
tripleC 7(2): 202-207, 2009 203
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
with those ideas that are commonplaces to
every version of Situation Theory and every
version of Channel Theory.
What does it mean that some things carry
information about each another? We know
that fire causes smoke; this (causal) regularity
or constraint supports in some way the fact
that every piece of smoke carries the
information that there is a fire; however, and
this is the controversial point, the semantic
relation denoted by “carries the information
that” is usually thought of as different from the
nomic relation denoted by “causes”. In other
words, we figure out and speak of the world
as if there were information flow out there;
furthermore, this information flow is taken as
something that rests on regularities, although
it is not a regularity by itself. The main
problem is how to achieve a good explanation
for information on the basis of regularities.
We are going to work out an indirect notion
of information guided by the use of language.
In which sense? The nature of information is
not given by English language, of course, but
we can substitute the abstract notion of
information by a more concrete notion with the
help this language. The key is to identify
typical reports describing what we are
interested in, and then to define our topic as
the reference of those reports. Let us start. By
an “information transfer” I suggest to
understand hereafer anything whose typical
linguistic expression is
X carries the information that Y (1a)
or some other variant close enough to this
one. We will say in the sequel that X is the
“source” and Y is the “target” of the transfer.
At the linguistic level, statements like (1a) are
called “information reports” after Israel and
Perry (1990). Typical examples of information
transfers are: dark clouds in the sky bear the
information that it is going to rain nearby, the
open door of my house carries the information
that someone is in there, your smiling brings
the information that you are happy, a jacket in
my brother's wardrove means that my brother
owns the jacket, and so on. Of course, there
are also more complex information
phenomena; to put an example, the word
“open” on the door of a shop indicates that we
can enter the shop, though this permission is
not something we can easily recognize as a
state of affairs. For convenience, we consider
in this paper only those information transfers
in which both X and Y are state of affairs we
can easily describe in terms of “item s in of
the type T”. In the previous example, it is far
from clear whether the item is a concrete
person, any person, all the persons, the
situation itself, the relation of a person with
respect to the shop, etc.
In ordinary language, while keeping the
term “information” playing the role of a direct
object, we can distinguish two groups of
expressions reductible to (1a). Firstly, there
are those expressions whose main verb is
static, in the sense that doesn't refer to
change, and indicates possession: X conveys
the information that Y, X supports the
information that Y, X has the information that
Y, X gives you the information that Y, etc.
Secondly, there are those expressions whose
main verb is dynamic and indicates
transportation: X bears the information that Y,
X brings the information that Y, X transports
the information that Y, etc. This distinction is
admittedly not very sharp in everyday
conversations; nevertheless, it will become
quite useful for philosophical analysis.
Further, there are expressions akin to (1a)
without the term “information”: X informs that
Y, X reports that Y, X means that Y, X
involves Y, or X implies Y.
There is the habit of assuming X and Y to
be of different nature. It is frequently accepted
that X stands for something physical, the so-
called “signal”, whereas Y stands for
something either mental or abstract, the so-
called “information content of the signal”. For
some reason, schema (1a) is assimilated to
the schema of propositional attitudes: A
believes that p, A sees (that) p, A truthfully
asserts that p, A remembers that p, A wonder
wether p, and so on. This is the case for
instance in Israel and Perry (1990), a brief
article whose influence can be traced until
important monographs like Pérez (2000) or
Floridi (2004). But is this the only way for an
understanding of the above schema? We
would like to show that the similarity between
(1a) and propositional attitudes is misleading,
hence a potential source of pseudo-problems.
By saying or writing first X, then a verb, and
then Y preceded by the word “information”, it