control
or manipulation of causal relations.
The conceptualization of theory as science
has been critiqued for disguising relations of
power and intentions of manipulation, and for
not welcoming a multitude of realities and a va-
riety of epistemic perspectives. For example,
philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend (1994)
professes that “interests, forces, propaganda,
and brainwashing techniques play a much
greater role than is commonly believed in the
growth of our knowledge and in the growth of
science” (p. 17). Poststructuralist philosopher
Michel Foucault (1965; 1972) declares that the
“normative” has become the “normal” and the
“disciplinary” has become the “disciplined” in the
science(s), conducive to a history of repressing
the “abnormal” and the “undisciplined.” Scien-
tists and philosophers have argued that theory
devised as science naïvely essentializes and
fails to problematize, among other things, race
(Cajete, 2000; Jackson, 2002), gender (Harding,
1986; Haraway, 1989; Subramaniam & Weasel,
2001), and sexuality (Keller, 1985; Graber,
2001; Sullivan, 2003), that it fixates white, mas-
culine, and heterosexual viewpoints as the all-
encompassing truth, and that it reduces the mul-
tiplicity and diversity of human perspectives to a
unique and uniform vision.
In spite of critiques, the conceptualization of
theory as science has remained overwhelmingly
dominant in numerous disciplines, including
communication studies. Different authors in the
field have defined theory as truth-seeking, as
“explanation (power) and prediction (precision)”
(Dance & Larson, 1976, p. 5), as “abstract
ideas” and predictable findings” (Chafee, 1996,
pp. 15-18), and as “a set of concepts and rela-
tionship statements that enables one to under-
stand, describe, explain, evaluate, predict, and
control things (phenomena)” (Cragan & Shields,
1998, p. 4). Diverse authors in the field have
cited Popper, paradoxically by quoting the first
half (“Theories are nets cast to catch what we
call ‘the world’”) and forgetting the second part
of his definition (“to rationalize, to explain, and to
master it”), as well as Kaplan, sometimes asso-
ciating his ideas with a scientist perspective, but
some other times connecting his thoughts to an
interpretivist perspective. Intentionally or acci-
dentally, these scholars reify “the orthodox con-
sensus,” an extended “model of natural science”
(see critiques by Giddens, 1989, p. 56).
The designation of theory as science in com-
munication studies was connected with the con-
figuration of theoretical concepts as laws. Berger
(1977) describes the covering law or the general
law as having the form “All X is Y” and of having
the power of predicting and demonstrating “with
100% success” an object or phenomenon (p. 8),
and states that cultural and temporal variation
are reducible and, in many cases, irrelevant (pp.
13-16). This notion, although re-evaluated and
critiqued later (for reevaluations of theoretical
concepts as laws, see Kochen, 1979; Berger,
1989; for different critiques of theoretical con-
cepts as laws, see Delia, 1977; Smith, 1988),
has left a powerful mark of the field. The de-
nomination of theory as science in the field of
communication has been linked with universal-
ity, with the characterization of theory in terms of
simplicity, testability, and intersubjectivity (also
named “heurism”), and with causality, with the
attribution of explanatory and predictive roles to
theory.
It is notable that at least some of the charac-
teristics of theory as formulated by this approach
have been appropriated by a number of dispa-
rate scholars, not all found in association with a
communication as science perspective: Berger
and Chaffee (1987) characterize theory by ex-
planatory power (plausibility), predictive power
(probability), parsimony (simplicity), falsiability
(testability), internal consistency (coherence),
heuristic provocativeness (acceptability), and
organizing power (innovation) (p. 104); Infante,
Rancer, and Womack (2003) characterize theory
as simple (easy to understand), parsimonious
(simple in structure), consistent with related
theories (acceptable by a scholarly community in
terms of premises), interpretable (acceptable by
a scholarly community in terms of conclusions),